American University Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4

Article 3

2005

2004 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit
Steven C. Cherny
David A. Nelson
Kenneth G. Schuler
Peter N. Witty
Sasha Mayergoyz
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cherny, Steven C., David A. Nelson, Kenneth G. Schuler Peter N. Witty, Sasha Mayergoyz and Amanda J. Hollis. "2004 Patent Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit." American University Law Review 54, no.4 (2005): 941-1162.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

2004 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit
Authors

Steven C. Cherny, David A. Nelson, Kenneth G. Schuler, Peter N. Witty, Sasha Mayergoyz, and Amanda J.
Hollis

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol54/iss4/3

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AREA SUMMARIES
2004 PATENT LAW DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
STEVEN C. CHERNY*
A. NELSON**
SCHULER***
WITTY****

DAVID
KENNETH G.
PETER N.
SASHA
MAYERGOYZ*****
AMANDA J. HOLLIS******

*

B.S.M.E. 1987, M.I.T.; J.D. 1991, University of Chicago. Mr. Cherny is global cochair of the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Latham & Watkins LLP.
**
B.S.E.E. 1987, Stanford University; J.D. 1992, Northwestern University School of
Law. Mr. Nelson is global co-chair of the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Latham &
Watkins LLP.
***
B.A. 1990, University of Northern Iowa; J.D. 1993, University of Michigan Law
School. Mr. Schuler is the Deputy Chair of the Chicago Office Litigation Group at Latham
& Watkins LLP.
****
B.S. Aerospace Engineering 1989, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1997, The Notre
Dame Law School. Mr. Witty is an associate in the litigation department of Latham &
Watkins LLP.
*****
B.S.E.E. 1996, Cornell University; J.D. 1999, Northwestern University School of
Law. Mr. Mayergoyz served as a law clerk to the Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa during the
1999-2000 term. He is currently an associate in the litigation department of Latham &
Watkins LLP. All correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to
sasha.mayergoyz@lw.com.
******
B.S. 2000, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; J.D. 2003, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ms. Hollis is currently an associate in the litigation
department of Latham & Watkins LLP.

941

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

942

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...............................................................................................943
I. Procedural Aspects .........................................................................944
A. Appellate Jurisdiction ..............................................................944
B. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction and Subject Matter
Jurisdiction ..............................................................................949
C. Standing...................................................................................957
D. Collateral Estoppel ..................................................................959
E. Trial Procedures.......................................................................962
1. Jury instructions.................................................................962
2. Jury composition................................................................965
3. Motions for a judgment as a matter of law ........................968
F. United States Patent and Trademark Office Procedures..........969
G. Statutory Interpretation............................................................972
H. Miscellaneous Procedural Issues .............................................973
II. Patentability and Validity ...............................................................974
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101 .......................................................................974
B. 35 U.S.C. § 102 .......................................................................976
1. Printed publication..............................................................976
2. Anticipation ........................................................................978
a. Inherency.......................................................................978
b. Anticipation by a printed publication under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)........................................................980
c. On-sale bar and public use ............................................984
C. 35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness...............................................990
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112 .....................................................................1001
1. Written description ............................................................1001
2. Enablement ........................................................................1015
3. Best mode ..........................................................................1018
4. Indefiniteness.....................................................................1021
E. Design Patent.........................................................................1025
F. Interference and Priority of Invention ...................................1026
G. Patent Term ...........................................................................1029
H. Inventorship...........................................................................1032
I. Double Patenting ...................................................................1041
III. Infringement .................................................................................1042
A. Claim Construction................................................................1042
1. Phillips v. AWH Corporation: The panel discussion
and the en banc order .......................................................1043
2. A modest proposal for a claim construction
methodology ....................................................................1048
3. “Broad construction” cases..............................................1050
4. “Narrow construction” cases ...........................................1076
5. “Coined terms” cases .......................................................1100
6. Means-plus-function claims.............................................1103

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

943

a. Determining whether a claim limitation invokes the
means-plus-function format of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 1103
b. Determining the recited function and corresponding
structure .....................................................................1108
c. Preamble limitations ..................................................1115
7. Miscellaneous claim construction issues .........................1118
8. Various tools of claim construction .................................1126
a. Use of related prosecution histories ...........................1126
b. Use of prior art cited in prosecution histories ............1127
c. Expert testimony ........................................................1128
B. Literal Infringement...............................................................1129
C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents ..................1133
1. Festo ................................................................................1133
2. Dedication-disclosure rule ...............................................1136
3. Prosecution history estoppel ............................................1141
D. Indirect Infringement.............................................................1145
E. Willful Infringement..............................................................1149
IV. Inequitable Conduct and Other Defenses .....................................1156
A. Inequitable Conduct...............................................................1156
B. Antitrust.................................................................................1159
C. Pre-Emption...........................................................................1160
D. License...................................................................................1161
E. Settlement ..............................................................................1163
F. Miscellaneous Defenses ........................................................1164
V. Remedies.......................................................................................1169
A. Permanent Injunction.............................................................1169
B. Damages ................................................................................1172
1. Lost profits.......................................................................1172
2. Reasonable royalty...........................................................1173
3. Enhanced damages...........................................................1174
4. Attorney’s fees and costs .................................................1174
5. Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11.............................1176
INTRODUCTION
Although much ink has been spilled regarding the Federal Circuit’s
failure to achieve the very purpose for which it was created1—to bring
uniformity to patent law—the decisions in 2004 may have been the most
frustrating year yet for practitioners, district court judges, and even the
Federal Circuit judges themselves.2
Indeed, the Federal Circuit
1. See, e.g., Mathew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The
Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 791 (1998) (stating that the Federal Circuit was created in
order to foster a uniform application of the patent law to allow research based on “wellestablished rules”).
2. The only group that may be pleased by the Federal Circuit’s consistent
inconsistency is academia, which, as canvassed by Judge Rader, has generated a remarkable
body of work critiquing the Federal Circuit’s opinions. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314-25, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader,
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characterized its own precedent as “inconsistent” and “confusing.”3
Seeming to realize that the resolution of claim construction disputes is
highly panel dependent, the Federal Circuit announced that it would
experiment with disclosing the panel composition the Thursday before the
week of oral argument.4 The court also decided to review en banc the
panel decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.5 and requested briefing on seven
different questions concerning claim construction. However, given that
many of these questions were not even implicated in Phillips, together with
the court’s penchant for balkanized opinions in en banc hearings, Phillips
does not portend well for the much sought after uniformity in claim
construction jurisprudence.
I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
In Competitive Technologies, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd.,6 defendant included
several counterclaims in its answer to the plaintiff’s action for patent
infringement, including state-law claims for breach of confidentiality,
misappropriation of trade secrets, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, as
well as unfair competition and “abuse of process.”7 Plaintiff contended
that these counterclaims should have been dismissed because, among other
things, they violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.8
Crediting plaintiff’s position, the district court determined that plaintiff was
an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, but held that plaintiff had waived immunity to defendant’s
counterclaims because such counterclaims were compelled by the
underlying patent infringement action.9 The district court reasoned that
defendant’s counterclaims were based on the same underlying factual
allegations as its affirmative defenses, including unclean hands which
“encompasses all of the conduct alleged in support of” the counterclaims at

J., dissenting from denial of en banc hearing); see also Paula K. Davis, Questioning the
Requirement for Written Description: Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe and Overly Broad
Patent Cases, 37 IND. L. REV. 467, 500 (2004) (arguing that lenient enforcement of the
written description requirement slows the pace of scientific research); Harold C. Wegner,
The Disclosure Requirements of the 1952 Patent Act: Looking Back and a New Statute for
the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243, 244 (2004) (criticizing changes to Section 112
as “an arcane deviation from the rest of the world”).
3. Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305, 1307, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546, 1548.
4. In 2005, the Federal Circuit ended this experiment.
5. 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
6. 374 F.3d 1098, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
7. Id. at 1099, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360-61.
8. Id. at 1100, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
9. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
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issue.10 The court noted, however, that if it later determined that the
affirmative defenses were not supported by the evidence or were otherwise
insufficient as a matter of law, it would “‘revisit the question of [plaintiff’s]
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.’”11 Plaintiff appealed the
district court’s decision on the waiver issue to the Federal Circuit.
As a threshold matter, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction
over the appeal because (1) the judgment below lacked finality,12 and
(2) the district court did not issue the certificate required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).13 The Federal Circuit was
not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the judgment was an
appealable collateral order that fell within an exception to the final
judgment rule under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.14 It
explained that in deciding Cohen, the Supreme Court created an exception
to the final judgment rule, “permitting immediate appeals from orders that
‘fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separate
from, and collateral to rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’”15
Looking to later cases clarifying Cohen, however, the Federal Circuit held
that the appealed judgment did not fall within the excepted class of
orders.16
Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained that the appealed judgment
did not “conclusively determine the disputed question” as required by
Cohen.17 Because the district court stated that “it may be necessary to
revisit the question of [plaintiff’s] waiver of Eleventh Amendment
10. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
11. Id. at 1100-01, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361-62 (quoting Competitive Techs. v.
Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1140 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).
12. Federal law provides that the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, excepting the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, shall have appellate jurisdiction from
“all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
13. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (permitting the appeal of an interlocutory decision if such order
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion”); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (allowing courts to enter final judgment as to fewer than
all claims or parties “upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon express direction for the entry of judgment.”).
14. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
15. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362.
16. Id. at 1103, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363-64 (citing Swint v. Chambers County
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (declining review of summary judgment where district
court planned to review its ruling)).
17. Later cases clarifying Cohen relied upon by the court explained that “[t]o come
within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final judgment rule by Cohen, the
order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal
form a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), quoted
in Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363.
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immunity” if it were to determine that the affirmative defenses lacked
sufficient evidentiary support,18 the Federal Circuit determined that the
appealed judgment resembled those judgments in which appeals had been
previously prohibited because they were “tentative, informal or
incomplete,”19 “subject to revision in the District Court,”20 or “subject to
future reconsideration by the issuing court.”21 Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit found that an appeal of the issue of waiver at the present stage
would have been “particularly inappropriate” because the district court had
not yet decided the propriety of the affirmative defenses, an issue that was
“intimately bound up with the merits.”22 The Federal Circuit therefore
concluded that the appealed judgment was distinguishable from Cohen
which required collateral orders to be “not of such an interlocutory nature
as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of th[e] case.”23
In TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,24 plaintiff appealed a
judgment that its patents were invalid and defendant cross-appealed the
dismissal without prejudice of its claims of noninfringement.25 The Federal
Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over defendant’s crossappeal because the district court held that all asserted claims were invalid.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit first explained that “[a] party that is not
affected by a judgment lacks standing to appeal.”26 The Federal Circuit
then reasoned that “it is only necessary and appropriate to file a crossappeal when a party seeks to enlarge its own rights under the judgment or
to lessen the rights of its adversary under the judgment.”27 Considering
these rules, it held that “[w]here . . . [a] district court has entered a
judgment of invalidity as to all of the asserted claims, there is no basis for a
cross-appeal as to . . . claims of noninfringement,”28 even where the

18. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1100-01, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361-62.
19. Id. at 1103, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 42).
20. Id. at 1104, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S.
at 469).
21. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,
745 F.2d 161, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1984)).
22. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364.
23. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
24. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
25. A single judge initially denied TypeRight’s motion to dismiss by order, but the
Federal Circuit later considered the issue of its jurisdiction over Microsoft’s cross-appeals in
its final decision, holding that an order by a single judge does not bind the court. Id. at 1157
n.5, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505 n.5.
26. Id. at 1156, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504. The court explicitly found that the same
rule necessarily applies to cross-appeals. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
27. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Bailey v. Dart Container Corp., 292
F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
28. Id. at 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
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accused infringer has filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement.29
Significantly, for litigants looking to appeal validity issues following a
finding of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit went on to explain that the
converse was not true: “a judgment of noninfringement does not
necessarily moot validity issues on appeal.”30 The Federal Circuit noted
that “‘a determination of infringement applies only to a specific accused
product or process,’ whereas ‘invalidity operates as a complete defense to
infringement for any product, forever.’”31 Distinguishing defendant’s
situation from circumstances in which an appellee urges invalidity as a new
ground to support a judgment of noninfringement, necessitating a crossappeal,32 the court found that defendant’s rights under the invalidity
judgment were actually broader than what they would have been under a
judgment of noninfringement. Therefore, the court found that defendant
had not been adversely affected by the district court’s judgment.33
In a similar case, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories,34 the Federal Circuit refused to permit defendant to appeal a
grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of
noninfringement. Defendant “conditional[ly] cross-appealed” that, in the
event the court reversed the JMOL, defendant was entitled to a new trial
because the portion of the jury’s verdict which was not disturbed by the
JMOL could not be reconciled with the infringement verdict that was
disturbed.35 The Federal Circuit held that the appeal was improper,
explaining that “[a] party who prevails on noninfringement has no right to
file a ‘conditional’ cross-appeal to introduce new argument or challenge a
claim construction, but may simply assert alternative grounds in the record
for affirming the judgment.”36
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc.,37 the Federal Circuit
29. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (citing Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc.,
163 F.3d 1326, 1335, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
30. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l,
Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993)).
31. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Weatherchem, 163 F.3d at 1335-36, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009).
32. Id. at 1157 n.4, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 n.4.
33. Because there was no jurisdiction, the court dismissed the cross-appeal and stated
that it would treat Microsoft’s arguments in support of its cross-appeal “as an alternate
ground for affirming the district court’s judgment” of invalidity. Id. at 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1504-05. Considering Microsoft’s noninfringement arguments as an alternative
ground for sustaining the lower court’s judgment, however, the court declined to reach the
infringement question because the issue of noninfringement was not considered by the
district court. Id. at 1160, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
34. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
36. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207,
1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
37. 381 F.3d 1178, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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addressed the issue of whether it was vested with appellate jurisdiction
when “all of the patent claims in [an] amended complaint were dismissed
prior to [a] non-patent ruling on appeal.”38 Noting that this question turned
on whether the dismissal of the patent claims was with or without
prejudice, the court explained that “[d]ismissals without prejudice are de
facto amendments to the complaint,” and
[f]or purposes of determining Federal Circuit jurisdiction, we do not
differentiate between actual and constructive amendments: both divest
of us of jurisdiction if they eliminate all issues of patent law . . . .
Dismissals with prejudice are adjudications on the merits and not
constructive amendments to the complaint . . . . In all such cases, we
retain jurisdiction to hear all appeals on all issues.39

The Federal Circuit then reasoned that:
Taken together, whenever the complaint included a patent claim and the
trial court’s rulings altered the legal status of the parties with respect to
that patent claim, we retain appellate jurisdiction over all pendent claims
in the complaint. In other words, if all patent claims raised in the
amended complaint were dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal
would divest us of jurisdiction; dismissals with prejudice would not . . . .
Dismissals divest this court of jurisdiction only if “[t]he parties were left
in the same legal position with respect to [all] patent claims as if they
had never been filed. [T]he dismissal of a claim with prejudice
operate[s] as an adjudication of that claim on the merits,” and preserves
our jurisdiction.40

The Federal Circuit thus concluded that despite the district court’s
semantic characterization of a dismissal of a patent claim “as ‘without
prejudice’ subject to a condition subsequent that can no longer occur,”41
and dismissal of other patent claims as “‘without prejudice’ except in a
single forum,”42 the court possessed appellate jurisdiction given that the
effect of the district court’s dismissals did not constitute “‘dismissal
without prejudice’ because they alter the legal status of the parties vis-à-vis
all of [plaintiff’s] asserted patent claims. [The parties] were not ‘left in the
same legal position with respect to the patent claims as if they had never
been filed.’”43

38. Id. at 1189, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
39. Id. at 1189-90, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
40. Id. at 1190, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
41. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
42. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
43. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (quoting Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782,
785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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B. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.44 presented an appeal from a declaratory
judgment action in which the jury returned verdicts of noninfringement and
invalidity.45 Rather than addressing the merits of the appeal, the Federal
Circuit held that neither it nor the district court possessed jurisdiction to
hear the case.46 The trial record demonstrated that prior to commencement
of the litigation, the defendant granted plaintiff a non-exclusive license to
its patents in return for an upfront payment and an ongoing royalty.47 On
December 21, 1999, plaintiff sent defendant a letter indicating that it was
exercising its license option relating to third-party uses of the licensed
patents and stating its “intent to maintain the status quo [of the license
agreement] by continuing to pay royalties throughout the litigation.”48 The
next day, plaintiff filed its declaratory judgment action, alleging that its
products did not infringe on any of the licensed patents and that such
patents were invalid.49
Despite a full trial in the district court, the Federal Circuit began by
observing that “[a]ny party or this court sua sponte may raise the question
of subject matter jurisdiction.”50 Addressing its own jurisdiction in
declaratory judgment actions the Federal Circuit noted that “the long
established rule of law is that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must
establish an actual controversy on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”51
Turning to the facts before it, the Federal Circuit determined that its
decision in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz52 was analogous.53 Recognizing
that while the C.R. Bard decision provided that “a patent license need not
be terminated before a patent licensee may bring a declaratory judgment
action,”54 the court explained that C.R. Bard also involved “two critical
circumstances” that vested the court with jurisdiction.55 First, the licensee
“had ceased payment of royalties under the agreement to licensor and
patentee.”56 The Federal Circuit further noted that the licensee’s cessation

44. 359 F.3d 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
45. Id. at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
46. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
47. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
48. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
49. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
50. Id. at 1379, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
51. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089 (quoting Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co.,
940 F.2d 631, 634, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
52. 716 F.2d 874, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
53. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1380, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
54. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 875, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198).
55. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
56. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880-81, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203).
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of royalty payment constituted “a material breach of the agreement
that . . . enabled [the licensor] to terminate the agreement.”57 The Federal
Circuit explained that the material breach granted the licensor “the power
to file an infringement lawsuit against Bard at any time.”58 Contrasting
C.R. Bard to the circumstances on appeal, the Federal Circuit explained
that plaintiff:
[D]id not cease paying royalties and materially breach its license
agreement with [defendant]; [defendant] did not file a breach of contract
action. In fact, [plaintiff] was a licensee in good standing that continued
paying royalties throughout the declaratory judgment lawsuit. In fact,
[plaintiff] expressly acknowledged its desire to maintain the status quo
and remain a faithful licensee.59

The Federal Circuit also placed significant weight on plaintiff’s decision
to “exercise[] options to extend the duration of the license for its alliances
with [third parties] contemporaneously with its filing of the declaratory
judgment lawsuit. Far from breaching its license agreement, [plaintiff]
affirmatively confirmed its desire to remain in good standing.”60
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that no controversy existed sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.61
Addressing the district court’s reliance on oral notifications and letters
between plaintiff and defendant regarding possible infringement, the court
explained that such communications occurred before the parties entered
into the license agreement,62 and concluded that the license “insulated
[plaintiff] from an infringement suit instituted by [defendant]” and “unless
materially breached, obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit
based on prior circumstances cited by the district court.”63
The Federal Circuit also discussed the district court’s reliance on Lear v.
Adkins,64 in which the Supreme Court held that a licensee can challenge the
validity of a patent.65 The Federal Circuit distinguished Lear by reasoning
that it “does not grant every licensee in every circumstance the right to
challenge the validity of the licensed patent.”66 Then citing its holding in

57. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880-81, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203).
58. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
59. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
60. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
61. Id. at 1382, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
62. Id. at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
63. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
64. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
65. Id. at 656, 671 (rejecting precedent of estopping licensees from attacking the
validity of licensors’ patents in light of the “strong federal policy favoring free competition
in ideas which do not merit patent protection.”).
66. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
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Studiengesellschaft Kohle M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co.,67 which provided that “a
licensee . . . cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i)
actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor
that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed
the relevant claims to be invalid,”68 the court held that, at minimum, a
licensee must stop paying royalties before bringing suit to challenge the
licensed patent.69
In Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.,70
the Federal Circuit again addressed whether plaintiff had properly
established a “case or controversy” for seeking a declaratory relief of
invalidity and noninfringement.71 The Federal Circuit began by articulating
its two-pronged inquiry for determining whether a case or controversy
exists in the context of “patent-based declaratory judgment suits,”72 stating
that:
There must both be (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity
which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the
intent to conduct such activity.73

The Federal Circuit explained that the first prong “looks to the patent
holder’s conduct,”74 while the second prong “looks to the potential
infringer’s conduct.”75 The Federal Circuit further noted that the potential
infringer bears the burden of establishing that “jurisdiction over its
declaratory judgment action existed at, and has continued since, the time
the complaint was filed.”76
Given that plaintiff sought declaratory judgment of noninfringement for
three separate product categories,77 the Federal Circuit explained that when
a potential infringer seeks to “ground jurisdiction on activities involving
distinct, technologically different products, the court must carefully
calibrate its analysis to each of the products. To do otherwise would risk
issuing an advisory opinion on one product—or on a method using that
67. 112 F.3d 1561, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 1568, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
69. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
70. 363 F.3d 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
72. Id. at 1373, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585.
73. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585-86 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
74. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
75. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
76. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (quoting Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs.,
Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 281 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
77. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
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product—based on an actual controversy involving another product.”78
Turning to the first prong, the Federal Circuit noted that the question of
whether a patentee’s conduct “created a reasonable apprehension on the
part of the declaratory plaintiff ‘is an objective one.’”79 The Federal
Circuit held that patentee’s letter stating that it “intended to aggressively
protect its [patent] rights” and that “other patents [that] are pending and are
expected to issue which will further cover our client’s technology,” was
sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension.80 While noting that such
apprehension waned over a period of time in which the parties did not
correspond regarding the disputed products and patents, the Federal Circuit
determined that the reasonable apprehension re-emerged in view of a
subsequent letter from the patentee stating that if plaintiff “continue[s] to
make, use, or sell infringing products . . . [it] seems likely to be considered
intentional patent infringement.”81
Concerning the second prong’s requirement of “present activity,” the
Federal Circuit explained that “later events may not create jurisdiction
where none existed at the time of filing.”82 The Federal Circuit then held
that although plaintiff’s damages exposure was minimal with respect to the
first product category, the court possessed jurisdiction because the “Patent
Act does not set a damages threshold for bringing suit, and thus a patent
case or controversy can exist even where the conduct at issue would result
in only de minimis damages.”83 With respect to the second product
category that plaintiff never made and no longer intended to manufacture,
the Federal Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction because “[o]nce a
development effort has been wholly abandoned, it can no longer be the
basis for an ‘intent to engage’ case or controversy.”84
Looking to the third product category, the court began by clarifying the
legal standard for determining whether a declaratory plaintiff has taken
“concrete steps” with intent to infringe.85 The Federal Circuit explained
that “Article III requires a dispute ‘of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”86 As to immediacy, the
Federal Circuit stressed “the importance of the period of time between the

78. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
79. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d
885, 888, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1627, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
80. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.
81. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.
82. Id. at 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (quoting GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v.
Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 479, 483, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
83. Id. at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
84. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
85. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
86. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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date on which the complaint was filed and the date on which potentially
infringing activities will begin. The greater the length of this interim
period, the more likely the case lacks the requisite immediacy.”87 As to
reality, the Federal Circuit explained that:
The greater the variability of subject of a declaratory judgment suit,
particularly as to its potentially infringing features, the greater the chance
that the court’s judgment will be purely advisory, detached from the
eventual, actual content of that subject—in short detached from eventual
reality.88

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
third product category because on the date the complaint was filed “it was
impossible to determine—on that date—whether any eventual design of the
[product] would infringe [defendant’s] patents.”89
In Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Medical Products,90 plaintiff appealed an order
dismissing its declaratory judgment action against defendant.91 Plaintiff
was defendant’s long-time customer in the “wear-over” sunglass market.
The parties’ dispute commenced when the defendant’s president informed
plaintiff that he had seen plaintiff’s intent-to-use trademark application for
wear-over sunglasses and that although defendant preferred to avoid legal
disputes with good customers, it had a large patent portfolio covering wearover sunglasses that it vigorously enforced against infringers.92 Plaintiff
responded by stating that it had already obtained a detailed opinion of
counsel indicating that its products did not infringe defendant’s patents.93
Later the following month, defendant placed several calls to plaintiff
stating that defendant had thirteen patents and would soon have forty
patents covering all of the basic wear-over sunglass frame shapes, and that
plaintiff was “charging down a path [towards infringement] that [was]
going to end up into a multi-million dollar lawsuit.”94
Plaintiff responded by filing the declaratory judgment action.95 Rather
than counterclaim infringement, however, defendant moved to dismiss the
action on the basis that plaintiff could not have threatened suit for
infringement because it had never seen plaintiff’s products, nor had it
analyzed the products for possible infringement.96 The district court agreed
with the plaintiff, holding that an actual controversy existed but declining
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1378-79, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
Id. at 1379, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
Id. at 1380, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
387 F.3d 1352, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1353, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
Id. at 1354, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
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to exercise jurisdiction “in its considerable discretion under the Declaratory
Judgment Act” because defendant had neither filed the compulsory
counterclaim of infringement nor seen plaintiff’s product.97
Reversing on appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that although a
district court has “appropriate discretion” to decline a declaratory judgment
action, this discretion is to be exercised “in accordance with the purposes of
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the principles of sound judicial
administration.”98 In the absence of “well-founded” reasons for declining
to entertain a declaratory action, the Federal Circuit stated that an accused
infringer’s declaratory action should be permitted “when there has been a
direct charge of infringement by the patentee, and an actual controversy
exists due to ongoing activity that has been accused of infringement.”99 In
plaintiff’s case, the Federal Circuit found no good reason for dismissal, as
defendant’s threats created an apprehension of suit, and the apprehension
was reasonable because defendant was aware that plaintiff had entered into
the marketplace of wear-over sunglasses.100 The Federal Circuit also
observed that the fact that defendant had not seen plaintiff’s products was
irrelevant to whether defendant’s threats instilled a reasonable
apprehension of suit.101 The Federal Circuit thus explained that it would
impose no duty on the accused to ascertain whether the patentee had
conducted a reasonable investigation prior to making its threats. Finally,
the Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s finding that the case was
not ripe because defendant had other patent applications pending that it felt
more closely covered the accused products, opining that “the possibility of
future patents is irrelevant to present rights and liability.”102
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Chiron Corp.,103 the Federal
Circuit addressed the question of whether its own law or a regional circuit’s
law applied when determining whether an injunction precluding a party
from pursuing parallel actions in different district courts is appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).104 While observing that the language of
97. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
98. Id. at 1355, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
99. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
100. Id. at 1356, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
101. The court noted that this fact may be relevant to whether the accuser acted
“responsibly,” however. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
102. Id. at 1357, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. Dioptics argued that Capo filed its
declaratory judgment action solely as a pretext for obtaining access to Dioptics’s pending
patent applications. The court agreed with Capo that it was Dioptics who injected its
applications into controversy, but opined that it would be a valid exercise of judicial
discretion to limit discovery of these pending applications in order to prevent prejudice to
Dioptics. Id. at 1357, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
103. 384 F.3d 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
104. Id. at 1327-28, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. Section 1292(a)(1) provides that the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction from: “Interlocutory orders of the district courts
of the United States . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing
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§ 1292(a)(1) “appears to be both unambiguous and compelling,”105 the
Federal Circuit noted that “there is a circuit split concerning whether
injunctions enjoining co-pending actions in other courts are appealable
under [that section].”106 The circuit split was particularly important in the
pending case because Federal Circuit law provided that such injunctions
were appealable under § 1292(a)(1) whereas the Third Circuit had held the
opposite.107
The Federal Circuit explained that it applies its own law rather than a
regional circuit’s law governing a procedural issue that does not itself
involve substantive patent law when the issue: (1) “pertains to patent law,”
(2) “bears an essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive
control by statute,” or (3) “clearly implicates the jurisprudential
responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction.”108
The court then analogized the pending case to its earlier decision in
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,109 in which a party filed a declaratory
judgment in the Southern District of Indiana and the patentee filed an
action the next day in the Northern District of California.110 In Genentech,
the court explained:
The question of whether a properly brought declaratory action to
determine patent rights should yield to a later-filed suit for patent
infringement raises the issue of national uniformity in patent cases, and
invokes the special obligation of the Federal Circuit to avoid creating
opportunities for dispositive differences among the regional circuits.
Thus, although the Federal Circuit applies the procedural law of the
regional circuit in matters that are not unique to patent law, . . . and
although matters of procedure do not always carry substantive weight,
the regional circuit practice need not control when the question is
important to national uniformity in patent practice.111

or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000).
105. 384 F.3d at 1328, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
106. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. Compare FDIC v. Geldermann, Inc., 975 F.2d
695, 697 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding such injunctions appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1)), Phillips v. Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
that § 1292(a)(1) authorizes an interlocutory appeal), and Klein v. Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d
337, 339 (2d Cir. 1971) (permitting an appeal where an order denies the application for the
posting of security), with Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272,
1278-79 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding same injunctions to affect only venue, not substantive law
at issue, and thus to be not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).
107. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1328, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (noting that case arose
from a decision of the Delaware district court, which resides in the Third Circuit).
108. Id. at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (quoting Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
109. 998 F.2d 931, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
110. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (citing Genentech, 998
F.2d at 935, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242).
111. Genentech, 998 F.3d at 937, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (citation omitted).
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Relying on the holding and rationale in Genentech, the Federal Circuit
held that “injunctions arbitrating between co-pending patent declaratory
judgment and infringement cases in different district courts are reviewed
under the law of the Federal Circuit.”112
In reaching this holding the Federal Circuit addressed its decision in Katz
v. Lear Siegler, Inc.,113 in which the court stated that it would “[apply] the
law of the First Circuit”114 to review an order issued by the District of
Massachusetts enjoining a patentee from prosecuting other pending actions
in the Western District of New York.115 The Federal Circuit explained that
the statement in Katz regarding application of First Circuit law “was not
accompanied by an analysis or discussion of the policy issues relevant to
the choice of law where there are material differences in Federal Circuit
and regional circuit precedent.”116 The Federal Circuit thus determined that
“the reference to First Circuit law in Katz . . . should not be read to
foreclose consideration of the important policy factors dictating the choice
of law in cases in which the regional circuit applies a different standard
than the Federal Circuit.”117
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings,118 the Federal Circuit held that the district court had no
jurisdiction to consider defendant’s claims that one of plaintiff’s patent
claims was invalid where the parties did not dispute that defendant
continued to pay royalties on a license in effect on tests defendant
performed that it alleged were covered by that claim. The Federal Circuit
likened the situation to the scenario in which a patentee seeks a declaratory
judgment against a future infringer and determined that there was no real
case or controversy regarding the defendant test alleged to infringe that
claim. The Federal Circuit explained that the license is essentially a
licensor’s covenant not to sue the licensee.119
In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Accordingly, a licensor who has
implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license
agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement.
Moreover, in light of [defendant’s] continuing royalty payments on the
panel test, LabCorp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for
112. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
113. 909 F.2d 1459, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
114. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1329, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (quoting Katz, 909
F.2d at 1462, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557).
115. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (citing Katz, 909 F.2d at 1462-64, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1557-58).
116. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
117. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
118. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
119. Id. at 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
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which it continues to pay royalties.120

C. Standing
In Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc.,121 the
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether an exclusive licensee has
standing to sue for infringement. Plaintiff filed suit for infringement of a
patent related to artificial athletic field surfaces and the district court
dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing.122 The record
revealed that plaintiff acquired its rights to the asserted patent through a
variety of transactions, including two license agreements to which its
predecessor-in-interest was a party. The first agreement gave the
predecessor-in-interest the exclusive right to manufacture and market
commercial embodiments of the patent, but reserved to the licensors the
right of first refusal to enforce the patent, as well as a “limited right” to
develop, display commercially, and market to potential costumers.123 In the
second transaction, the same parties essentially agreed that the predecessorin-interest would continue to be the exclusive licensee, and that the second
agreement would “cancel and replace” the first.124
Plaintiff argued that it had standing to sue as an exclusive licensee of the
patent on the licenses to which its predecessor was a party. The Federal
Circuit, however, determined that two factors deprived plaintiff of
standing. First, the Federal Circuit noted that the second agreement entered
into by the predecessor-in-interest was “no more than a bare license,”
despite the fact that it named the predecessor-in-interest as the exclusive
licensee because it was silent with regard to who had “the right to enforce
the patent.”125 Second, the Federal Circuit observed that the predecessorin-interest failed to acquire “all substantial rights” to the patent required for
standing because the second agreement was silent with respect to the
licensor’s retention of a limited right to develop and market the potential
invention.126 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff’s claim for patent
infringement must be dismissed and remanded for a determination of
120. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (citations omitted).
121. 357 F.3d 1266, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1795 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
122. Id. at 1267, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796. The Federal Circuit reviewed the issue
of Fieldturf’s standing to sue for infringement on appeal de novo, despite the fact that
Southwest had already raised the issue in a preliminary motion to dismiss that was
subsequently denied, citing the rule that “[a] motion to dismiss denied by the order of a
single judge . . . does not become the law of the case.” Id. at 1268, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1797; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (discussing similar holding in Novartis
Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
123. Fieldturf, 357 F.3d at 1267, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.
124. Id. at 1267-68, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.
125. Id. at 1269, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
126. Id. at 1269, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
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whether plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed with prejudice. In particular,
the Federal Circuit opined that joinder of certain parties, such as the
predecessor-in-interest’s licensor, might be required to complete plaintiff’s
standing. It further noted that plaintiff failed to produce any documentation
evidencing the transfer of interests in the patent from the patent’s original
owner to the predecessor-in-interest’s licensor. Even though plaintiff had
argued that the licensor was a “successor in form” and was controlled by
the same partner as the original patent owner, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the argument was unhelpful in identifying the actual successor.127
D. Collateral Estoppel
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,128 plaintiff
sued defendant for infringement of two of its patents (the “‘625 patent” and
the “‘840 patent”), both directed to compositions of cyclosporine, a
compound used to prevent organ rejection in transplant patients.129 Two
claims were at issue, one from each patent. The ‘625 patent required a
“lipophilic phase component,” the ‘840 patent required a “lipophilic
component,” and both patents required a “surfactant.”130 The parties
agreed that “lipophilic component” and “lipophilic phase component,” as
used in the two patents, bore the same meaning.131
The jury returned a verdict that defendant did not infringe the ‘625
patent, but did infringe the ‘840 patent.132 Following the verdict, the
district court granted defendant’s JMOL with respect to the ‘840 patent,
finding that defendant’s accused composition did not have a “lipophilic
component” as required by the asserted claim of that patent, either literally
or under the doctrine of equivalents.
Defendant asserted that plaintiff was barred from challenging the court’s
JMOL of noninfringement of the ‘840 patent because it had failed to
explicitly challenge the verdict on the ‘625 patent, and therefore any legal
determinations or factual findings necessary to that verdict were given
preclusive effect.133 Plaintiff, in turn, argued that it had preserved its right
to appeal the jury verdict on the ‘625 patent, and that collateral estoppel
therefore did not bar its challenge to the JMOL on the ‘840 patent.134
Referencing its discussion on the construction of the term “surfactant,”
plaintiff first asserted that the term was relevant only to the ‘625 patent.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1330-31, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id. at 1332, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
Id. at 1332-33, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
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Plaintiff then asked the Federal Circuit to remand for further proceedings if
it reversed the district court’s claim construction but did not reinstate the
jury infringement verdict on the ‘840 patent. Finally, defendant admitted
that plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal might have been broad enough to cover
the ‘625 patent verdict. The Federal Circuit found none of these actions
sufficient to preserve plaintiff’s right to appeal the ‘625 patent jury verdict
and instead held that plaintiff waived that right because, “from the
beginning,” it had maintained that it was appealing the entry of the JMOL
of noninfringement.135
Regardless of the fact that plaintiff had waived its right to appeal the
‘625 jury verdict, the Federal Circuit found that plaintiff was not
collaterally estopped to challenge the ‘840 patent verdict.136 Defendant had
argued that, because the parties agreed that the terms “lipophilic
component” and “surfactant” were common to the ‘625 and ‘840 patents,
plaintiff’s failure to challenge the construction of these terms in the ‘625
patent estopped it from challenging their construction in the ‘840 patent.
Applying Third Circuit law, the Federal Circuit disagreed because the jury
had not been requested to specify on its verdict form, the limitations in the
claim of the ‘625 patent that it found Abbott’s product did not contain, and
because no record evidence explained the jury’s rationale for its verdict.137
Thus, the court explained, it could not conclude that the court’s
construction of “lipophilic phase component” proved necessary to the
jury’s noninfringement decision on the ‘625 patent, and Novartis was not
collaterally estopped from challenging the claim construction and the
JMOL with respect to the ‘840 patent.138
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.139 involved an appeal from a
grant of summary judgment “giving collateral estoppel effect to a decision
in an earlier case between the predecessors of the parties in this case.”140
135. Id. at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55. The court contrasted Novartis’ case
from that of Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865
(Fed. Cir. 2003), in which the court “consented to construe terms that did not form a part of
the appealed summary judgment because they ‘may be relevant to the remand determination
of infringement’ and because they were found to be construed erroneously.” Novartis, 375
F.3d at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (quoting Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1366, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866).
136. Novartis, 375 F.3d at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
137. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. The Federal Circuit applied the law of the
regional circuit—here, the Third Circuit—to the issue of collateral estoppel. Id. at 1333, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. Under the Third Circuit law, the party seeking collateral
estoppel bears the burden of showing: “(1) the previous determination was necessary to the
decision; (2) the identical issue was previously litigated; (3) the issue was actually decided
in a decision that was final, valid, and on the merits; and (4) the party being precluded from
relitigating the issue was adequately represented in the previous action.” Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1654 (quoting Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 475 (3d Cir. 1997)).
138. Id. at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
139. 363 F.3d 1235, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
140. Id. at 1242, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (citation omitted).
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Specifically, the district court ruled that the Federal Circuit’s prior decision
in Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,141 in which the
court held that claims in a related patent were invalid for lack of
enablement, compelled a holding that the asserted claims in the first
disputed patent were not enabled and that the asserted claims in a second
disputed patent were not infringed.142
With respect to enablement, the Federal Circuit noted that to determine
whether the claimed “transformation of monocots through the use of
Agrobacterium” is enabled it is necessary to consult the specification of the
disputed patents,143 “which differ significantly from the specification of the
patent at issue in the Plant Genetic Systems case.”144 The Federal Circuit
thus vacated the grant of summary judgment based collateral estoppel,
explaining that although the parties in Plant Genetic Sys. fully litigated
the issue of whether one of ordinary skill in the art in 1986 would be able
to transform a monocot using Agrobacterium . . . collateral estoppel may
bear on the enablement issue, but only if the district court concludes that
the specifications of the [disputed] patents themselves do not teach the
transformation of monocots.145

With regard to infringement, the Federal Circuit also reversed the grant
of summary judgment because the district court improperly “[applied] the
claim construction in the Plant Genetic Systems case without examining the
intrinsic evidence specific to the [disputed] patent.”146 The court explained
that:
It is not enough for the court simply to rely on the conclusion of the
court in Plant Genetic Systems that the prosecution history of the patent
in that case and the corresponding extrinsic evidence support a narrow
construction . . . because similar terms can have different meanings in
different patents depending on the specifics of each patent.147

The Federal Circuit thus held that defendant “should not now be
precluded from arguing that the same claim term appearing in the claims of
the [disputed] patent has a different meaning.”148

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

315 F.3d 1335, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1242, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63.
Id. at 1243, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 1243-44, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
Id. at 1245, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
Id. at 1244, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
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E. Trial Procedures
1. Jury instructions
In Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V.,149 plaintiff sued its competitor for
infringement of two patents related to a method of weaving fabrics and
operating a weaving machine. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of
noninfringement and the district court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously
instructed the jury that plaintiff carried the burden of establishing that
defendants “manufactured” its weaving machines using a process that
included all steps of the asserted claims, where the asserted claims only
covered a method of operating weaving machines rather than the
manufacture of such machines. Plaintiff contended that the error was
prejudicial given the jury confusion that arose from the instruction coupled
with plaintiff’s failure to present any evidence showing defendant’s
manufacture of the accused machine.150 The Federal Circuit rejected
plaintiff’s argument, holding that to the extent that any error existed, it was
harmless. The Federal Circuit explained that the remainder of the jury
instruction, besides the one statement questioned by plaintiff, properly
addressed the method of operation of defendant’s machine.151 The Federal
Circuit further noted that the fact that the parties had put forth evidence
relating solely to defendant’s operation of the machine supported its
decision.
Plaintiff also asserted prejudicial error in the district court’s failure to
include any instruction with regard to its earlier claim construction of
disputed terms.152 While the district court construed the claim terms prior
to the close of evidence, it had not provided its final constructions in the
jury instructions. Plaintiff argued that the district court’s omission left the
jury to construe the claim terms any way it wanted. The Federal Circuit
agreed on this point, explaining that because the meaning of claim terms
are legal issues central to most patent cases, a district court is obligated to
instruct the jury adequately to ensure that it “fully understands the court’s
claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.”153
The Federal Circuit further stated that a district court must ensure that the
jury understands it is not free to diverge from the predetermined
constructions.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff failed to establish

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

358 F.3d 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966-67.
Id. at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967-68.
Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
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that it had been prejudiced by the district court’s error. Plaintiff attempted
to show prejudice by pointing to the testimony of its own expert witness,
who arguably had suggested a construction of a claim term that was
contrary to the construction finalized by the district court.154 Plaintiff also
relied on its own presentation of a demonstrative exhibit indicating a
contradictory construction shown to the jury during the cross-examination
of defendant’s witness. The Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff’s
evidence of prejudice largely originated from its own witnesses’ testimony
or from its own actions. Accordingly, based on its determinations that any
alleged confusion by jury was “invited” by plaintiff and that the other
testimony at trial adequately reflected the district court’s constructions, the
court held that the district court’s failure to restrict the jury to the claim
constructions in its instruction did not prejudice plaintiff.155
In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,156 plaintiff argued that it was entitled
to a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions issued by the district
court.157 The Federal Circuit explained that it “reviews jury instructions in
their entirety and ‘only orders a new trial when errors in the instructions as
a whole clearly misled the jury.’”158 The Federal Circuit also explained
that a party seeking a new trial “must show both fatal flaws in the jury
instruction and a request for alternative instructions which could have
corrected the flaws.”159 The court then rejected plaintiff’s argument that
the district court erred by providing an instruction on the burden of proof
necessary to invalidate a patent but failing to instruct the jury regarding a
patent’s presumption of validity.160 The Federal Circuit explained that the
“presumption of validity and heightened burden of proving invalidity ‘are
static and in reality different expressions of the same thing—a single hurdle
to be cleared.’”161 The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the
instructions were proper because the jury applied the “correct ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ standard.”162
Plaintiff also sought a new trial arguing that the district court erroneously
154. Id. at 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
155. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
156. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
157. Id. at 1258, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
158. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod.
Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
159. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Delta-X, 984 F.2d at 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1451).
160. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
161. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The court also
explained that “the presumption is one of law, not fact, and does not constitute ‘evidence’ to
be weighed against the challenger’s evidence.” Id. at 1258-59, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1329 (quoting Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
162. Id. at 1259, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
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instructed the jury regarding the standard for complying with the written
description requirement.163 The Federal Circuit, however, found no error
with the instructions, explaining that courts “need not use identical
language to this court’s opinions in its instructions.”164
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,165 plaintiff sought a new trial on the
issue of obviousness, arguing that “its case was prejudiced because the jury
was allowed to hear evidence of [plaintiff’s] admitted misstatements to the
examiner concerning the teachings of [a prior art] reference.”166 At trial,
plaintiff’s counsel admitted that, in preparation for trial, he had discovered
that he made a “factual misstatement as to the [prior art reference’s]
teaching” during prosecution of the asserted patent.167 While the district
court granted summary judgment that plaintiff did not commit inequitable
conduct despite the admitted misstatement, the court allowed the jury to
consider evidence of the misstatement in determining validity, particularly
in “consider[ing] the proceedings before the examiner and the extent to
which and the manner in which the prior art was considered by or before
the examiner.”168
Citing to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau
Co.,169 plaintiff argued that without sufficient evidence to establish the
factual predicates of inequitable conduct, evidence concerning an
examiner’s state of mind should not be admitted at trial as unduly
prejudicial.170 The court accepted plaintiff’s argument, explaining that “the
presumption of validity is not subject to being diluted by ‘procedural
lapses’ during prosecution.”171 The Federal Circuit further reasoned that:
[T]he presence and “strength” of the presumption of validity does not
warrant inquiry into the examiner’s understanding or competence or
gullibility . . . . Introspection and speculation into the examiner’s
understanding of the prior art or the completeness or correctness of the
examination process is not part of the objective review of
patentability.172

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court “erred
in instructing the jury that the presumption of validity varied with the jury’s
163. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
164. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
165. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
166. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
167. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (quoting Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 252 F.
Supp. 2d 945, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
168. Id. (quoting Norian, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 960).
169. 115 F.3d 956, 960, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
“[p]rocedural lapses during examination, should they occur, do not provide grounds for
invalidity.”).
170. Norian, 363 F.3d at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
171. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
172. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (citations omitted).
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view of whether the examiner believed the applicant’s misstatements or
otherwise did not ‘properly focus on the prior art.’”173 However, in light of
plaintiff’s failure to object to this instruction at trial, the court denied the
motion for a new trial because it was “not persuaded that the error was
prejudicial or the trial unfair.”174
2.

Jury composition
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sturman Industries, Inc.,175 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision to empanel a juror whose spouse was
an employee of the plaintiff.176 During the jury selection stage of trial,
defendant moved to dismiss for cause any current or former employees of
plaintiff and their spouses.177 The district court refused to grant
defendant’s blanket objection, but instructed defendant that it would
consider individual motions for cause.178 When defendant addressed each
juror specifically, it “argued beyond the parameters of the initial blanket
objection,” focusing on potential jurors’ additional connections to
plaintiff.179 While defendant was making these challenges, however,
plaintiff repeatedly objected that defendant was merely rearguing its
previous blanket objection.180
During this process, the district court focused on whether each potential
juror or his spouse held a management or union-contract position with
plaintiff.181 It ultimately dismissed one juror whose husband was in
management with plaintiff, but refused to dismiss jurors who were
connected to plaintiff’s union-contract employees.182 Defendant neither
specifically objected to nor used a peremptory challenge against Juror No.
3, whose husband was an employee of plaintiff.183 Juror No. 3 ultimately
sat on the jury.184 After receiving an unfavorable verdict at trial, defendant
appealed the district court’s decision to empanel Juror No. 3.185
The Federal Circuit began its analysis of defendant’s appeal by settling
on a de novo standard of review. It reasoned that whether Juror No. 3 had
a financial interest in the case or implicit bias186 presented a question of
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
387 F.3d 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1372-73, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
Id. at 1364-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id. at 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id. at 1366, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
Id. at 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
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law.187
The Federal Circuit next considered whether defendant waived its
objection to Juror No. 3.188 Holding that it did not, the court reasoned that
defendant had included Juror No. 3 in its original objection to all current
and former plaintiff employees and their close family members.189 The
parties specifically argued about this particular ground for dismissal, and
the judge ultimately ruled that no juror would be dismissed on this basis
alone.190 The Federal Circuit therefore held that it was “clear that
[defendant] voiced its objection to these potential jurors for reasons of
implied bias, and the court distinctly ruled on the objection.”191
The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was
required to individually challenge Juror No. 3 in order to preserve an
objection to her empanelment.192 The Federal Circuit first noted that
plaintiff’s argument ran contrary to its repeated objections at trial that
defendant was simply rearguing its blanket objection.193 Further, although
the district court judge advised defendant to object to specific jurors
individually, the context of the instruction showed that the judge intended
that defendant would elicit supplemental reasons for the jurors’
dismissal.194 The Federal Circuit opined that “[t]his is best demonstrated
by the fact that . . . [defendant] brought up additional facts about the
individual jurors beyond the reasons given in the original blanket
objection,” and was further demonstrated by the district court’s focus on
whether the employees held management versus union-contract positions
with plaintiff.195
The Federal Circuit also found that defendant had specifically stated that
it would not challenge Juror No. 3 despite having “additional” reasons for
challenging her empanelment.196 The defendant’s statement, the court
found, again demonstrated that when the district court suggested that
defendant make individual challenges, the request sought to elicit
supplemental challenges in addition to defendant’s blanket objection to any
juror’s employment with or spousal relationship with an employee of
187. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. The court contrasted the issue of implied bias
with that of actual bias, an inquiry the court characterized as factual. Id. at 1367, 73
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
188. Id. at 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
189. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. The court found that Sturman had included
Juror No. 3 in a list of eleven individuals who fell into the category to which its objection
was directed. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
190. Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
191. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
192. Id. at 1369-70, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
193. Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
194. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
195. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18.
196. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
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plaintiff.197
The Federal Circuit finally considered whether Juror No. 3 was
impliedly biased as a matter of law because of her spousal relationship with
a plaintiff employee. Applying the law of the Seventh Circuit, it found that
jurors are excluded for implied bias “in extraordinary circumstances,” but
that even under this standard jurors had been excluded as a matter of law if
the juror had “even a tiny financial interest in the case.”198 Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that because Juror No. 3’s husband worked for
plaintiff, she had a financial interest that warranted her dismissal as a
matter of law. The Federal Circuit deemed it legally irrelevant whether the
juror’s financial interest arose due to the employee’s position in
management or as a union-contract employee of plaintiff, and therefore
disagreed with the district court’s basis for distinguishing between these
roles. Because Juror No. 3 should have been excluded as a matter of law,
yet actually sat on the jury, the Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s verdicts
in favor of plaintiff and ordered a new trial.199
3.

Motions for a judgment as a matter of law
In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,200 plaintiff asserted that defendant waived its
right to challenge the jury verdict of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because “simply listing the grounds on which [defendant]
based its Rule 50(a) motion was insufficient to put [plaintiff] on notice as
what [defendant] alleged to be deficient in [plaintiff’s] evidence.”201
Though noting that defendant’s “references to the ‘all elements’ rule and
‘specification estoppel’ constituted a terse—even cryptic—statement of the
197. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. The court distinguished the facts at hand from
those in Zamora v. Guam, 394 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1968), in which the Ninth Circuit held that
the defense had waived its right to object to a juror where the defense had made a general
objection to the seating of jurors, who had been seated in a jury against the same defendant
in another case, yet failed to question individual jurors as to any bias after the court
“announced that defense counsel could explore the matter of prejudice with any juror.”
Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (citing Zamora, 394 F.2d at
816). In Zamora, the Caterpillar court explained, the issue was actual bias, a factual
question that requires inquiry as to individual jurors. 387 F.3d at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1618. Implied bias, on the other hand, is a question of law which requires no such
factual inquiry. Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. In Sturman’s case, the record
was complete because all relevant facts had been gathered through the voir dire process,
including the employment and spousal ties of potential jurors to Caterpillar. Id., 73
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. Furthermore, Sturman had “expeditiously inform[ed]” the court
about potential mistakes that might lead to reversal on appeal. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1618. The court found that these facts satisfied the two prongs of the rationale supporting
the waiver doctrine, encouraging parties to develop a full record of the case and putting the
court on notice of potential errors. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
198. Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1371-72, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618-19 (citing United
States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000)).
199. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
200. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
201. Id. at 1287, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
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grounds” for a Rule 50(a) motion,202 the Federal Circuit noted that the
district court “was in the best position to judge the sufficiency of the Rule
50(a) motion in the context of the trial,” and affirmed the district court’s
holding that no waiver occurred.203
In Summit Technology, Inc. v. Nidek Co.,204 the Federal Circuit set forth
its standard for reviewing a motion for a JMOL, stating that “courts
reviewing a jury verdict on a motion for judgment as a matter of law are
required to review all of the evidence presented at trial.”205 The Federal
Circuit further explained that such a review “requires an examination not
merely of isolated snippets of testimony or abbreviated excerpts from
documentary evidence divorced from the context in which they appear, but
of all relevant evidence on which the jury verdict may have been based.”206
F. United States Patent and Trademark Office Procedures
In re Watts207 presented the issues of (1) waiver of arguments before the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”), and (2) the
circumstances under which any Board error might preclude the need for
remand.208 Regarding the first issue, the question before the Federal Circuit
was whether appellant could challenge the Board’s decision on grounds not
previously raised before the Board.209 Specifically, appellant sought to
overturn the Board’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103210 by contending that
the Board and the examiner mischaracterized a prior art reference.211 The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that “[b]ecause the
appellant failed to argue his current interpretation of the prior art below, we
do not have the benefit of the Board’s informed judgment on the issue for
our review.”212 The Federal Circuit then explained that given appellant’s
failure to proffer a viable excuse for not raising the argument below, it
declined to “hold that appellant has waived his argument.”213
The Federal Circuit then addressed the question of whether the Board’s
rejection of a subset of claims without specific analysis of those claims
202. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
203. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. The district court reasoned that the Rule 50(a)
motion was sufficient given that “liability under the doctrine of equivalents has been the
central issue in this case since [it] determined . . . that [plaintiff’s] patent was not literally
infringed.” Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
204. 363 F.3d 1219, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
205. Id. at 1223, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
206. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
207. 354 F.3d 1362, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
208. Id. at 1366, 1369, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457, 1458.
209. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
210. Id. at 1363, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
211. Id. at 1366-67, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
212. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
213. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
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constituted reversible error.214 Noting that it had “previously made clear
that the harmless error rule applies to appeals from the Board just as it does
in cases originating from district courts,”215 the Federal Circuit explained
that “to prevail appellant must not only show the existence of error, but
also show that the error was in fact harmful because it affected the decision
below.”216 After reviewing the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the Board’s error was harmless because appellant never explained why the
subset of claims would be patentable if the other claims were properly
rejected.217
In the case of In re Sullivan,218 the Federal Circuit resolved several
procedural issues relating to interferences. Appellant owned a patent
involved in an interference that had been provoked by a patent applicant
who had copied appellant’s patent claims into its own application.219 Some
of the copied claims had been patented for over one year. Shortly after the
first interference was provoked by the applicant, the Board redeclared the
interference to add another patent owned by appellant and simultaneously
amended one of the copied claims in the application.220 At this stage,
Sullivan filed several preliminary motions, but the Board terminated the
interference in favor of the other party without addressing these motions
because appellant conceded that he did not have priority.221
On appeal, the court reviewed the Board’s actions under the arbitrary
and capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.222
The appellant first argued that because the Board had no jurisdiction over
an interference in which some of the claims involved were copied more
than one year after their issuance,223 the Federal Circuit had no jurisdiction
to review the Board’s final decision to terminate the interference.224 The
Federal Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, and explained that even if
the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction were improper the jurisdictional
question was properly within the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.225
The Federal Circuit also found appellant’s underlying argument

214. Id. at 1369, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
215. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458-59.
216. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
217. Id. at 1370, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
218. 362 F.3d 1324, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
219. Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
220. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
221. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
222. Id. at 1326, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)
(“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.”).
223. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
224. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
225. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

969

regarding the Board’s jurisdiction to be erroneous.226 The lawfulness of the
Board’s declaration of the original interference, it stated, was not at issue.
Instead, the issue was whether the redeclaration of the interference was
somehow unlawful.227
Appellant attacked the lawfulness of the
redeclaration on the grounds that he had not been given adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard.228 The Federal Circuit rejected this
interpretation of the facts, concluding that the Board had given notice to
appellant of the redeclaration and that appellant had entered an opposition
to the amendment that accompanied the redeclaration.229
After rejecting the challenges to the Board’s redeclaration of the
interference, the Federal Circuit addressed appellant’s arguments that the
Board inappropriately terminated the interference before addressing his
preliminary motions. Appellant had argued that the parties’ claims
corresponding to the interference were unpatentable as obvious in view of
certain prior art references.230 The Federal Circuit noted that the statute
governing interferences provides that the Board “shall determine questions
of priority of inventions and may determine questions of patentability.”231
The Federal Circuit interpreted this statute to vest the Board with discretion
to address questions of patentability after it had determined priority. The
Federal Circuit then held that the Board’s decision not to exercise this
discretion after appellant conceded priority was not arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.232
For its final line of attack against the Board’s decision, appellant took
issue with a standing order issued by the Board. The order regulated
procedural issues such as the form of papers to be filed, the procedure for
conferences, and the cross-examination of witnesses. Appellant contended
that the Board had no authority to enter a standing order governing the
procedure to be followed during the interference by virtue of 37 C.F.R. §
1.610, which provides that “times for taking action by a party in the
interference will be set on a case-by-case basis by the administrative patent
judge assigned to the interference.”233 The Federal Circuit however, gave
“controlling weight” to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s
(“PTO”) interpretation of § 1.610 to allow such standing orders because the
Federal Circuit could not find that such interpretation was “plainly

226. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
227. Id. at 1327, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
228. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
229. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
230. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
231. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)
(2000)).
232. Id. at 1327-28, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49.
233. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c) (2002)).
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”234 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that the administrative patent judge should not have to “reinvent
the wheel” in such procedural matters for each interference proceeding, and
the standing order specifically provided for its own modification by the
judge when appropriate.235 The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the award of
priority in favor of the patent applicant.
G. Statutory Interpretation
Kinik Co. v. International Trade Commission236 presented the issue of
whether the defenses in 35 U.S.C. 271(g)(1)–(2)237 are applicable to
infringement actions before the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”).238 The appellant challenged the ITC’s holding that it could not
invoke such defenses, arguing that pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a),239 the
ITC is obligated to consider “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses that may be
presented in all cases.”240
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the legislative
history concerning § 271(g), which stated that the section was designed to
provide patentees with the “new right to sue for damages and seek an
injunction in federal district court when someone, without authorization,
uses[,] sells[,] . . . or imports into the United States, a product made by [the
patentee’s] patented process.”241 The Federal Circuit thus explained that
the purpose of § 271(g) is to “authorize the district courts to adjudicate and
impose liability for infringement based on the overseas practice of
processes patented in the United States, upon importation of the products of

234. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
235. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
236. 362 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
237. Section 271(g) provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or
uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the
United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or
use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for
infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on
account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no
adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or
other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a
patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made
after—
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
238. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
239. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2000) (detailing the adjudicative procedure of the ITC for
cases involving importation of products that infringe protected U.S. intellectual property).
240. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(c)).
241. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 27 (1987)).
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those processes.”242 Noting that any ambiguity in § 1337, in light of
§ 271(g), would require deference to the ITC’s interpretation, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding because “no material changes were
made in the text of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) . . . despite the concurrent enactment
of § 271(g).”243 The Federal Circuit supported its holding by referring to
Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,244 in which
the court observed that § 271(g) “expressly limited the new defenses to
infringement ‘for purpose of this title.’”245
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling246 involved the question of whether by
passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act,247 Congress intended to
“preempt and invalidate all prohibitions on seed saving contained in utilitypatent licenses.”248 Answering the question in the negative, the Federal
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.249 that plants were subject-matter
eligible for utility protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101250 and that hybrid seeds
are also eligible for protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act.251
H. Miscellaneous Procedural Issues
The Federal Circuit in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.252
addressed the issue of whether a court may moot a defendant’s
counterclaims of invalidity and unenforceability in the event it grants
summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant. Despite
the fact that a defendant who wins on the infringement issue may still have
an interest in invalidating the patent to prevent the patentee from later
asserting infringement of the same patent against new products or methods,
and contrary to its rationale in TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp.,253 the Federal Circuit stated that a district court has discretion either
to hear such counterclaims or to dismiss them without prejudice, subject

242. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
243. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
244. 902 F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
245. 362 F.3d at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (citing Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1540
n.13, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741 n.13).
246. 363 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
247. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). See also 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (providing breeders of
seed-derived plant varieties patent-like rights protecting the distribution and reproduction of
their breeds).
248. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1344, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
249. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
250. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
251. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1344, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
252. 355 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
253. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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only to abuse of discretion review.254 The Federal Circuit reached this
conclusion despite its recognition that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International255 rejected a strict per se
policy of mooting claims of invalidity following rulings of
noninfringement.
In In re Violation of Rule 28(c),256 the Federal Circuit cautioned that
serious violations of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, even if
inadvertent, may result in sanctions.257 At issue was a violation of Rule
28(c),258 which limits the contents of a cross-appellant’s reply brief to the
issues raised by the cross-appeal.259 The underlying suit involved a claim
of patent infringement in which the district court found infringement and
granted damages in favor of the plaintiff.260 The defendant appealed from
the infringement judgment and the district court’s calculation of
damages.261 The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking to modify the judgment
on damages.262 Twenty of the twenty-three pages of the cross-appellant’s
reply brief, however, addressed issues pertinent only to the main appeal and
not to the cross-appeal.263 Finding no ambiguity in the language of Rule
28(c), the Federal Circuit explained that the rule prohibits the cross-appeal
reply brief from addressing the issues raised in the main appeal.264 Because
the failure to comply with the rule in this case was inadvertent, however,
the Federal Circuit did not exercise its authority under Rule 46(c) to impose
sanctions.265 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit warned that “in future cases,
serious violations of applicable rules, whether or not ‘inadvertent,’ will
potentially subject counsel to sanctions.”266
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,267 Judge Gajarsa wrote a
concurring opinion explaining that he would hold a claim directed solely to
“crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate” to be invalid under
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Liquid Dynamics, 355 F.3d at 1370, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
388 F.3d 1383, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1385, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
FED. R. APP. P. 28(c).
Id.
In re Violation of Rule 28(c), 388 F.3d at 1384, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
Id. at 1385, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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§ 101.268 The concurrence noted that the “question of patentability under
Section 101 does not arise often, and a court’s decision to raise it sua
sponte is even less common.”269 However, citing to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Slawson v. Grand Street Railroad270 and Richards v. Chase
Elevator Co.,271 the concurrence explained that “the question of whether
the invention which is the subject-matter in controversy is patentable or not
is always open to consideration of the court, whether the point is raised by
the answer or not.”272 The concurrence also acknowledged that while § 101
should be “given wide scope,” the statute “nevertheless excludes laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”273 The concurrence then
set forth that “the critical distinction guiding all Section 101 inquires into
the patentability of subject matter is that human-made, or synthetic,
products or processes are patentable, while products and processes of
nature are not.”274
The concurrence explained that the asserted claim covered “a natural
physical process whereby paroxetine anhydrate . . . could, under normal
climatic conditions with no human intervention, bond with water molecules
and convert itself into paroxetine hemihydrate.”275 Observing that the
disputed claim covering paroxetine hemihydrate “forces the courts to
consider the patentability of products and/or process launched in a
laboratory and released into nature,” the concurrence concluded that:
[A] natural reproduction process, whether sexual, asexual, part of a chain
reaction, or a process of decay, is ineligible for patent protection under
Section 101 . . . . An item reproduced by such a natural process, whether
an inorganic structure or a life form, must ipso facto be ineligible for
patent protection under Section 101.276

Addressing the concurrence’s discussion of § 101, the majority opinion
268. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). Section 101
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000).
269. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
270. 107 U.S. 649 (1883) (upholding decision that found a patent invalid despite the fact
that neither party put the validity in dispute).
271. 158 U.S. 299 (1895) (dismissing a patent for lack of novelty).
272. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring) (quoting Slawson, 107 U.S. at 652). The court also canvassed various decisions
from circuit courts in which issues relating to patentable subject matter under § 101 were
raised sua sponte. Id. at 1321-23, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748-50 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
273. Id. at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
275. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 1331-32, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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explained that “the claimed invention is without question a ‘composition of
matter’ or an article of ‘manufacture’ within the terms of § 101.
Accordingly, the claimed invention represents subject matter eligible for
patent protection.”277
B. 35 U.S.C. § 102
1.

Printed publication
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,278 the Federal Circuit addressed
whether an “Abstract” presented at a dental research conference constituted
prior art that was “described in a printed publication” more than one year
before publication pursuant to § 102(b).279 Affirming the district court’s
holding that the abstract did not qualify as a printed publication for
purposes of anticipation, the Federal Circuit explained that “the lack of
substantial evidence of actual availability of the Abstract adequately
supports the court’s conclusion that dissemination of the Abstract was not
established.”280 In particular, the Federal Circuit credited testimony from a
co-author of the Abstract that he did not recall whether he attended the
conference and did not recall whether the Abstract was actually distributed
to conference participants.281
In re Klopfenstein282 presented the issue of whether a slide presentation
that was pasted onto poster boards and “displayed continuously for two and
a half days”283 at an industry conference and displayed again for less than a
day at another industry conference constituted a “printed publication” for
purposes of § 102(b).284 The appellant argued that the presentation was not
a “printed publication” because it had not been “disseminated by the
distribution of reproduction or copies and/or indexed in a library or
database.”285 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that its
precedent does not limit a “printed publication” only to material that is
indexed or distributed.286 Rather, the Federal Circuit opined that:
[T]hroughout our case law, public accessibility has been the criterion by

277. Id. at 1316, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
278. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
279. Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)
(prohibiting issuance of patent if an invention was published more than a year before patent
application).
280. Norian, 363 F.3d at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. The court’s reference to
“the lack of substantial evidence” is at odds with its statement that “[w]hether a document is
a prior publication is a question of law.” Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
281. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
282. 380 F.3d 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
283. Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
284. Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
285. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
286. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

975

which a prior art reference will be judged for purposes of § 102(b).
Oftentimes courts have found it helpful to rely on distribution and
indexing as proxies for public accessibility. But when they have done
so, it has not been to the exclusion of all other measures of public
accessibility. In other words, distribution and indexing are not the only
factors to be considered in a § 102(b) “printed publication inquiry.”287

Providing an example, the Federal Circuit reasoned that
a public billboard targeted to those of ordinary skill in the art that
describes all of the limitations of an invention and that is on display for
the public for months may be neither “distributed” nor “indexed”—but it
most surely is “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art”
and therefore . . . a “printed publication.”288

The Federal Circuit also explained that determining whether a reference
constitutes a “printed publication” requires “a case-by-case inquiry into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members
of the public.”289
Having concluded that the presentation at issue was available to the
public only during certain periods of time at industry conferences, the
Federal Circuit identified several factors for determining whether a
temporarily displayed reference is sufficiently accessible to the public to
qualify as a “printed publication”:
The factors relevant to the facts of this case are: the length of time the
display was exhibited, the expertise of the target audience, the existence
(or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed
would not be copied, and the simplicity or ease with which the material
displayed could have been copied.290

The Federal Circuit instructed that “[o]nly after considering and
balancing these factors can we determine whether or not the [presentation]
was sufficiently accessible to be a ‘printed publication.’”291
In analyzing these factors, the Federal Circuit first explained that
“duration of the display is important in determining the opportunity of the
public in capturing, processing, and retaining the information conveyed by
the reference,” and that the more “transient the display, the less likely it is
to be considered a ‘printed publication.’”292 The Federal Circuit noted that
the presentation was displayed for a total of approximately three days.293
The Federal Circuit also determined that the intended target audience of the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 1350, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
Id. at 1350, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
Id. at 1351, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
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presentation was those of ordinary skill in the art.294 The Federal Circuit
further reasoned that no expectation existed that the presentation would not
be copied given the absence of any measures taken to protect the displayed
information.295 Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the presentation
was displayed in a simple manner and “copying of the information it
contained would have been a relatively simple undertaking.”296
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the cumulative weight of these
factors established that the presentation “was sufficiently publicly
accessible to count as a ‘printed publication.’”297
2.

Anticipation
a.

Inherency

In Toro Co. v. Deere & Co.,298 the asserted patents were directed to a
machine for lifting and fracturing soil to decrease subsurface soil density,
thereby increasing turf growth. In support of its motion for summary
judgment of invalidity, defendant argued that one of the asserted claims
was anticipated by a reference that expressly disclosed two of the three
claim limitations, and inherently disclosed the third. The district court
rejected defendant’s argument concerning inherency, stating that “no
reasonable factfinder could find that one of skill in the art would discern
from the [prior art] patent the unique combination of all of the necessary
parameters to produce the aeration method claimed in the [asserted]
patent . . . . The [prior art] patent does not thus anticipate the [asserted]
patent.”299
On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified numerous errors in the district
court’s analysis. First, the Federal Circuit explained that the district court
erroneously failed to construe the claim limitation at issue, and that such
failure rendered it impossible to decide whether the prior art inherently
disclosed the limitation. The Federal Circuit further noted that the district
court had suggested contradictory constructions by stating in one part of its
opinion that the terms and phrases should be given their ordinary meaning,
and, in another part of its opinion, incorporating specific operational
features described in the specification of the asserted patent, including
those described in the preferred embodiments but not recited in the asserted

294. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
295. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
296. Id. at 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
297. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
298. 355 F.3d 1313, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1584 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
299. Id. at 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589 (quoting Toro Co. v. John Deere & Co.,
143 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 (D. Minn. 2001)).
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claim.300
The Federal Circuit also found error in the district court’s failure to
address “a critical question” for inherent anticipation: whether, as a matter
of fact, practicing the prior art invention necessarily featured or resulted in
the allegedly inherent limitation of the asserted patent.301 Stating that proof
of inherent anticipation required that the “missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would
be so recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art,” the court opined that
the district court erroneously suggested that the inventor or other artisans
must have recognized that practicing the invention would result in the
allegedly inherent characteristic.302 The Federal Circuit pointed to its
decision in Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,303 which held
that a characteristic that is a necessary feature or result of a prior art
embodiment, sufficiently described and enabled, suffices for an inherent
disclosure even if such feature or result was unknown at the time of the
prior invention.
Along similar lines, the Federal Circuit found flaws in the district court’s
statement that “no reasonable factfinder could find that one of skill in the
art would discern from the [prior art reference] the unique combination of
all of the necessary parameters to produce the aeration method claimed in
the ‘168 patent.’”304 The Federal Circuit explained that this statement was
made without a “proper construction” of the relevant limitation and “a
corresponding factual analysis of [the prior art reference’s]
embodiments.”305 Further, the Federal Circuit noted that a proper
construction of the disputed term could demonstrate that the claim was not
restricted to the precise numerical ranges included in the specification,
thereby rendering irrelevant the absence of numerical ranges in the prior art
reference.
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,306 defendant appealed the district
court’s finding that two of plaintiff’s patents directed to the antibiotic
known by the trade name of Ceftin® were not anticipated or made obvious
by a third patent owned by Glaxo.307 Defendant had presented expert
testimony that performance of the experiments recited in the examples of
300. The Federal Circuit, however, stopped short of construing the claims because the
appellate record did not contain sufficient evidence to guide it, and instead remanded the
issue back to the district court. Id. at 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
301. Id. at 1320, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90.
302. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Toro, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30).
303. 339 F.3d 1373, 1377-78, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
304. Toro, 355 F.3d at 1319, 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90 (quoting Toro, 143
F. Supp. 2d at 1130).
305. Id. at 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
306. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
307. Id. at 1343, 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803, 1807.
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the allegedly anticipating reference resulted in the features claimed by the
asserted patents, necessitating a finding that those features were inherent in
the reference.308 The district court discredited this testimony because the
expert had admitted to deviating from the examples in performing his
experiments.309 Furthermore, the expert admitted that he had read the
patents asserted by plaintiff prior to performing the experiments.310 The
district court opined that these facts rendered the expert’s experiments
“highly suspect” and that therefore the experiments did not constitute clear
and convincing evidence of the patents’ invalidity. The Federal Circuit
found no error in the district court’s conclusions.311
b.

Anticipation by a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)

In the case of In re Ngai,312 an inventor appealed the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interference’s decision that its patent claims were anticipated
or rendered obvious by the prior art. The patent at issue was generally
directed to methods for “amplifying” and “normalizing” ribonucleic acids
(“RNA”) in order to prepare sufficient quantities of RNA for
experimentation. Although most claims covered methods, the only claim at
issue on appeal was drawn to a “kit” for normalizing and amplifying RNA
populations comprising several components including “instructions
describing the method of claim 1.”313 The Board held that kits existed in
the prior art, which contained all of the claimed components including
instructions, and thus the claim was anticipated. Relying on the court’s In
re Gulack314 decision for the proposition that “[d]ifferences between an
invention and the prior art cited against it cannot be ignored merely
because those differences reside in the content of the printed matter,”315
appellant contended that its claims could be distinguished from the prior art
because no prior art kit had instructions bearing the same content.
The Federal Circuit determined that the circumstances on appeal were
not analogous to Gulack. The invention in Gulack was a circular band
bearing printed numbers that could be used for math education and
recreation. Although bands with numbers printed on them were widely
308. Id. at 1345, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
309. Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
310. Id. at 1345, 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804, 1807.
311. Id. at 1345, 1348-49, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804, 1807. It further found that
secondary factors of non-obviousness including commercial success, long felt but
unresolved need, and unexpected results favored the non-obvious determination reached by
the court below, especially considering the admission of Apotex’s expert that the patent
Apotex relied upon did not suggest the benefits of the additional features of the inventions
covered by the asserted patents. Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
312. 367 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
313. Id. at 1337, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
314. 703 F.2d 1381, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
315. Id. at 1385, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 403.
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known in the prior art, the numbers in Gulack’s invention had a functional
relationship to the band: the band supported the digits, and the digits
exploited the endless nature of the band. In contrast, Ngai’s printed matter
in no way “depend[ed] on the kit, and the kit [did] not depend on the
printed matter.”316 The Federal Circuit thus held that even Gulack pointed
out that printed matter would not distinguish the invention from prior art
where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate. The
Federal Circuit also observed that accepting appellant’s position would
require the PTO to grant patents on a product to anyone who would attach a
new instruction sheet to it.
Kioto Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC317 involved an appeal
from a district court’s grant of a JMOL holding claims directed to methods
for injection molding of plastic products invalid as anticipated.318 On
appeal, the patentee argued that the district court erred because the plaintiff
“merely submitted th[e] [prior art] reference into evidence and made no
specific mention of it at trial.”319 The Federal Circuit began its analysis by
stating that a party advancing an anticipation shoulders “an especially
heavy burden.”320 In reviewing the trial record, the Federal Circuit
observed that although plaintiff entered the prior art reference into
evidence, it “otherwise failed to provide any testimony or other evidence
that would demonstrate to the jury how that reference met the limitations of
the claims . . . or how the reference enabled one of ordinary skill in the art
to practice the claimed invention.”321 The Federal Circuit also observed
that plaintiff’s invalidity expert never specifically mentioned the prior art
reference during his testimony and “offered a conclusion of invalidity
relating to a quintet of prior art patents which included [the prior art
reference].”322
In reversing the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, the
Federal Circuit explained:
Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from
one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the
witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how
each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference. The testimony
is insufficient if it is merely conclusory.323
316. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
317. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
318. Id. at 1144-45, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191-92.
319. Id. at 1151, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
320. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting N.V. Akzo v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours,
810 F.2d 1148, 1150-51, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1707 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
321. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
322. Id. at 1151-52, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
323. Id. at 1152, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting Schumer v. Lab. Computer
Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315-16, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
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The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the “general and conclusory
testimony” provided by plaintiff’s invalidity expert “does not suffice as
substantial evidence of invalidity . . . . This is so even when the [prior art]
reference has been submitted into evidence before the jury.”324
In re Elsner325 presented an appeal from the PTO’s finding that claims
directed to geranium and rose plants were anticipated under § 102(b).326 In
particular, the PTO determined the appellants’ published Plant Breeder’s
Rights patent applications disclosed the claimed inventions while the
foreign sales of the claimed plants placed the possession of the inventions
in those skilled in the art.327 The Federal Circuit explained that the precise
issue on appeal was “whether evidence of foreign sale of a claimed
reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non-enabled printed
publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a § 102(b) bar.”328 The
Federal Circuit began by noting that while “foreign sales of an invention in
combination with a publication will not constitute a bar because such a
result would circumvent the established rules that neither non-enabling
publications nor foreign sales can bar one’s right to a patent,”329 the case
before it was distinct because “it deals with plant patents, which may be
granted to ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any
distinct and new variety of plant.’”330 The Federal Circuit thus reasoned
that “only when possession derived in this manner enables a person of skill
in the art to practice asexual reproduction of the plant in a manner
consistent with the statute can a non-enabling publication and a foreign sale
act as a § 102(b) bar.”331
The Federal Circuit rejected appellant’s argument that its holding would
create a printed publication bar when a non-enabling publication could be
coupled with a foreign sale, explaining that:
When a publication identifies the plant that is involved or discovered and
a foreign sale occurs that puts one of ordinary skill in the art in
possession of the plant itself, which, based on the level of ordinary skill
in the art, permits asexual reproduction without undue experimentation,
that combination of facts and events so directly conveys the essential
knowledge of the invention that the sale combines with the publication to
erect a statutory bar.332

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s use of the published patent
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 1152, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
381 F.3d 1125, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1126, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
Id. at 1126-27, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039-40.
Id. at 1128, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000)).
Id. at 1128-29, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id. at 1129, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
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applications together with the sales of the claimed plants “to show that the
public was in possession of the claimed plants and thus that the [patent]
applications were enabled anticipatory references”333 because its precedent
“supports the use of secondary references to show that a primary § 102(b)
reference was in fact enabled.”334
In Nystrom v. Trex Co.,335 the Federal Circuit applied its precedent in
Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group International, Inc.336 and In re
Wright337 to determine whether a patent figure anticipated a claim
limitation directed to a radius of curvature to width ratio of a surface of a
board used for constructing outdoor decks. The patentee argued that the
district court incorrectly based its anticipation decision on data generated
by an employee of defendant, who made a software model of the boards
depicted in the perspective drawings of the allegedly anticipatory patent
figure, and then performed computation to determine that the figure
displayed the recited ratio. The district court concluded that the precedents
of Hockerson-Halberstadt and Wright were not applicable as it found that
“the correct inquiry [was] whether a person of ordinary skill in the art
would use measurements from the [cited] reference to ascertain the degree
of curvature.”338
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court erroneously
applied precedents that indicated the court’s “disfavor in reading precise
proportions into patent drawings which do not expressly provide such
proportions.”339 Because the district court improperly relied on defendant’s
data, which assumed the patent figure was drawn to scale, in its holding
that certain claims of plaintiff’s patent were anticipated, the Federal Circuit
reversed the court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity.340
c.

On-sale bar and public use

In Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,341 the Federal Circuit
reversed a finding that plaintiff’s patent covering a sustained release
formulation of the anti-inflammatory composition, naproxen sodium, was

333. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
334. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
335. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
336. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district
court’s judgment of noninfringement in a patent infringement case concerning an article of
outer footwear).
337. 569 F.2d 1124, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 332 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that appellant’s
invention concerning a whiskey barrel croze would have been obvious, at the time it was
made, to a person of ordinary skill).
338. 374 F.3d at 1116, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
339. Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
340. Id. at 1117-18, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
341. 366 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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invalid under the on-sale bar.342 Defendant asserted that the patent was
barred by plaintiff’s offer to supply the composition to several
pharmaceutical companies in the United States in excess of one year before
the patent’s application filing date.343 The district court agreed, finding that
a letter drafted by a plaintiff’s executive to a potential licensee, dated
approximately four years before plaintiff filed its patent application,
constituted an offer for sale for purposes of the statutory bar.344 The letter
“confirmed” plaintiff’s plans to be in a position to file an Investigational
New Drug (“IND”) by the following year, and to file a New Drug
Application (“NDA”) after two years of collecting necessary data and
developing a sustained-release naproxen sodium compound. The letter also
expressed plaintiff’s interest in seeking a partner in such licensing and
development and specified the licensing and clinical fees that would be
associated with partnership.345 The letter further “confirmed” that plaintiff
would be responsible for supplying bulk tablets to the potential customer
under a price structure that would allow the potential licensee an “initial
gross margin based on current naproxen prices of not less than 70% after
taking into account [its] processing charge . . . , A.I. cost, packaging and
royalty.”346
Reversing the judgment on appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that its
previous decisions, such as In re Kollar,347 made clear that “an offer to
license a patent claiming an invention after future research and
development had occurred, without more, is not an offer to sell the
invention.”348 The Federal Circuit further explained that “a sale of rights in
a patent, as distinct from a sale of the invention itself, is not within the
scope of the statute, and thus does not implicate the on-sale bar.”349 Thus,
contrary to the district court’s opinion, the Federal Circuit found that
plaintiff’s letter to the potential licensee was merely an offer to enter into a
license under a patent for future sale of the invention “when and if it has
been developed.”350 The Federal Circuit explained that the letter lacked
provisions for quantities, time of delivery, place of delivery, and detailed
product specifications. The Federal Circuit also noted that the price terms
provided for in the letter were labeled “licensing fees,” and therefore
merely represented the amount that plaintiff requested to form and continue
342. Id. at 1337, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
343. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724.
344. Id. at 1337-39, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723-25.
345. Id. at 1337-38, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723-24.
346. Id. at 1338, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
347. 286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
348. Elan, 366 F.3d at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725-26.
349. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725 (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1049, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
350. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
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a partnership with the potential licensee. The fees were not, the Federal
Circuit explained, price terms for the sale of tablets. The court also found
important the absence of any terms linking prices to quantities of tablets.
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff’s “confirmation” that it would
supply bulk tablets according to a specified price structure was not a “price
term” because the actual prices would not be determinable until the
sustained release formulation was approved as safe and effective, and the
charges for processing, packaging, and etcetera would not be determinable
until later.351
Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.352 addressed the
validity of six design patents owned by plaintiff, a furniture sales company
that provided customers and industry representatives a preview of its new
furniture designs one month before a biannual, industry-wide “Market”
event.353 Plaintiff’s preview event was called “Pre-Market.” Plaintiff’s
standard procedures at Pre-Market required attendants to be named on a
special list of invitees and to present identification twice at the exhibition
before being escorted by a sales representative around the showroom. No
pictures were allowed, and no one could take anything from the showroom
when they left the exhibition. In September 1999, plaintiff hosted a
preview event at which it showcased a line of furniture that it later adopted
as its “Coronado Collection.”354 The designs of this particular furniture
collection were the subject of the six asserted patents.
The district court held that four of the asserted patents were invalid
under § 102(b) as a result of plaintiff’s exhibition of its designs at the
September 1999 Pre-Market.355 On appeal, plaintiff argued that (1) the PreMarket event was not “public” for purposes of § 102(b), and that
(2) defendant failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the designs exhibited
at the September 1999 Pre-Market were actually covered by the asserted
patents. The court first focused on whether defendant had sufficiently
proven that the exhibited designs fell within the scope of the patents at
issue. The evidence proffered by defendant showed that four stock keeping
units (“SKUs”), used by plaintiff to track its designs, had been included in
a “Pre-Market Wish List,” a document listing the SKUs of the furniture that
would be exhibited at Pre-Market events. Defendant argued that these
SKUs corresponded to furniture designs covered by the asserted patents.
Defendant also presented a document from plaintiff summarizing
comments gathered from the invitees to the September 1999 Pre-Market
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726-27.
386 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1373-74, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903-04.
Id. at 1373-75, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903-04.
Id. at 1375, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
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event that named three such SKUs. The district court concluded from this
evidence that it was highly likely that “the furniture designs for the four
SKUs corresponding to the patents were shown at the 1999 Pre-Market.”356
The Federal Circuit found the district court’s analysis of this question to
be lacking. Although the district court had found that the furniture pieces
corresponding to the “SKUs” were “similar to” the furniture design shown
in each patent, the court did not apply the “ordinary observer test” or the
“points of novelty test” to determine whether the designs actually displayed
were “substantially similar in appearance in the eyes of an ordinary
observer . . . or appropriated the points of novelty of the patented
designs.”357
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the Pre-Market exhibition
was “public” within the meaning of § 102(b). The district court had held
that the Pre-Market exhibition was public because it found that plaintiff had
produced insufficient evidence that the Pre-Market invitees were under any
duty or ethical obligation of confidentiality when they viewed the items
displayed.
The Federal Circuit found that this conclusion was
“misdirected.”358 Contrary to the implications of the district court’s
opinion, it held that the presence or absence of confidentiality agreements
was not dispositive of whether use is public under § 102(b), and that the
appropriate inquiry mandates review of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the allegedly barred use.359 Specifically, it found the district
court had failed to analyze how plaintiff’s Pre-Market exhibition
comported with the policies underlying the public use bar. This failure was
enough for the Federal Circuit to find the court’s analysis incomplete and
to justify vacating the court’s holding.
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,360 the court explained
that the public use defense under § 102(b)361 incorporates the same “ready
for patenting” analysis as the on-sale bar.362 The court explained that while
the commercial sale prong of the on-sale bar does not apply, public use
“includes any use of the claimed invention by a person other than the
inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to
the inventor.”363 The Federal Circuit thus made clear that the public use
356. Id. at 1376, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (quoting Bernhardt L.L.C. v. Collezione
Eurpoa USA, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 485, 495 (M.D.N.C. 2003)).
357. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
358. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
359. Id. at 1379, 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907, 1909.
360. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
361. Section 102(b) provides in relevant part that a claim is invalid if “the invention
was . . . in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the date of the
application for the patent in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
362. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1316-17, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
363. Id. at 1317, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (quoting Netscape Communications
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defense “erects a bar where, before the critical date, the invention was
ready for patenting and was used by a person other than the inventor who is
under no confidentiality obligation.”364
Turning to the undisputed facts in the record, the Federal Circuit held the
claim invalid observing that “the record shows that [the claimed
compound] PHC hemihydrate was in public use before the critical date.”365
In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the plaintiff “placed PHC
hemihydrate in public clinical trials in the United States . . . . Moreover,
[plaintiff] administered PHC hemihydrate to patients without any apparent
confidentiality restrictions on the patients or the administering
physicians.”366
The Federal Circuit also addressed plaintiff’s argument that the clinical
trials constituted experimental use exempt from the reach of the public use
bar, explaining that: “Testing or experimentation performed with respect
to non-claimed features of the device does not show that the invention was
the subject of experimentation. In other words, an experimental use only
negates a statutory bar when the inventor was testing claimed features of
the invention.”367 Then, noting its adoption of plaintiff’s own construction
of PHC hemihydrate as not limited by any considerations of “efficacy,
commercial use, or pharmaceutical viability,”368 the Federal Circuit held
that “clinical trials designed to establish the efficacy and safety of the
compound as an antidepressant for FDA approval are not experimental uses
of that claimed invention.”369 The Federal Circuit further elaborated that
“[i]n other words, the claim covers the compound regardless of its use as an
antidepressant. The antidepressant properties of the compound are simply
not claimed features.”370 The Federal Circuit also explained that potential
confusion may exist between experimental use and the “separate
requirement of patent law to test an invention for utility, i.e., to show that it
works for its intended propose.”371 While noting a “potential overlap for
utility and experimental testing,”372 the Federal Circuit held that “utility
testing (reduction to practice) and experimental use testing are not
synonymous,”373 and “after the invention is reduced to practice, further
testing will not qualify as experimental use for purposes of negating a bar
Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
364. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
365. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
366. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
367. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
368. Id. at 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
369. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
370. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
371. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
372. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
373. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
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under § 102(b).”374
The Federal Circuit also stated that it was aware of its decisions in EZ
Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc.,375 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track &
Court Construction,376 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
Inc.,377 in which the experimental use was found despite “testing that did
not focus on an expressly claimed feature.”378 The court, however,
explained that “[e]ach of those cases permitted testing to negate the bar
when the experimentation improves or verifies a feature inherent in the
express claims of the invention.”379
With respect to Manville, the Federal Circuit noted that the decision
explicitly provided that the inventor’s testing was necessary because
“durability in an outdoor environment is inherent to the purpose of the
invention,” a covered light pole used for highway repairs.380 Discussing
Seal-Flex, the Federal Circuit explained that the case involved claims
directed to “an all-weather track” and “experimentation again focused on
features inherent to the claimed invention.”381 With regard to EZ Dock, the
Federal Circuit explained that although that case involved claims covering
a “floating dock” without an express limitation on performance in “choppy
water,” the claim language “carried the implication that the invention must
perform in rough water. Thus, again the experimentation verified or
improved a feature inherent to the claimed invention.”382 Having
374. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. The court also explained that experimental
testing and utility testing stemmed from “different origins and purposes, the narrower
experimental use negation does not extend beyond perfecting claimed features.” Id. at 1319,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
375. 276 F.3d 1347, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (remanding a patent
infringement case regarding a polyethylene floating dock to determine factual issues as to
whether sale of the dock before the critical date was experimental).
376. 98 F.3d 1318, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing the district
court’s summary judgment of a patent infringement case concerning all-weather athletic
track because factual questions existed on the issue of patentability of invention under onsale bar).
377. 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that the use of
iris guide arms for self-centering luminaire assembly for lighting poles on one pole at one
site was experimental for purposes of on-sale and public use bars).
378. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
379. Id. at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
380. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (quoting Manville, 917 F.2d at 551, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592).
381. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. The court noted that Seal-Flex was decided
under the “totality of the circumstances” standard rendered inapplicable by a subsequent
Supreme Court opinion. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (rejecting totality of
circumstances test as “undermin[ing] the interest in certainty” and adopting a two-prong test
for the on-sale bar). The court further explained that the Seal-Flex decision did not
affirmatively hold that experimental use was applicable, but rather vacated the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on invalidity and remanded the case. SmithKline, 365
F.3d at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
382. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. The court again
explained that in EZ Dock there was no definitive holding that the experimental use
exception was applicable, but instead a vacate of summary judgment of invalidity and a
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canvassed its decisions in these cases, the Federal Circuit concluded that its
jurisprudence “has remained faithful to the strict requirements of the
experimental use negation by limiting it to testing to perfect claimed
features, or, in a few instances, testing to perfect features inherent to the
claimed invention.”383 The Federal Circuit then instructed that: “[A]
patentee should understand that testing the properties, uses, and
commercial significance of a compound claimed solely in structural terms
may start the clock under § 102(b) for filing a claim that is not limited by
any property, commercially significant amount, or other use of the
compound.”384
Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.385 involved the
question of whether a pre-patenting sale of a device that was capable of
performing the patented process rendered the disputed patent claims invalid
under the on-sale bar of § 102(b).386 In affirming the jury’s verdict that the
claims were not invalid, the Federal Circuit explained that substantial
evidence established that the sold device was not designed to perform the
patented process and was not used to perform the patented process until
after the asserted claims had issued.387
C. 35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness
In Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,388 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding that a patent directed to a screw anchor system that was
used to support and stabilize slouching buildings was invalid as obvious in
light of the prior art. The asserted claims recited an elongated shaft with a
screw tip and a transversely extending load-bearing metal bracket. Of the
two prior art patents relied upon by the district court, one disclosed the
screw anchor component and the other disclosed the metal bracket
remand to the district court. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
383. Id. at 1319-20, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. While concurring with the
majority’s holding that the asserted claim was invalid, Judge Gajarsa wrote a concurring
opinion explaining that he would affirm the district court’s decision that plaintiff is entitled
to summary judgment that the claim is not invalid under public use because “the control
[plaintiff] actually exercised over the trials was sufficient to demonstrate that the trials were
in the nature of experimentation rather than mere commercial use.” Id. at 1324, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750-51 (quoting SmithKline Beechum v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp.
2d 925, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The concurrence also noted that the majority opinion failed to
explain why out of the cases discussed, only the plaintiff in the case at bar “had reduced its
claimed invention to practice sufficiently to preclude the experimental use doctrine.” Id. at
1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
384. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747-48.
385. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
386. Id. at 1308-09, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89. Section 102(b) provides, in
pertinent part, that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention
was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
387. Poly-America, 383 F.3d at 1309, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89.
388. 357 F.3d 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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component. Both references disclosed systems for supporting building
foundations.
The Federal Circuit had previously remanded the case because the
district court had not made specific findings on the motivation to combine
the prior art references, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and whether
and to what extent secondary considerations were probative in its
obviousness analysis.389 Upon remand, the district court again came to its
original conclusion: the asserted claims were obvious in light of the cited
references, stating that motivation to combine the references was found in
the problem of underpinning foundations to which the asserted patent and
the prior art references were addressed.390 The district court also explained
that the patentee’s evidence of commercial success and doubt of expert
witnesses were weak.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and rejected the patentee’s
argument that the district court exercised hindsight in its obviousness
analysis, explaining that motivation to combine prior art references can be
found in the nature of the problem to be solved, particularly with “simpler
mechanical technologies.” The Federal Circuit noted that it was therefore
proper for the district court to find a motivation to combine “because the
two references address precisely the same problem,” underpinning
structural foundations.391 The Federal Circuit also rejected the patentee’s
contention that the district court employed hindsight in identifying the
required motivation to combine. The Federal Circuit pointed to the district
court’s careful consideration and ultimate dismissal of a witness’s
testimony that actually supported a finding of a motivation to combine, and
declared that this careful consideration “show[ed] further that it performed
a detailed and reasoned analysis of the evidence, rather than a conclusionoriented discussion that typically accompanies a hindsight analysis.”392
In National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway,393 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s patents were
not invalid as obvious over two prior art references. The primary issues
were:
(1) whether either reference disclosed the “drop-deck” or
“intermediate depressed floor section” limitation of the asserted claims, in
which the floor of the rail car between the end truck assemblies was lower
than the portion of the floor over the end truck assemblies, and (2) whether
there existed a motivation to combine the references.394 The Federal
Circuit found that one reference disclosed a rail car with a floor while the
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 1274, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
Id. at 1276, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
Id. at 1277, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
357 F.3d 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1322-25, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643-45.
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other reference disclosed a railcar in which the bottom’s center portion was
lower than the portion over the ends. The fact that the second reference’s
bottom was not load-bearing, as the district court construed the term
“floor” to require, was not problematic the Federal Circuit reasoned,
because it found a load-bearing floor could be found in the first reference.
Plaintiff argued that even if these two references disclosed all of the
limitations of its asserted claims, defendant did not demonstrate a sufficient
motivation to combine them in order to raise a substantial question of
invalidity for obviousness. The Federal Circuit, however, rejected that
argument, explaining that defendant produced two pieces of documentary
evidence supporting its position that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated to combine the references.395
The Federal Circuit thoroughly criticized the district court’s reasoning
underlying its conclusion that plaintiff’s patent was obvious. First,
addressing the district court’s conclusion that neither reference had been
disclosed to a sufficient number of people in order to qualify as “prior art,”
the court emphasized that “[p]ublic distribution is irrelevant” as it has “long
been the law that the motivation to combine need not be found in prior art
references, but equally can be found in the knowledge generally available
to one of ordinary skill in the art.”396 The Federal Circuit explained that the
question was not whether others learned of the drawing evidencing the
motivation to combine, as it would be if the issue was whether the drawing
constituted prior art; rather the inquiry was whether the drawing
demonstrated that persons of ordinary skill in the art would have
considered it obvious to combine the elements found in the prior art
references.397
Second, the Federal Circuit found clear error in the district court’s
dismissal of one of the references as prior art on the basis that it was
created by a person without knowledge of engineering or rail car design.
The court explained that the fact that the creator of a work allegedly
showing the motivation to combine had less skill than one of ordinary skill
in the art is actually probative of what one of ordinary skill in the art would
have found obvious.398
Third, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that
because the references addressed goals different from those served by the
asserted patent, they “taught away” from the claimed invention. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that “[a] finding that two inventions were
designed to resolve different problems . . . is insufficient to demonstrate
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 1337-38, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
Id. at 1337, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655-56.
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that one invention teaches away from another.”399
Finally, addressing secondary considerations, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court’s finding that a long-felt but unsatisfied
need for the invention existed was “flatly contradictory” with its additional
finding that customers were satisfied with railcars that already existed on
the market. The Federal Circuit further noted that the other secondary
considerations considered by the district court were insufficient by
themselves to uphold its conclusion with regard to obviousness.400
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary
injunction.
In Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,401 the
Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment that plaintiff’s drug
patent was invalid as obvious. The patent was directed to a composition of
ibuprofen and hydrocodone and methods of administering such
composition to treat pain. The district court found the prior art suggesting
combination of hydrocodone and ibuprofen to be invalidating.402 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that the district court erred by failing
to look to the specification’s acknowledgment that the analgesic effect
resulting from the combination was greater than that provided by using
either ibuprofen or hydrocodone alone. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
found the district court improperly excluded the patentee’s evidence of
studies conducted after the patent was granted that demonstrated the
synergistic interaction of hydrocodone and ibuprofen. The Federal Circuit
held that such “[e]vidence developed after the patent grant is not excluded
from consideration” because it provides an “understanding of the full range
of an invention is not always achieved at the time of filing the patent
application.”403
The Federal Circuit also found error in the district court’s treatment of
certain evidence of the failure of others to develop similar combination
drugs, including evidence that others had abandoned their FDA registration
applications for related compounds. The district court did not ignore this
evidence altogether, but dismissed it on the basis that several similar
combinations had made it to market. The Federal Circuit deemed these
materials to be objective evidence of others’ failure to make the invention,
and held that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence
instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opponent
of summary judgment.404 As the Federal Circuit saw it, “[a]t a minimum
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 1339, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
Id. at 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
367 F.3d 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1957 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1384, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.
Id. at 1385, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
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the conflicting evidence reinforced the patentee’s argument that the activity
observed for the patented combination [was] not routinely present for all
[related] combinations.”405
In TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,406 plaintiff sued
defendant for infringement of its various patents directed to certain Vshaped ergonomic keyboards.407 The district court granted a motion for
summary judgment of invalidity, finding that all of the asserted claims
were obvious in light of prior art.408 Defendant relied primarily on one
reference created by a German company called Marquardt (“the
document”) which included several pictures of V-shaped keyboards similar
to the claimed invention. The document, however, was undated, and
therefore the main issue was whether it in fact constituted prior art. The
district court heard several of defendant’s witnesses testify to the effect that
the document had been published at a trade show in Germany in 1986,
prior to the critical date, and therefore determined that it was prior art.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that genuine issues existed as to the
credibility of defendant’s witnesses and therefore summary judgment had
been improperly granted. First, the Federal Circuit concluded that
defendant’s testimony that the document was publicly available in 1986
was tentative—one witness had said he thought the document had been
handed out at the 1986 trade show, and the other testified only that he
remembered seeing documents “similar” to the document at the trade
show.409 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit observed that these same
witnesses testified that the document had been found in a file dated 1990
and that the document had served as the basis for patent applications filed
in 1991, and would have barred those patent applications had it been
published in 1986. Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that although the
witnesses had testified that it was possible to verify the exact date of the
document, no evidence suggested that such a step had been taken.410
Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit determined that summary
judgment of invalidity was improperly granted.411 The Federal Circuit
explained that although a naked statement that witnesses should not be
believed would not prohibit summary judgment, “where the opposing party
offers specific facts that call into question the credibility of the movants

405. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
406. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
407. Id. at 1154, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
408. Id. at 1155, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
409. Id. at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
410. Id. at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
411. The court did not discuss the fact that had the document been published as late as
1990, it still could have been considered prior art.
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[sic] witnesses” summary judgment is not appropriate.412
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,413 the Federal
Circuit held that a prior art reference’s recognition of a problem to be
solved did not render obvious subsequent claims for solving that
problem.414 Cardiac Pacemakers involved an appeal from a district court’s
grant of a JMOL, holding claims directed to cardiac defibrillators that are
permanently installed under a patient’s skin invalid for obviousness.415 In
granting the JMOL, the district court reasoned that all the elements of the
disputed claims were well known in the prior art and found a “compelling
motivation” to combine the various elements in light of a prior art reference
that identified the same problem and solved the disputed claims.416
Reversing the grant of the JMOL, the Federal Circuit explained that the
district court “applied an incorrect standard to the ultimate question” of
obviousness:417
Recognition of the problem of treating complex heart arrhythmias does
not render obvious the eventual solution. Recognition of a need does not
render obvious the achievement that meets that need. There is an
important distinction between the general motivation to cure an uncured
disease . . . and the motivation to create a particular cure.418

Though opining that “[t]here can of course arise situations wherein
identification of the problem is itself the invention,” the Federal Circuit
explained that “in the case at bar the problem was well-recognized . . .
[and] the solution of this problem, according to trial proceedings, had not
previously been achieved.”419 The Federal Circuit therefore determined
that “[r]ecognition of an unsolved problem does not render the solution
obvious.”420
In re Fulton421 involved an appeal from the Board’s obviousness
rejection of claims directed to an improved shoe sole.422 The Federal
Circuit first noted that “[w]hen a rejection depends on combination of prior
art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the references.”423 The Federal Circuit also explained that the
source of the motivation to combine may be “the nature of the problem, the
412. TypeRight Keyboard, 374 F.3d at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06.
413. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
414. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
415. Id. at 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
416. Id. at 1376-77, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
417. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
418. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
419. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
420. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
421. 391 F.3d 1195, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
422. Id. at 1196-97, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43.
423. Id. at 1200, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1355, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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teachings of the pertinent references, or the ordinary knowledge of those
skilled in the art.”424
Appellant argued that the Board’s finding of a motivation to combine
lacked substantial evidence because it failed to show that the characteristics
in the prior art reference “are preferred over other alternatives disclosed in
the prior art.”425 The court rejected this argument and explained:
[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the
preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in
order to provide motivation for the current invention. “The question is
whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the
desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination,” not
whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest that the
combination is the most desirable combination available.426

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “a finding that the prior art as
a whole suggests the desirability of a particular combination need not be
supported by a finding that the prior art suggests that the combination
claimed by the patent applicant is the preferred, or most desirable,
combination.”427
Relying on its precedent that a reference “teach[es] away when a person
of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from
following the path set out in the reference,”428 appellant also argued that the
Board erred in finding that none of the prior art references taught away
from the combination of prior art references relied upon for the rejection.429
The Federal Circuit also rejected this argument, reasoning that “[t]he prior
art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a
teaching away from any of [the] alternatives because such disclosure does
not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed in the
[appellant’s] application.”430
Appellant further argued that the Board erred by failing to establish that
the prior art contained a teaching identifying the importance of a feature
covered by the claimed invention.431 The Federal Circuit also declined to
accept this argument, noting that it “relies on the mistaken premise that the
prior art must teach that a particular combination is preferred, or ‘optimal,’

424. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149
F.3d at 1355, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456).
425. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
426. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
427. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
428. Id. at 1201, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
429. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145-46.
430. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
431. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
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for the combination to be obvious.”432 Citing In re Gurley,433 the court
stated that “as long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the
references is provided by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not
require that the reference be combined for the reasons contemplated by the
inventor.”434
In re Bigio435 presented the question of whether prior art references
relating to toothbrushes constituted analogous art for purposes of
determining whether claims directed to a hair brush would have been
obvious.436 The Federal Circuit observed that:
[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether
the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.437

Challenging the Board’s application of the field of endeavor test,
appellant argued that such an approach is “unworkable because the lack of
clear guidelines leaves the application of this test to an examiner’s
subjective judgment.”438 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
explaining that “the field of endeavor test is neither wholly subjective nor
unworkable. The test for analogous art requires the PTO to determine the
appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of the
invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the
embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.”439 The
Federal Circuit further observed that:
Although the majority of the case law precedent for analogous arts
hinges on the second test, this court detects no ambiguity in the “field of
endeavor” test. While the scope of any field of endeavor will vary with
the factual description of each invention, that variability does not equate
with ambiguity and absence of a neutral standard.440

Turning to the record, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
determination that the toothbrush references were analogous art to claims
directed to a hair brush “because the structural similarities between
toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary
skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all
432. Id. at 1201-02, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
433. 27 F.3d 551, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130.
434. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1202, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citations omitted) (quoting
In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
435. 381 F.3d 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
436. Id. at 1325, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
437. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
438. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
439. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
440. Id. at 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
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similar brushes including toothbrushes.”441 The Federal Circuit also
affirmed the Board’s finding that one skilled in the art would have
considered toothbrushes and hairbrushes “to be within the same
endeavor.”442 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
rejection of the claims “[b]ecause there is no dispute that the combination
of the three toothbrush references renders [appellant’s] invention
obvious.”443
In dissent, Judge Newman explained that the “toothbrush art is not
analogous to the hair brush art. [Appellant’s] patent application is directed
to a hair brush, and his claims are limited to a hair brush” and “[a] brush for
hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth than does hair resemble
teeth.”444 Judge Newman further reasoned that:
The mode and mechanics of brushing teeth cannot reasonably be viewed
as analogous to the mode and mechanics of brushing hair. To state the
obvious: teeth require a brush that penetrates around the edges of
relatively large and hard substrates, a brush that administers a soapy
abrasive, a brush that works in the up-and-down and circular motion
needed to scrub teeth; a brush for hair must serve entirely different
shapes and textures and purposes.445

Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.446 involved an appeal from a
grant of summary judgment holding invalid as obvious a claim directed to a
weight plate “formed with solely a triad of spaced apart elongated handle
openings.”447 In comparing the claims to the prior art, the Federal Circuit
emphasized its precedent warning against use of hindsight to evaluate the
prior art and explained that the “district court’s use of an ‘overall picture’
and ‘common sense’ test of obviousness falls squarely into the hindsight
trap.”448 Then noting that the requirement for a motivation to combine
prior art “prevents the use of ‘the inventor’s disclosure as a blueprint for
piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of
hindsight,’”449 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the appeal presented
circumstances in which the disputed claim limitation fell within a range
disclosed in the prior art references.450 The Federal Circuit observed that:
Where the “prior art . . . discloses a range encompassing a somewhat

441. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
442. Id. at 1327, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
443. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
444. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213 (Newman, J., dissenting).
445. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213 (Newman, J., dissenting).
446. 392 F.3d 1317, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
447. Id. at 1319, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,436,015
(issued Aug. 20, 2002)).
448. Id. at 1320, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
449. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
450. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
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narrower claimed range,” the narrower range may be
obvious . . . . “[W]hen the difference between the claimed invention and
the prior art is the range or value of a particular variable,” then a patent
should not issue if “the difference in range or value is minor.”451

The Federal Circuit thus reasoned that “simply because an invention falls
within a range disclosed by the prior art does not necessarily make it per se
obvious. Both the genus and species may be patentable.”452 The Federal
Circuit further explained that “where there is a range disclosed in the prior
art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, there is a presumption
of obviousness,”453 but observed that the presumption could be rebutted if:
(1) the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention, or (2) the
claimed invention results in unexpected results not disclosed in the prior
art.454
Reviewing the record evidence, the Federal Circuit reasoned that:
The prior art suggested that a large number of elongated grips in exercise
weights was beneficial, thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art
look to the range appearing in the prior art. The prior art disclosed
weight plates with one, two, or four elongated handles. [Plaintiff] is
claiming a weight plate with three elongated handles, within the range of
the prior art.455

The Federal Circuit then noted that, other than a conclusory statement,
plaintiff offered no evidence that the prior art taught away from the
invention.456 The Federal Circuit further observed that plaintiff failed to
adduce any evidence showing the three-grip barbell produced unexpected
results, particularly because “[t]here is no indication of any new and
unexpected results from the use of a three-grip plate in the . . . patent or the
prosecution history.”457 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the
claim was invalid as obvious “absent substantial evidence of pertinent
secondary factors supporting patentability.”458
Finally, addressing the record evidence on secondary considerations, the
Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff failed to establish commercial
success of the claimed invention.459 In particular, the Federal Circuit
observed that “[t]he only evidence of marketplace success that [plaintiff]
proffers is that six retail competitors offered three-grip plates, and three of
451. Id. at 1321, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227-28 (quoting Haynes Int’l v. Jessop Steel
Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1577 n.3, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
452. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
453. Id. at 1322, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
454. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
455. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
456. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
457. Id. at 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
458. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
459. Id. at 1324, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
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those competitors have entered into license agreements with respect to
the . . . patent.”460 The Federal Circuit explained that such evidence was
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff “did
not explain the terms of the licenses nor the circumstances under which
they were granted . . . . Our cases specifically require affirmative evidence
of nexus where the evidence of commercial success presented is a license,
because it is often ‘cheaper to take licenses than to defend infringement
suits.’”461
Then addressing plaintiff’s evidence of copying, the Federal Circuit
explained that “[n]ot every competing product that arguably falls within the
scope of a patent is evidence of copying. Otherwise every infringement suit
would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent.”462 The
Federal Circuit thus concluded that evidence that competitors abandoned
one-arm plates in favor of three-arm plates was insufficient to establish
copying.463
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112
1.

Written description
Although in 2004 the Federal Circuit as a whole continued to debate at a
conceptual level what role, if any, the written description requirement
should play in patent jurisprudence, the court’s individual decisions
reaffirmed that the written description requirement provides a viable
challenge to the validity or the patentability of claims.
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.464 involved an appeal from
a grant of summary judgment holding claims covering methods of
selectively inhibiting COX-2 enzymes invalid for failure to comply with
the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.465 On appeal, plaintiff
first argued that the district court erred in holding the claims invalid
because “no written description requirement exists independent of
enablement.”466 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, providing an
460. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
461. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal, Inc.,
755 F.2d 898, 908, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 20, 26 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
462. Id. at 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
463. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
464. 358 F.3d 916, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
465. Id. at 917-19, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888-89. Section 112 states that the patent
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
466. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 920, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
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extensive analysis establishing that written description and enablement are
two separate and independent requirements that must both be satisfied by
the patentee.467 The Federal Circuit began by noting that § 112, ¶ 1,
provides three separate criteria for patentability “referred to as the ‘written
description requirement,’ the ‘enablement requirement,’ and the best mode
requirement.’”468 The Federal Circuit explained that:
Although there is often significant overlap between the three
requirements, they are nonetheless independent of each other . . . . Thus,
an invention may be described without an enabling disclosure of how to
make and use it. A description of a chemical compound without a
description of how to make and use it, unless within the skill of one of
ordinary skill in the art, is an example. Moreover, an invention may be
enabled even though it has not been described . . . . Such can occur when
enablement of a closely related invention A that is both described and
enabled would similarly enable an invention B if B were described. A
specification can likewise describe an invention without enabling the
practice of the full breadth of its claims. Finally, still further disclosure
might be necessary to satisfy the best mode requirement if otherwise
only an inferior mode would be disclosed.469

The Federal Circuit also reasoned that the written description
requirement “serves a teaching function, as a ‘quid pro quo’ in which the
public is given ‘meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from
practicing the invention for a limited period of time.’”470 Then providing a
historical analysis of the case law addressing § 112, ¶ 1, the Federal Circuit
made clear that its “precedent clearly recognizes a separate written
description requirement.”471
Plaintiff next argued that the Federal Circuit s decisions in Regents of
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,472 Fiers v. Reval,473 and Enzo
467. Id. at 921-23, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890-92.
468. Id. at 921, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
469. Id. at 921-22, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (citations omitted).
470. Id. at 922, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. GenProbe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that the public notice function of the written description requirement
“became redundant with the advent of claims in 1870,” the court stated that “[s]tatutory
language does not become redundant unless repealed by Congress in which case it no longer
exists.” Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891.
471. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891. The court examined the following cases: Enzo,
323 F.3d at 956, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609; Regents of Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Reval, 984
F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 178
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
118 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 553, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647 (C.C.P.A.
1963); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 301 (C.C.P.A. 1962); and In re Moore,
155 F.2d 379, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (C.C.P.A. 1946). Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at
922, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891.
472. 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398.
473. 984 F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601.
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Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.474 were not applicable on the grounds that
those cases “all related to genetic material whereas this case does not.”475
The Federal Circuit found plaintiff’s distinction to be “irrelevant” because
the written description statute “applies to all types of inventions” and there
was “no reason for the rule to be any different when non-genetic materials
are at issue.”476 The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s contention
that “those cases were limited to composition of matter claims, whereas the
[asserted] patent is directed to a method.”477 The Federal Circuit opined
that:
Regardless whether a compound is claimed per se or a method is claimed
that entails the use of the compound, the inventor cannot lay claim to that
subject matter unless he can provide a description of the compound
sufficient to distinguish infringing compounds from non-infringing
compounds, or infringing methods from non-infringing methods.478

The Federal Circuit clarified its reasoning by explaining that it was not
suggesting that “the written description requirement can be satisfied only
by providing a description of an actual reduction to practice.”479 Rather,
the Federal Circuit instructed that “[c]onstructive reduction to practice is an
established method of disclosure, but the application must nonetheless
‘describe the claimed subject matter in terms that establish that [the
applicant] was in possession of the . . . claimed invention.”480
The plaintiff also challenged the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, contending that a “‘patent-in-suit cannot be per se invalid’
because written description is a question of fact.”481 The Federal Circuit
found this argument unavailing, reasoning that “although compliance with
the written description requirement is a question of fact . . . [plaintiff’s]
argument that a patent may not be held invalid on its face is contrary to our
case law . . . . After all, it is in the patent specification where the written
description must be met.”482 In a related argument, plaintiff argued that
“because [defendant] adduced no evidence, other than the patent in suit, to
support its written description defense, [plaintiff] was entitled to summary
judgment on that issue.”483 The Federal Circuit likewise rejected this
argument explaining “[a]lthough section 282 of the Patent Act places the
474. 323 F.3d 956, 970, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1617.
475. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 925, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
476. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
477. Id. at 926, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.
478. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (emphasis omitted).
479. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.
480. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (quoting Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1353,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
481. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (emphasis omitted).
482. Id. at 927, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895 (citations omitted).
483. Id. at 930, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
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burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a patent, it does not
foreclose the possibility of that party demonstrating that the patent in suit
proves its own invalidity.”484
Following issuance of the panel opinion in University of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle & Co.,485 the plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing to the panel
and then a petition for rehearing en banc.486 The petition for rehearing en
banc was denied by one vote, with five judges writing separate opinions to
express their views on the state of law of the written description
requirement.487 Judge Newman dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc, citing the need for the court to resolve “the burgeoning conflict in the
pronouncements of this court concerning the written description and the
enablement requirements of the Patent Act. This question has been
promoted from simple semantics into a fundamental conflict concerning
patent scope and the support needed to claim biological products.”488
Interestingly, while dissenting from the denial of the en banc hearing,
Judge Newman explained that she “fully share[s] Judge Lourie’s
understanding of the law. The continuing attack on well-established and
heretofore unchallenged decisions . . . is not only unwarranted, but is
disruptive of the stability with which this court is charged.”489 Rather,
Judge Newman observed that:
[T]he issue of whether patent law contains a separate written description
requirement has percolated through various panels of this court, on a
variety of facts. The differences of opinion among the judges of the
Federal Circuit are, in microcosm, the “percolation” that scholars feared
would be lost by a national court at the circuit level. Percolation is the
great justifier of conflict among the regional circuits.490

Judge Newman then addressed the concerns advanced by the
biotechnology industry concerning the written description requirement:
The new biology has indeed raised new and important questions, with
implications for policy as well as law. However, the answer is not the
simplistic one espoused by some commentators; it is simply incorrect to
say that there is not now and never has been a “written description”
requirement in the patent law. It has always been necessary to disclose

484. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the district
court’s decision “vitiates universities’ ability to bring pioneering innovations to the public”
as intended by the Bayh-Dole Act, the court found the argument to be “unsound” because
“no connection exists between the Bayh-Dole Act and the legal standards that courts employ
to assess patentability.” Id. at 929, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
485. 375 F.3d 1303, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
486. Id. at 1304, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
487. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
488. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting).
489. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (citations omitted) (Newman, J., dissenting).
490. Id. at 1305, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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and describe what is patented. It has never been the law that one can
claim what is not made known and set forth in the patent.491

Judge Newman further explained that “[i]f the nature of the subject
matter is not amenable to precise description, some alternative mode of
disclosure is required, such as deposit in a pubic depository . . . . However,
the public purpose of patents is seriously disserved by eliminating the
description requirement entirely.”492
Judge Lourie, the author of the original Rochester opinion, concurred in
the court’s decision not to rehear the case en banc,493 explaining that:
Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, certain amici, and some of the
dissenters, there is and always has been a separate written description
requirement in the patent law. The requirement to describe one’s
invention is basic to the patent law, and every patent draftsman knows
that he or she must describe a client’s invention independently of the
need to enable one skilled in the relevant art to make and use the
invention. The specification then must also describe how to make and
use the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different task.494

Judge Lourie further reasoned that the written description requirement
cannot be swept away by claiming that it relates only to priority issues or
that the prohibition on introduction of new matter takes care of the need
for a written description. The statute does not contain a limitation that it
pertains only to priority issues.
Moreover, the prohibition on
introduction of new matter . . . is not a substitute for the written
description requirement.495

Addressing arguments that the court’s recent application of the written
description requirement was not consonant with the historical use of § 112,
¶ 1, Judge Lourie opined that:
The fact, if it is a fact, that written description has only been relied upon
in recent years as a ground of invalidity does not remove that
requirement from the statute. Legal holdings arise when they do because
litigants raise them and courts have to decide them. Contrary to what has
been asserted, the interpretation of the statute as containing a separate
written description requirement did not originate with [Eli] Lilly . . . . It
has always been there.496

Judge Rader, joined by Judges Gajarsa and Linn, dissented from the
court’s decision not to hear the case en banc, noting that “[b]y a narrow
margin . . . this court avoids the opportunity to clarify and correct its
confusing jurisprudence on the new written description invalidity
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Id. at 1304, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1305, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1306, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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doctrine.”497 Judge Rader’s motivation for an en banc hearing was his
disagreement with the court’s decision in Eli Lilly and its progeny:
[T]his court for the first time applied the written description language of
35 U.S.C. § 112 . . . as a general disclosure requirement in place of
enablement, rather than in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent
applicants from adding new inventions to an older disclosure . . . . In
simple terms, contrary to logic and the statute itself, Eli Lilly requires
one part of the specification (the written description) to provide
“adequate support” for another part of the specification (the claims).
Neither Eli Lilly nor this case has explained either the legal basis for this
new validity requirement or the standard for “adequate support.”
Because this new judge-made doctrine has created enormous confusion
which this court declines to resolve, I respectfully dissent.498

Judge Rader noted that the Eli Lilly opinion engendered the court’s
opinion in Enzo, which “[f]ollowing issuance, withdrawal, and
reissuance . . . [caused the] court [to] engage in lengthy debate over the
new disclosure validity doctrine” and “[t]hat debate continued in [the]
court’s subsequent cases.”499 Judge Rader observed that “a brief survey of
the literature on this topic, an astounding amount in a few short years,
shows thirty-one articles criticizing the Eli Lilly doctrine, seven articles
defending the doctrine, and sixteen neutrally commenting on the state of
this evolving case law.”500
Addressing the hypothetical provided in the Rochester opinion for
explaining the necessity of a written description requirement separate from
an enablement requirement, Judge Rader opined:
The hypothetical actually facilitates a policy analysis that explains the
reasons that the new 1997 requirement is both superfluous and
dangerous. In the first place, the hypothetical rarely, if ever, happens.
No actual case presents the hypothetical. In both Eli Lilly and Rochester,
for instance, the invention A (rat insulin in Eli Lilly; an assay for Cox 1
and 2 in Rochester) was enabled and described, but the invention B
(human insulin in Eli Lilly; a Cox 2 inhibitor in Rochester) was not
enabled.
In understandable terms, the hypothetical says that an inventor invents
the radio, but his invention solves a problem that enables those of
ordinary skill in the art to know how to make and use both a radio and a
TV. His patent disclosure only describes a radio but he claims broadly an
“electrical receiver.” Thus, his claims seem to encompass the TV which
his specification does not describe but would enable if it were described.
497. Id. at 1307, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (Rader, J., dissenting).
498. Id. at 1307-08, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548-49 (citations omitted) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
499. Id. at 1308, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (Rader, J., dissenting).
500. Id. at 1309, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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In that context, the reason the hypothetical does not occur becomes
obvious. If everyone of ordinary skill in the art knows from the
disclosure how to make and use the TV, the exceptionally talented
inventor will also. To avoid any risk of losing the TV invention, the
inventor will fully disclose it and claim it, probably in a separate
application. For this very practical reason, no case has ever presented
the hypothetical. Inventors know when they have made an invention and
realize that they must properly disclose it or risk losing it entirely.501

Joined by Judge Rader and Judge Gajarsa, Judge Linn also dissented
from the court’s denial of en banc consideration, explaining that the
Rochester panel opinion “perpetuates the confusion our precedent in [Eli]
Lilly and Enzo has engendered in establishing ‘written description’ as a
separate requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, on which a patent
may be held invalid.”502 Judge Linn reasoned that:
The question presented by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, is not, “Does
the written description disclose what the invention is?” The question is,
“Does the written description describe the invention recited in the
claims—themselves part of the specification—in terms that are sufficient
to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention
and practice the best mode contemplated by the inventor?” That is the
mandate of the statute and is all our precedent demanded prior to [Eli
Lilly].
Reading into paragraph 1 of section 112 an independent written
description requirement, divorced from enablement, sets up an inevitable
clash between the claims and the written description as the focus of the
scope of coverage. This is ill-advised. Surely there is no principle more
firmly established in patent law than the primacy of the claims in
establishing the bounds of the right to exclude.503

Accordingly, Judge Linn concluded that “[c]onstruing section 112 to
contain a separate written description requirement beyond enablement and
best mode creates confusion as to where the public and the courts should
look to determine the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude.”504
Finally, Judge Dyk wrote separately explaining that while he concurred
in the court’s decision not to hear the case en banc “[f]or the reasons set
forth in the panel opinion and in Judge Lourie’s opinion concurring in the
denial of en banc review,” his vote to deny en banc review “should not be
taken as an endorsement of our existing written description jurisprudence.
In my view we have yet to articulate satisfactory standards that can be

501.
502.
503.
504.

Id. at 1312, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1325, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (Linn, J., dissenting).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566-67 (Linn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1326, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (Linn, J., dissenting).
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applied to all technologies.”505
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.506 involved an appeal from a denial of
plaintiff’s motion for a JMOL that claims directed to monoclonal
antibodies were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 because those claims could
not claim priority back to earlier applications.507 The Federal Circuit began
its analysis by noting that § 120 provides that an
“[A]pplication for [a] patent for an invention disclosed in the manner
provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an
application previously filed in the United States . . . shall have the same
effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior
application.”508

The Federal Circuit then explained that a claim “may only claim priority
to an earlier application if the earlier application fulfills the requirements of
§ 112, first paragraph.”509
Turning to the trial record, the Federal Circuit noted that “genetically
engineered antibodies, specifically chimeric antibodies, first appeared as a
successful technology in the literature of this art field in May 1984, four
months after the filing date of the first application” to which plaintiff
claimed priority.510 The Federal Circuit thus observed that the “jury may
have found that the [first application] does not provide any support for the
new matter . . . [b]ecause chimeric antibody technology did not even exist
at the time of the 1984 filing.”511 The Federal Circuit thus concluded that
“the record conclusively supports that the [plaintiff’s] scientists did not
possess and disclose this technology in the February 1984 filing.”512
In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,513 plaintiff
advanced two separate theories in arguing that the disputed claims failed to
satisfy the written description requirement.514 First, plaintiff argued that
the patentee amended the patent specification through a certificate of
505. Id. at 1327, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
506. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
507. See Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1249-50, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23. The parties
stipulated before trial that the claims would be invalid under § 102 based on intervening
prior art if the claims were entitled to a priority filing date of earlier applications. Id. at
1252, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
508. See id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 120).
509. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. The first paragraph of § 112 provides that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
510. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
511. Id. at 1255, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
512. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
513. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
514. See id. at 1153-54, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198-99.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

1005

correction in a manner that was not supported by the original disclosure.515
The Federal Circuit noted that “a change to correct an error is not
considered new matter if ‘one skilled in the art would appreciate not only
the existence of an error in the specification but what the error is.’”516 The
Federal Circuit then rejected the written description challenge, concluding
that “[b]ecause the amended material is inherently contained in the original
application, it cannot constitute new matter.”517
Second, plaintiff argued that claims requiring a “significantly thicker and
wider” flow channel were not supported because such structure was not
depicted by certain figures in the patent specification.518 The Federal
Circuit rejected this argument and upheld the jury’s verdict that the claims
were adequately supported by the specification, explaining that “the written
description requirement can be satisfied by ‘words, structures, figures,
diagrams, formulas, etc.’”519 The Federal Circuit then concluded that
figure 1 of the patent “clearly shows that [the] flow channel . . . is
‘significantly thicker and wider.’”520
In re Wallach521 involved an appeal from the Board’s rejection of
pending claims for failure to satisfy the written description requirement.522
The appellants had two pending applications before the PTO—one
application contained claims directed to proteins capable of inhibiting the
cytotoxic effect of tumor neurosis factor, and a second application with
claims directed to deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) molecules capable of
encoding such proteins.523 The claims at issue on appeal were the latter.524
Challenging the Board’s finding, the appellants argued that the
specification itself “establishes that the present inventors were in fact in
possession of the entire claimed genus of DNA sequences at the time the
application was filed.”525
In response, the PTO argued that the
specification “includes neither any actual DNA sequence within the scope
of the claims nor the complete amino acid sequence of the [claimed]
protein, but only the sequence of . . . [certain] amino acids that make up the
protein.”526
515. Id. at 1153, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.
516. Id. at 1154, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (quoting In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1206,
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 272 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
517. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
518. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
519. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107
F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
520. Id. at 1155, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
521. 378 F.3d 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
522. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41.
523. Id. at 1331-32, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41.
524. Id. at 1332, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
525. Id. at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
526. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
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While noting that it saw “no reason to require a patent applicant to list
every possible permutation of the nucleic acid sequences that can encode a
particular protein for which the amino acid sequence is disclosed,”527 the
Federal Circuit explained that the appellants “did not claim the nucleic acid
molecules that encode the simple protein sequence that they disclosed.
Rather, they claimed the nucleic acids encoding a protein for which they
provided only a partial sequence.”528 The Federal Circuit also rejected
appellant’s argument that because it demonstrated possession of the
claimed protein, it was also “necessarily in possession of its inherent amino
acid sequence, as well as all of the DNA sequences encoding that amino
acid sequence.”529 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
[w]hether Appellants were in possession of the protein says nothing
about whether they were in possession of the protein’s amino acid
sequence. Although Appellants correctly point out that a protein’s
amino acid sequence is an inherent property of the protein, the fact that
the Appellants may have isolated and thus physically possessed [the
claimed protein] does not amount to knowledge of that protein’s
sequence or possession of any of its other descriptive properties.530

The Federal Circuit further explained that while it has “recognized that
the written description requirement can in some cases be satisfied by
functional description . . . such functional description can be sufficient only
if there is also a structure-function relationship known to those of ordinary
skill in the art.”531 The Federal Circuit thus concluded that without a
sequence “or with only a partial sequence, those structures cannot be
determined and the written description requirement is consequently not
met.”532
In a series of cases in 2004, the court addressed the issue of whether
disclosure of a species could support claims broadly directed to a genus. In
re Curtis533 was an appeal of the Board’s re-examination decision holding
that the patentee could not overcome a prior art rejection by claiming the
benefit of an earlier application.534 The rejected claims were directed to
dental floss covering a genus of friction-enhancing coating, while the
earlier application disclosed only micro-crystalline wax (“MCW”)

527. Id. at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
528. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
529. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
530. Id. at 1334-35, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
531. Id. at 1335, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943 (citations omitted).
532. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
533. 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
534. Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275 (explaining that patentee’s earlier
application “failed to adequately describe the subject mater encompassed by the rejected
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.”).
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coating.535 Because the parties agreed that the patentee could overcome the
anticipation and obviousness rejections only by obtaining the benefit of the
earlier application’s filing date, the sole issue was whether substantial
evidence supported the Board’s finding that the earlier application did not
provide “a written description of [appellant’s] later-claimed genus of
friction enhancing coatings.”536
Concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings, the
Federal Circuit explained that the earlier application was replete with
passages describing MCW as the only suitable coating.537 The Federal
Circuit observed that the single test example in the earlier application
involved MCW coating and the application did not name “a suitable
friction enhancing coating for . . . dental floss other than MCW.”538 The
Federal Circuit further underscored its conclusion by noting that during
prosecution of the earlier application, the patentee submitted declarations
“demonstrating that MCW coating was in fact the only friction enhancing
coating conveyed by [appellant] at the time the [earlier] application was
filed and that dental flosses . . . would not be expected to be commercially
acceptable when coated with other materials.”539
As a collateral attack on the Board’s decision, the patentee argued that
under the reasoning of In re Smythe,540 the earlier application provided
adequate support for the later genus claims because it “convey[ed] how and
why individual species of the genus are operable in the invention.”541 In
Smythe, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor allowed later genus claims
because an earlier application “clearly convey[ed] to one skilled in the art
that in this invention the characteristics of a fluid are what make
segmentizing medium work . . . .”542 The Court of Customs and Patents
Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”), however, qualified its holding by explaining that
“where there is unpredictability in performance of certain species or
subcombinations other than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in
the art may be found not to have been placed in possession of a genus or
combination claimed at a later date in the prosecution of a patent
application.”543
The Federal Circuit rejected appellant’s analogy to Smythe, explaining
535. Id. at 1349, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275-76.
536. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
537. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
538. Id. at 1352-53, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278-79.
539. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278-79.
540. 480 F.2d 1376, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
541. Curtis, 354 F.3d at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279-80.
542. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1382,
178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 284).
543. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1382, 178
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 284-85).
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that the substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of
unpredictability in the art of dental floss.544 The Federal Circuit explained
that
[u]nlike the circumstances In re Smythe presented, the instant facts
present a case in which there is ‘unpredictability in performance of
certain species or subcombinations other than those specifically
enumerated . . . . As such, mere recitation of properties common to all
species of friction enhancing coatings in the [earlier] [a]pplication did
not put persons of ordinary skill in the art in possession of the full range
of later-claimed friction enhancing coatings.545

The Federal Circuit further noted that, though in certain cases a
disclosure of a species may support later claims of a genus,
. . . we have never held that in all such cases, including those in which
persons of ordinary skill in the art could not predict the operability of
undisclosed species, the decision in In re Smythe compels a finding that
the claim to the genus is adequately described under § 112, ¶ 1.546

Noelle v. Lederman547 was an appeal from an interference proceeding
involving inter alia an issue of whether a junior party’s earlier application
could provide support for later claims directed to monoclonal antibodies.548
At the PTO, the Board predicated its analysis by analogizing the antibody
claims to DNA claims, and denied the junior party the benefit of an earlier
filing date because the earlier application “failed to describe any structural
features of the human or genus antibodies or antigens.”549
Accepting the Board’s analogy to precedent analyzing the written
description requirement in the context of DNA claims, the Federal Circuit
began by noting that “[a]n earlier application that describes later-claimed
genetic material only by a statement of function or result may be
insufficient to meet the written description requirement.”550 Rather, the
Federal Circuit explained that “a description of DNA ‘requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical
properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical
invention.”551
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the Board’s finding, explaining that
the earlier application did not provide sufficient support for claims “to the
human CD40CR antibody” in the earlier application because the junior
party “failed to disclose the structural elements of human CD40CR
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
355 F.3d 1343, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1346, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
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antibody or antigen in his earlier . . . application.”552 The Federal Circuit
also noted that the junior party “only described [a] mouse antigen when he
claimed mouse, human, and genus forms of CD40CR antibodies by citing
to the ATCC number of the hybridoma secreting the mouse DC40CR
antibody.”553 The court further stated that the junior party could not claim
a genus form of the CD40CR antibody by simply describing mouse
CD40CR antigen, explaining that “a patentee of a biotechnological
invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited
number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results
obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated.”554
Bilstad v. Wakalopulos,555 involved an appeal from the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interference’s judgment that appellant’s patent application
lacked a sufficient written description under § 112. Appellant provoked an
interference by copying claims of appellee’s patent into the patent
application. The technology to which the application and patent were
directed was an apparatus for sterilizing three-dimensional objects using
ionizing radiation without hurting the objects.556 The relevant portions of
the interference count read as follows:
“A sterilization apparatus
comprising, an electron beam tube . . . and a moveable member
manipulating objects in a plurality of directions within the reactive volume
wherein the manipulated objects are sterilized.”557
Having construed “plurality” to connote an “indefinite numerical range,”
ranging from two to infinity, the Board concluded that appellant’s
application disclosing manipulation in only a small number of directions
did not support the interference count.558 On appeal, appellant argued that
the Board erred in requiring that the application describe every
embodiment within the range of two to infinity attributed to the term
“plurality” by the Board. The Federal Circuit approached this question by
reviewing the “spectrum of cases” discussing whether disclosure of a
species supports a claim covering a genus, including In re Smythe,559 In re
Rasmussen,560 Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc.,561 Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,562 In re Curtis,563 and Tronzo
552. Id. at 1349, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
553. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
554. Id. at 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
555. 386 F.3d 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
556. Id. at 1118, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87.
557. Id. at 1119, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
558. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
559. 480 F.2d 1376, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
560. 650 F.2d 1212, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
561. 772 F.2d 1570, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that a parent
written description supported several open-ended ranges).
562. 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
563. 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also supra notes
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v. Biomet, Inc.564 It noted that although the “general rule” was that
“disclosure of a species provides sufficient written description support for a
later filed claim directed to the genus,”565 exceptions to this rule exist
where the art is unpredictable such that persons skilled in the art would not
readily discern the other members of the genus that would perform
similarly to the disclosed members,566 and like in Tronzo, where the
specification specifically distinguished the disclosed invention from other
members of the genus.567
The Federal Circuit disapproved of the Board’s analysis of this question.
Though the Board found that appellant’s disclosure of manipulation of an
object in only a small number of directions was insufficient to support the
claim to manipulation of objects in a range from two to infinity, the Federal
Circuit held that the Board failed to analyze “what one skilled in the art
would have understood from the Bilstad disclosure or the degree of
predictability of technical variations in this field of art.”568 The Federal
Circuit thus remanded for reconsideration under the “proper test” for
support of the interference count.
2.

Enablement
In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,569 the Federal Circuit explained that
in order to support a claim of priority, the earlier application must satisfy
both the enablement requirement and written description requirement of §
112.570 The Federal Circuit then canvassed the applicable enablement law,
explaining that to satisfy the enablement requirement requires that “one
skilled in the art, after reading their disclosures, could practice the
invention . . . without undue experimentation.”571 The Federal Circuit
explained that simply because some experimentation is necessary “does not
preclude enablement; what is required is that the amount of
experimentation ‘must not be unduly extensive.’”572 The Federal Circuit
534-539 and accompanying text (reviewing implications of species disclosure in In re
Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
564. 156 F.3d 1154, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that there was
insufficient evidence for a verdict that a parent disclosing only a trapezoidal shape
supported claims to a hip prosthesis of a generic shape).
565. Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785, 1791
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
566. See supra notes 540-546 and accompanying text (discussing In re Curtis, 354 F.3d
1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the Federal Circuit stated that
prior disclosure of species is unlikely to support a later claim of genus where one skilled in
the art is unlikely to be able to predict operation of other species).
567. See supra note 564.
568. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1126, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
569. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
570. Id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
571. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
572. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus.
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further noted that while the full scope of the claim must be enabled,
[t]hat is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe
how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for
the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can
often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even
extrapolate beyond disclosed embodiments, depending upon the
predictability of the art.573

The Federal Circuit also observed that enablement is determined as of
the filing date of the application, and explained that nascent technology
“must be enabled with a ‘specific and useful teaching’ . . . because a person
of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the
patentee’s instruction.”574
Turning to the trial record, the Federal Circuit explained that “the jury
was entitled to determine as a matter of fact that chimeric antibodies were
not future technology, but were nascent technology requiring a ‘specific
and useful teaching.’”575 The Federal Circuit noted that “[e]vidence
presented to the jury showed that creation of genetically engineered
antibodies, such as chimeric antibodies, required significant
experimentation in 1985 and 1986 because those antibodies were
unpredictable at that early stage of development.”576 In particular, the
Federal Circuit noted that the record evidence demonstrated that only a few
laboratories contained the necessary equipment to make chimeric
antibodies, that the plaintiff’s applications did not disclose how to make or
use chimeric antibodies, and that the applications did not provide any
working examples of chimeric antibodies within the scope of the disputed
claims.577 The Federal Circuit further observed that while plaintiff’s
applications “certainly enable[d] murine antibodies, they [did] not enable
chimeric antibodies.”578 As a result, the applications failed to enable all
Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The court
also identified the Wands factors that are used to gauge whether undue experimentation
would be required to practice the claimed invention:
These factual considerations include “(1) the quantity of experimentation
necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.”
Id. at 1255-56, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
573. Id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344
F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
574. Id. at 1254, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo
Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
575. Id. at 1255, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1368,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006).
576. Id. at 1256, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
577. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
578. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
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antibodies within the scope of the asserted claims, which covered both
murine and chimeric antibodies.579
The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
applications “need not specifically enable chimeric antibodies, because
technicians of ordinary skill in this art could make and use them by that
time without undue experimentation.”580 The Federal Circuit explained
that the record contained substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding
of non-enablement, including expert testimony that the ability to
manufacture chimeric antibodies was not routine technology when
plaintiff’s applications were filed;581 evidence that very few laboratories
had the capacity and expertise necessary to make genetically engineered
antibodies;582 and an article published in 1989 that described techniques of
chimeric antibodies as “obviously those of a very young and very
ambitious field.”583
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bryson explained that “enablement must
be judged in light of the state of the art at the time of the application.”584 In
so doing, the concurrence cautioned against interpreting the Federal
Circuit’s predecessor’s opinion In re Hogan585 as holding that “claims that
are enabled by original application may be construed broadly enough to
encompass technology that is not developed until later and was not enabled
by the original application.”586 The concurrence thus opined that the proper
approach “is to address cases of new technology by construing claims,
where possible, as they would have been understood by one of skill in the
art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to reach the as-yetundeveloped technology that the applicant did not enable.”587
In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,588 plaintiff argued
that the patent specification failed to enable claims directed to injectionmolded plastics because the patentee did not disclose a “proprietary
formula for achieving the claimed predetermined flow direction.”589
Rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit explained that
579. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
580. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
581. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
582. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
583. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting Sherie L. Morrison, Genetically
Engineered (Chimeric) Antibodies, HOSP. PRACTICE, Oct. 15, 1989, at 75). The court also
explained that the Plaintiff’s failure to produce a commercial embodiment “also bears on
whether chimeric or humanized antibodies with the scope of the claims of the [asserted]
patent were routine technology. Accordingly, that evidence is relevant to enablement.” Id.
at 1260-61, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
584. Id. at 1262, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332 (Bryson, J., concurring).
585. 559 F.2d 595, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 527 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
586. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1262, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (Bryson, J., concurring).
587. Id. at 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (Bryson, J., concurring).
588. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
589. Id. at 1155, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
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[w]hile this evidence may go to best mode, it does not demonstrate that
any certain formula for achieving flow direction was required for one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention or that undue
experimentation would be required for one of ordinary skill in the art to
predetermine flow direction through trial and error.590

The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
enablement requirement was not met because the patentee omitted a
disclosure of certain injection parameters and gate size. Observing that
“[t]his Court has repeatedly explained that a patent applicant does not need
to include in the specification that which is already known to and available
to one of ordinary skill in the art,”591 the Federal Circuit concluded that
plaintiff did not provide clear and convincing evidence that knowledge of
injection parameters and gate size were necessary to practice the claims
without undue experimentation.592
3.

Best mode
The Federal Circuit’s disposition of best mode issues593 in 2004 was
consistent with its earlier proclamation that “[i]n the history of this court
and our predecessor courts, we have held claims invalid for failure to
satisfy the best mode requirement on only seven occasions.”594 The
Federal Circuit’s opinions, however, appeared to graft a subjective “intent
to conceal” requirement as part of the second prong of the best mode
inquiry—whether the patent application disclosed the inventor’s best mode
of practicing the claimed invention—that has long been classified as an
objective test.595

590. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
591. Id. at 1156, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
592. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
593. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
594. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
595. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1869, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2001); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d
1281, 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the “[first]
inquiry is wholly subjective . . . [t]he second inquiry . . . is objective and depends upon the
scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the relevant art”); Nobelpharma AB
v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (“[W]hether the best mode was disclosed in
sufficient detail to allow a skilled artisan to practice it without undue experimentation . . . is
an objective determination.”); Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 908 (1997) (stating that
determining whether a patent satisfies the best mode requirement involves two
factual inquiries. First, a fact-finder must determine whether at the time an
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High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enterprises Stone & Lime, Inc.596
involved an appeal from a grant of summary judgment holding the disputed
claims invalid under the best mode requirement.597 The disputed claims
were directed to use of pre-formed concrete frames that orientated heavy
cargo at an angle such that the cargo would not extend too far beyond a
transporting truck’s flat bed.598 The district court held that the inventors
violated the best mode requirement because the specification failed to
disclose “that a crane was the preferred mode of carrying out the method of
loading and tilting the [concrete] frame.”599
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit first
explained that “[i]nvalidation for failure to satisfy the best mode requires
(1) the inventor knew of a better mode than was disclosed, and (2) the
inventor concealed the better mode.”600 With respect to the second prong,
the Federal Circuit further elaborated that a best mode violation “requires
that the inventor knew of and intentionally concealed a better mode than
was disclosed.”601 Then, apparently accepting that use of a crane was the
inventors’ preferred mode of carrying out the invention, the Federal Circuit
determined that the best mode requirement was not violated because that
the record was devoid of evidence regarding the inventors’ intent to
conceal use of cranes:
[Defendant] conceded that use of a crane to assist with heavy loads is
well known to person in the field of loading cargo. There was neither
evidence nor inference of concealment of this information by the
inventors. Deliberate concealment is not charged. The best mode
requirement of § 112 is not violated by unintentional omission of
information that would be readily known to persons in the field of the
invention.602

The Federal Circuit also distinguished its decisions in Northern Telecom,
Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.603 and Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd.,604 explaining that in
applicant filed an application for a patent, he or she had a best mode of practicing
the invention; this is a subjective determination. Second, if the inventor had a best
mode of practicing the invention, the fact-finder must determine whether the best
mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it,
which is an objective determination.
).
596. 377 F.3d 1379, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
597. Id. at 1380, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49.
598. Id. at 1380-82, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-50.
599. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
600. Id. at 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
601. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
602. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950-51.
603. 908 F.2d 931, 940, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming
the district court’s determination that the inventors deliberately concealed the usage of tape
and cassettes of their own design in a patent for an invention to capture data on standard
audio magnetic tape cassettes).
604. 860 F.2d 415, 419-20, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692, 1696-97 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding
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“the case before us it was undisputed that anyone with experience of heavy
loads would know to use a crane to move the load.”605 The Federal Circuit
thus held that “[k]nown ways of performing a known operation cannot be
deemed intentionally concealed absent evidence of intent to deliberately
withhold that information.”606
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.607 also involved a
best mode challenge to the validity of claims directed at cardiac
defibrillators that are permanently installed under a patient’s skin.608 The
case came to the court on appeal from a grant of a JMOL that the claims
were invalid after a jury verdict finding no best mode violation.609 The
Federal Circuit framed the question as whether the best mode requirement
creates a disclosure “obligation with respect to subject matter that is not
part of the invention, but that is used in conjunction therewith—here the
battery for use with the battery-powered [cardiac defibrillators].”610 In
particular, the issue was whether the inventors were required to disclose a
battery specifically designed by a third-party for use with the claimed
cardiac defibrillators.611
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by stating that “invalidity for
omission of a better mode than was revealed requires knowledge of
concealment of that better mode.”612 The Federal Circuit then explained
that “[t]he obligation to disclose the best mode relates to the invention that
is described and claimed. Subject matter that is not part of the invention
that is claimed need not be included in the specification, and thus is not
subject to the best mode requirement.”613 Upon review of the record, the
Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported the jury’s
verdict that the best mode had not been violated, including testimony that
the “invention was not about batteries, that there was not intent to conceal

that the best mode requirement was violated because it was not disclosed that a technique of
applying silicone to rubber surfaces was known to be essential for the successful operation
of the claimed stem seals for valves).
605. High Concrete Structures, 377 F.3d at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
606. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
607. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
608. Id. at 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
609. Id. at 1374-75, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
610. Id. at 1378-79, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
611. See id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-39 (stating that the inventors asked
the third party to develop a battery to use with the cardiac devices, but then decided not to
include this battery in the patent specification since there were many different battery
choices that could be made and the inventors actually chose a different battery for their
commercial device).
612. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (citing Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re
Gay, 309 F.3d 769, 772, 135 U.S.P.Q. 311, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
613. Id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (citing Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer
Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1532, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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the [third-party] or any battery, and that it was not concealed,”614 and
evidence that “persons knowledgeable in the field of the invention would
know the sources of batteries for pacemakers and related devices.”615
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a JMOL because
“[t]here was no evidence of concealment, and the jury had evidence that the
[third-party] battery was published in a publication for battery
specialists.”616
4.

Indefiniteness
The volume of cases in which the indefiniteness defense was considered
and rejected by the court in 2004 underscores two recently emerging
themes in patent litigation: (1) defendants will frequently avail themselves
of the indefiniteness argument under § 112, ¶ 2 and (2) the Federal Circuit
will reject such a defense almost as frequently as it is raised.
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Insurances Co.617 involved the
issue of whether the claim term “surrender value protected investment
credits” was indefinite618 under § 112, ¶ 2 of the Patent Act.619 Seeking to
invalidate the claims, defendant argued that the term was indefinite because
(1) the patent did not expressly define the term, (2) the meaning of the term
could not be determined from the patent, and (3) the term did not have an
understood meaning by those skilled in the field of the invention.620 In
response, plaintiff argued that “surrender value protected investment
credits” meant the same thing as “stable value protected investment
credits,” which is a term that appeared throughout the patent and had a
well-established meaning in the field.621
The Federal Circuit began by canvassing its indefiniteness jurisprudence,
noting that the indefiniteness analysis is akin to “the court’s performance of
its duty as the construer of patent claims [and] therefore, like claim
construction, is a question of law.”622 The Federal Circuit explained that
indefiniteness is determined by “whether those skilled in the art would
understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the
specification.”623 The Federal Circuit stated that “a claim is not indefinite
614. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-39.
615. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
616. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
617. 359 F.3d 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
618. Id. at 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
619. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (providing that claims must “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”).
620. Bancorp Servs., 359 F.3d at 1371-72, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
621. Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
622. Id. at 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage
Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
623. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (citing Personalized Media Communications, Inc.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1888 (Fed. Cir.
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merely because it poses a difficult issue of claim construction; if the claim
is subject to construction . . . it is not invalid for indefiniteness.”624 Rather,
the Federal Circuit explained that “if the meaning of the claim is
discernible, ‘even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion
may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the
claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.’”625
The Federal Circuit further explained that “[b]y finding claims indefinite
only if reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord
respect to the statutory presumption of patent validity . . . . Thus ‘close
questions of indefiniteness in litigation involving issued patents are
properly resolved in favor of the patentee.’”626
While noting that the entire term “surrender value protected investment
credits” is not defined in the patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
claims were not indefinite because “the components of the term have wellrecognized meanings, which allow the reader to infer the meaning of the
entire phrase with reasonable confidence.”627 The Federal Circuit first
noted that “the term ‘surrender value’ has a clear meaning to one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.”628 The Federal Circuit then stated that
the patent specification and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that the term
“protected investment” likewise has a clear meaning.629 The Federal
Circuit also explained the specification provides a clear meaning for
“credits.”630 Thus, viewing the various parts of the claim term together, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the meaning of the term “surrender value
protected investment credits” could be reasonably determined,631 and
explained that “[t]he failure to define [a claim] term is, of course, not fatal,
for if the meaning of the term is fairly inferable from the patent, an express
definition is not necessary.”632
In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Circuit credited plaintiff’s
argument that the correspondence between “surrender value protected
1998); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
624. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338-39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
625. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
626. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g, 265 F.3d at
1380, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276).
627. Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
628. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
629. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
630. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
631. See id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000 (concluding that “‘surrender value protected
investment’ means the difference between the actual value of a protected investment and the
targeted return value of that investment at the time the protected life insurance policy is
surrendered.”).
632. Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
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investment credits” used in the claims and the reference to “SVP writer” in
specification “provides substantial support . . . that, as used in the patent,
the terms ‘stable value protected investment,’ ‘surrender value protected
investment,’ and ‘SVP’ are equivalent.”633 The Federal Circuit also
explained that “evidence of defendants’ knowledge of the use of the term
prior to patenting is relevant to show that the term was in use and had a
discernible meaning to at least some persons practicing in the field.”634
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,635 the district court
construed a claim covering the chemical compound “[c]rystalline
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate”636 (“CPH hemihydrate”) as limited
to commercially significant quantities of CPH hemihydrate, reasoning that
if the claim covered trace amounts of the compound then “potential
infringers would not be able to determine (and avoid) infringement if they
[could not] detect the claimed compound.”637 In reversing the district
court’s holding, the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he test for
indefiniteness does not depend on a potential infringer’s ability to ascertain
the nature of its own accused product to determine infringement, but
instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled artisan the bounds of
the invention.”638 The Federal Circuit further explained that the fact that
defendant could not “accurately ascertain the nature of its own product”639
in light of the claim language was irrelevant because “[t]he scope of this
claim is clear; infringement of [defendant’s] product is not. Even if a claim
is broad enough to embrace undetectable trace amounts of the claimed
invention, ‘breadth is not indefiniteness.’”640 Reasoning that the disputed
“claim covers a definite chemical structure [and] [t]o a chemist in this field,
this claim is plain on its face,” the court held that there was no violation of
the definiteness requirement.641

633. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
634. Id. at 1376, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2002.
635. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated by 403 F.3d
1328, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
636. Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
637. Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743 (citing Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal
Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1469-70, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
638. Id. at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. The court’s approach is correct in light
of well-established law that infringement involves a two-step process: (1) construing the
claim language, which like indefiniteness is a question of law, and (2) applying the
construed claims to the accused device, which is a question of fact. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461, 1464 (1996). The district court’s
approach would have collapsed this two prong test for infringement into a strained
indefiniteness inquiry, such that if a defendant was uncertain about infringement, the claim
necessarily would be invalid as indefinite.
639. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
640. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743 (quoting In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788, 166
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
641. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
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In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,642 defendant appealed the decision
of the district court that Glaxo’s patents were valid and infringed. The
asserted claims at issue claimed “[c]efuroxime axetil . . . having a purity of
at least 95% aside from residual solvents” and “[a] process for preparing a
highly pure . . . form of cefuroxime axetil which comprises preparing a
highly pure solution of cefuroxime axetil and spray drying said
solution . . . .”643 Defendant asserted that the district court’s construction of
“purity” and “pure” in the asserted claims rendered the claims indefinite.644
The district court had construed “pure” in the process claim “to mean the
absence of impurities, where excipients are not considered to be
impurities.”645 It construed “purity of at least 95%” in the product claim to
mean that the cefuroxime axetil must have “no more than 5% degrading,
unwanted impurities,” where, again, impurities do not include excipients.646
According to defendant, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
realize that the product claim covered cefuroxime axetil that had more than
five percent of other ingredients, or that the process claim covered a
process by which exicipients are mixed with cefuroxime axetil.647
The Federal Circuit found these arguments to be “disingenuous.”648 It
affirmed the district court’s construction of “purity” based on the fact that
the specification of the patent containing the product claim “specifically
states that the pharmaceutical compositions covered by the invention may
contain between 0.1 to 99% of the active ingredient.”649 “CA formulations
with more than 5% other ingredients were thus pointed out to the public in
the patent.”650 The Federal Circuit similarly affirmed the construction of
“pure” because the patent containing the process claim disclosed that
pharmaceutical compositions of cefuroxime axetil could be produced by
spray drying “a suspension of pure amorphous [CA] with the excipients
appropriate for said tablets, capsules or granules [and] Glaxo therefore
informed the public that combining CA with excipients prior to spray
drying was contemplated under the . . . patent.”651 The Federal Circuit
found that the patents’ detailed disclosures “clearly conveyed to [a person]
of ordinary skill in the art that the patentee ‘invented what is claimed’ and
also gave notice to the public of the limits of the invention.”652
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.

376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
Id. at 1345, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
Id. at 1344-45, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806-07.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
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E. Design Patent
In Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,653 the Federal
Circuit addressed, for the first time, the issue of what evidence must be
presented to prove infringement of a design patent under the point of
novelty test.654 Plaintiff sued defendant for infringement of six of its
design patents related to furniture designs.655 The district court held that
Plaintiff had not met its burden of establishing that defendant’s designs
appropriated the points of novelty of plaintiff’s patented designs.656 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that it was sufficient for showing the
points of novelty for plaintiff to introduce its presentation of the patents-insuit and their prosecution histories, all of the references cited during
prosecution, and its filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law specifying its contentions as to the points of novelty.657 The Federal
Circuit ruled that, at minimum, a patentee must introduce “the design
patent at issue, its prosecution history, and the relevant prior art references
cited in the prosecution history,” and must proffer, “in some form, its
contentions as to points of novelty.”658 It opined that the contentions as to
points of novelty “may be made in any appropriate way, such as in
proposed findings of fact.”659 If the points of novelty can be discerned
from these submissions, the Federal Circuit ruled that additional evidence
such as expert testimony was not necessary.660 The Federal Circuit held
that plaintiff had met the minimal evidentiary burden, and that the court
was wrong to have declined to determine the points of novelty from
plaintiff’s submissions and to have concluded, without analysis of the
submitted evidence, that Bernhardt did not sufficiently show how
defendant’s designs appropriated such points of novelty.661
F. Interference and Priority of Invention
In Stevens v. Tamai,662 Stevens appealed from the Board’s decision
granting priority in an interference proceeding to Tamai.663 Tamai was the
senior party to the interference, whose application was filed February 15,
1994, and was accorded the benefit of the filing date of the application,
1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
653. 386 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
654. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
655. Id. at 1373-74, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
656. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
657. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
658. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
659. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
660. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
661. Id. at 1385, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
662. 366 F.3d 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
663. Id. at 1327, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
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March 29, 1993, to which it was a continuation-in-part (“U.S. patent
application”). Stevens’s patent was filed February 7, 1994. During the
interference, both Stevens and Tamai filed motions under 37 C.F.R. §
1.633(f) “to be accorded the benefit of the filing date of earlier filed
Stevens based his motion on several European
application[s].”664
applications showing a constructive reduction to practice as early as
February 1993.665 Tamai’s motion was based on a Patent Cooperation
Treaty (“PCT”)666 application and an earlier Japanese patent application,
both of which were written in Japanese.667 The Board granted Stevens’s
motion, but partly denied Tamai’s motion with respect to the PCT
application on the basis that Tamai did not supply a translation of the PCT
application to English in accordance with Rule 637.668 The Board still
granted Tamai priority, however, on the basis of its Japanese application.669
Stevens contended on appeal to the Federal Circuit that the Board erred
in granting Tamai’s motion for the benefit of the Japanese application.
According to Stevens, 35 U.S.C. § 119670 prohibited Tamai from directly
claiming the benefit of that application because Tamai failed to obtain the
benefit of the intervening PCT application and because the Japanese
application was filed more than one year prior to March 29, 1993.671 It
followed, Stevens argued, that Tamai had failed to prove a constructive
reduction to practice of the subject matter corresponding to the interference
count prior to March 29, 1993, and therefore Stevens should have been
awarded priority.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Stevens, holding that “because Tamai
failed to prove his entitlement to the benefit of the [intervening] PCT
application, it was error for the Board to afford Tamai the benefit of the
[earlier] Japanese application.”672 It reasoned that because the Japanese
application was filed more than one year prior to the filing date of the U.S.
parent application, § 119 precluded reliance on that application for priority.
The Federal Circuit rejected Tamai’s arguments that a preliminary
664. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.633(f) (2003)).
665. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
666. Patent Cooperation Treaty, With Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.
667. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
668. Id. at 1328-29, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.637(f)(2)
(2004) (requiring that, for a preliminary motion for benefit of the filing date of an earlier
application under § 1.633(f), “[i]f the earlier filed application is not in English, the
requirements of § 1.647 must also be met”).
669. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
670. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (2000) (granting a patent for invention that was filed “in a
foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the
United States” the same rights as if it was filed in the U.S. on that date “if the application in
[the U.S.] is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign
application was filed”).
671. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
672. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
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motion for benefit under Rule 633 was unnecessary in the first instance
because Tamai filed its PCT application with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office for the purpose of entering the national stage
examination, and according to procedures governing PCT applications,
included therein a translation of the Japanese application.673 The Federal
Circuit found that the statutes governing PCT applications and the PTO
procedural requirements governing interferences “have little to do with one
another.”674 Tamai relied on 35 U.S.C. § 363, which requires an applicant
who seeks the benefit of an international application for his national stage
application to submit a copy of the international application and an English
translation of that application.675 The Federal Circuit noted that Tamai
overlooked 35 U.S.C. § 372(b)(3), which permits the PTO to “require a
verification of the translation of the international application . . . if the
application . . . was filed in a language other than English.”676 Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that the PTO was “not required to accept an
applicant’s transmittal letter requesting entry into the national stage as
conclusive proof that a foreign language application contains a particular
disclosure.”677
The Federal Circuit went on to note that the Rules 633, 637, and 647
governing interference procedures were reasonable to the extent that they
placed the burden on the applicant in the best position to know the content
of the disclosure and who hopes to benefit from the content of that
disclosure to prove its content and to assume the translation costs
associated with such proof.678 In view of the reasonableness of those rules
and the substantial deference to which they are accorded, the Federal
Circuit rejected Tamai’s assertion that § 363 “overwhelms the PTO’s
interference rules and requires the Board to accord Tamai the benefit of the
PCT ‘947 application merely because he completed the requirements for
entering the national stage of examination in the United States.”679
The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s rejection of Tamai’s
argument that the U.S. patent application was the translation of the PCT
application was supported by substantial evidence where Tamai’s motion
for benefit failed to allege as much, and because Tamai submitted no

673. Id. at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71.
674. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
675. See 35 U.S.C. § 363 (2000) (mandating that “[a]n international application
designating the United States shall have the effect . . . of a national application for patent
regularly filed”).
676. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 372(b)(3) (2000)).
677. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
678. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72.
679. Id. at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
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affidavit alleging as much.680 Nor did the court agree with Tamai that his
submission of a translation with the international application to enter
national stage examination under § 371(c)(2) was sufficient to comply with
Rules 637(f) and 647, as § 371(c)(2) does not require an affidavit attesting
to the accuracy of the translation.681 In the court’s opinion, “compliance
with [particular] filing requirements is not sufficient to prove constructive
reduction to practice in an interference proceeding.”682
Finding Tamai’s remaining arguments “either irrelevant or
unpersuasive,” the court concluded that “the Board did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to award Tamai the benefit of [his] PCT
application.”683 However, because Tamai was not entitled to the benefit of
the PCT application, it found that the board also erred in awarding Tamai
the benefit of the Japanese application.684
G. Patent Term
In Arnold Partnership v. Dudas,685 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision that the PTO did not err in its interpretation of 35
U.S.C. § 156 and denial of a patentee’s application to extend a patent’s
term.686 Section 156 provides for the extension of a patent’s term under
certain conditions where the patent claims a drug product that has been
subjected to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or
use, such as that required by the FDA.687 The term extension compensates
a patent applicant for time lost as a result of the regulatory review period,
time which the patent applicant arguably could be profiting from its
invention. The statute conditions term extension on the fact that the
“product” was not previously approved for commercial marketing.688
The patent claims at issue in Arnold addressed compositions of
hydrocodone and ibuprofen and the method of treating pain with such
compositions.689 Hydrocodone and ibuprofen had each been previously
approved for commercial marketing, in conjunction with other ingredients
680. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
681. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 371(c)(2) (2000)
(requiring only that a translation is filed and not requiring that an affidavit attesting to the
accuracy of a translation is not necessary), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.647 (2004) (requiring, in
addition to the translation itself, that an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of such translation
also be filed).
682. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
683. Id. at 1335, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
684. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
685. 362 F.3d 1338, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
686. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
687. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2004) (extending the patent term when “the product has
been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use”).
688. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(A) (2004).
689. Arnold P’ship, 362 F.3d at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
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or alone.690 On this basis, the PTO denied the application for patent term
extension.691 The district court affirmed.692
Appellant argued that the statute permits extension of the patent term for
a combination drug product when the combination itself previously had not
been marketed, and that the drug product should be examined as a whole
under the statute, and not on a component-by-component basis.693 The
Federal Circuit interpreted § 156 without deference to the district court, but
determined that the district court was correct in construing § 156 to require
examination of a drug product on a component-by-component basis.694
The Federal Circuit particularly emphasized the statute’s definition of
“product,” which means “drug product,” which is further defined to mean
“the active ingredient of a new drug . . . product . . . including any salt or
ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination with
another active ingredient.”695 It found the final phrase, “as a single entity
or in combination with another active ingredient,” to be determinative.696
Under the court’s construction, the statute would allow extension of the
term of a patent claiming a drug product with two active ingredients, A and
B, where either A or B had never been commercially marketed.697 But
where either A or B had been commercially marketed, no extension would
be allowed.698
The Federal Circuit refused to give in to Appellant’s argument that its
construction would conflict with § 156(c), which provides that a patent’s
term “shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period
for the approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is
issued,”699 suggesting that the combination as a whole should be reviewed
for prior marketing, since each combination drug product receives only one
regulatory review period.700 The Federal Circuit found that this argument
was based on a “vague implication” that could not overcome the
unambiguous language of the rest of the statute.701 It also refused to
change its decision despite its own admission that it does not perfectly
overlay with the FDA’s practices and regulations, specifically the
regulations requiring an NDA for combination drugs, and agreed with the
690. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
691. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
692. Id. at 1340, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
693. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
694. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
695. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2000)).
696. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
697. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
698. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
699. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. §
156(c) (2000)).
700. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
701. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
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district court’s reasoning for dismissal of the applicant’s policy argument
that its interpretation would create a financial disincentive to
pharmaceutical companies’ development of new therapeutic combination
drugs.702 The Federal Circuit explained that it “must follow the directions
of the law, not its own conceptions of the best way to make the law achieve
certain policy objectives.”703
Lastly, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the existence
of synergism exhibited by a drug combination would call for a different
result.704 The hydrocodone/ibuprofen drug combination was said to exhibit
synergistic effects in that it had a greater analgesic effect yet less harmful
side effects than that which could be achieved by its separate components
alone.705 Finding that “the statutory language [did] not distinguish at all
between synergistic and nonsynergistic combinations,” the court declined
to do so as well.706
In Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.,707 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s infringement claims.708
Plaintiff secured a patent on certain dihydropyridine compounds and their
acid addition salts. One such dihydropyridine compound was called
amlodipine. Plaintiff later obtained FDA approval of a drug for antihypertension and anti-ischemic therapeutic uses in which the active
ingredient was an amlodipine besylate salt, and successfully applied for the
extension of its patent term under § 156 to compensate for the days
consumed by the federal regulatory approval process.709 The patent was
originally scheduled to expire in early 2003, but as a result of the extension
granted to plaintiff, the expiration date was changed to mid-2006. For its
patent term extension application, plaintiff identified amlodipine besylate
as the product for which it obtained regulatory approval,710 but as part of
the registration of its drug during the FDA approval process, it submitted
clinical data obtained from uses of both amlodipine besylate and
amlodipine maleate, the latter being just another salt of amlodipine.
Plaintiff accused defendant of patent infringement in response to
plaintiff’s filing of a New Drug Application proposing to market
amlodipine maleate. As part of its NDA, defendant had relied on the
clinical data submitted by plaintiff for its amlodipine besylate product.

702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314-15.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
Id. at 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
359 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2016 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1363, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017.
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Defendant conceded that amlodipine maleate came within the scope of
plaintiff’s patent claims, but argued that the term extension obtained by
plaintiff applied only to protection of amlodipine besylate because that was
the compound plaintiff identified in its application for patent term
extension.711 Following this reasoning, plaintiff’s patent term would have
essentially expired for all compounds other than amlodipine besylate.
The Federal Circuit held that the term extension did in fact cover
amlodipine maleate. It reasoned that the statutory definition of “drug
product” in § 156(f) included “any salt or ester of the active ingredient”712
and was thus met by both amlodipine besylate and amlodipine maleate,
amlodipine being the “active ingredient” in both compositions.
Defendant’s attempt to market the same drug product for which plaintiff
had obtained approval, simply by changing the salt, would exploit the very
loophole that the statute’s definition of “drug product” foresaw and
guarded against. Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on the “rights derived”
provision of § 156(b), which specifically limits the extension of a patent
term to “any use approved for the product,” was misguided because that
section did not limit the term extension to any specific form of the
“product,” and thus must be construed to cover the “product” as that word
is defined in § 156(f), “including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient.”713 Thus, the court held that the extended term of plaintiff’s
patent included any salt or ester of amlodipine, and reversed the district
court’s judgment of noninfringement.
H. Inventorship
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Industries,714 plaintiff sued defendant for
alleged violation of Illinois’s trade secret statute, breach of a joint
development agreement, and unlawful conversion of plaintiff’s property.715
Plaintiff also sought correction of inventorship of two patents issued to
defendant, the “‘329 patent” and the “‘987 patent.”716 Defendant
counterclaimed, seeking correction of inventorship of a third patent issued
to plaintiff, the “‘901 patent,” and for fraudulent inducement.717 The
dispute arose out of a joint development agreement entered into by parties
through which the parties intended to work together “to develop actuators
and driver circuits for Caterpillar’s exclusive use in fuel systems for diesel

711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.

Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017.
Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2000)).
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019.
387 F.3d 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
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engines.”718 Under the agreement, defendant agreed to assign plaintiff
certain intellectual property “made or conceived by [defendant’s]
personnel, either alone or with others (a) pursuant to the joint development
program or (b) resulting from [plaintiff’s] Proprietary Information.”719
Plaintiff agreed to pay defendant royalties for its use of any such
intellectual property assigned, extending beyond the termination of the
agreement.720
The actuators and driver circuits jointly developed by defendant and
plaintiff were mainly of a certain type used for “mechanically actuated,
electronically controlled unit injectors” (“meuis”).721 Defendant assigned
his rights to these inventions to plaintiff, and plaintiff subsequently filed
applications for patents on them which were granted as the ‘131 and ‘219
patents. One weekend in September 1992, the parties met at a hotel to
discuss fuel injector designs and on the second day “brainstormed alternate
system designs.”722 The following morning, defendant sketched an idea for
an “integrated spool valve employing residual magnetic latching.”723 This
valve comprised a spool-shaped piece that moves back and forth within a
cylindrical housing.724 When a current is applied to one side of the
cylinder, the spool is magnetically attracted to that side of the cylinder and
slides to that side.725 The current is alternatively applied to each side of the
housing, making the spool move back and forth from side to side.726 In
doing so, the spool opens and closes various channels carrying fluids, and
thereby changes the flow of fluids in each repetition.727
When defendant showed his sketch to plaintiff’s employees, plaintiff
recognized the potential value of the valve, but rejected the use of the valve
design for use in meuis because it would not be suitable for high pressure
fuel systems.728 Later, however, plaintiff investigated the valve’s use in
another type of fuel injector, the hydraulically actuated, electronically
controlled unit injector (“heui”). Plaintiff did not disclose its investigation
to defendant.729
In 1993, when the joint development agreement expired, plaintiff
attempted to persuade defendant to release plaintiff from its ongoing

718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.

Id. at 1361, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
Id. at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
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royalty obligation for use of intellectual property in exchange for a onetime payment of $275,000.730 Defendant attempted to get clarification
from plaintiff as to the exact intellectual property rights that would be
released.731 Plaintiff listed the ‘131 and ‘219 patents but did not mention
the integrated spool valve invention. Defendant agreed to the release.732
Shortly thereafter, defendant published an article describing the
integrated spool valve technology and filed two patent applications based
on it.733 Subsequently, counsel for plaintiff approached defendant to
request that he sign a patent application to be filed in the name of plaintiff
covering the integrated spool valve.734 The application named defendant a
co-inventor, and his signature was therefore necessary to complete the
application.735 Defendant refused, stating that he had invented the valve
outside the scope of the joint development agreement.736 Plaintiff then
proceeded to file two applications based on the technology.737 The first
named defendant as an inventor, and as defendant refused to sign it, it was
ultimately abandoned.738 The second did not name defendant as an
inventor and issued as the ‘901 patent.739
The district court denied plaintiff’s co-inventorship claim to Sturman’s
‘329 and ‘987 patents. The court held that plaintiff’s engineer’s alleged
contribution to the invention, the selection of the type of steel to be used in
the valve, was “merely the exercise of ordinary skill in the art and therefore
not a significant addition to the conception” of the inventions.740 As part of
the development of meuis under the joint development agreement, plaintiff
engineers had searched for and found a type of steel that had specific
magnetic and physical characteristics that would meet the demands of meui
systems, such as “a sixty pound latching force.”741 Although defendant’s
drawing indicated the use of the particular steel identified by the plaintiff
engineers, the court found that the demands of the integrated spool valve
did not require the use of such steel.742 Furthermore, available publications
including a patent issued to defendant prior to the existence of the joint
development agreement taught that “substantially any magnetic material”
730. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
731. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
732. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
733. Id. at 1363-64, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
734. Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
735. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
736. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
737. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
738. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
739. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
740. Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman
Indus., Inc., No. 99-1201, slip op. 44 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2003)).
741. Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
742. Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
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would suffice for use in the integrated spool valve.743 Therefore, plaintiff’s
contribution to the integrated spool valve was not considered a significant
addition to the invention.744
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
defendant was the sole inventor of the ‘329 and ‘987 patents. Considering
the district court’s findings of fact, it agreed that the use of the particular
steels identified by plaintiff engineers was an “insignificant contribution”
which did not support a claim to co-inventorship. Furthermore, because the
‘329 patent claims did not require either type of steel suggested by the
plaintiff engineers, it was legally correct that the engineers were not
inventors because its precedent required “that one contribute something to
the claimed invention.”745 The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument
that defendant’s amendments of the ‘329 and ‘987 patents claims to require
“material with enough residual magnetism” compelled correction of
inventorship.746 These limitations, it reasoned, were not specific to the
steels identified by plaintiff engineers. Furthermore, when used in the
integrated spool valve, defendant’s prior patent taught all that was
necessary for someone of ordinary skill in the art to select appropriate
materials.747
As for the ‘901 patent, all the claims of this patent covered a three-way,
dual-solenoid, integrated spool valve used to control the flow of working
fluid in a heui. The district court held that, although plaintiff had worked
on a three-way integrated spool valve for use in a heui separately from
defendant, defendant demonstrated his own prior conception of a three-way
version of the valve in a marketing presentation delivered to plaintiff. As
for plaintiff’s other alleged improvements to the integrated spool valve, the
court found that each of these were either an exercise of ordinary skill or
disclosed in defendant’s sketch. The Federal Circuit found that the district
court had clearly erred in its conclusion.
Although defendant’s
presentation had disclosed a three-way valve, it did not refer to an
integrated spool valve. Additionally, it found that because a three-way
valve was “more complex” than the two-way valve disclosed in
defendant’s sketch, plaintiff’s contribution was “not insignificant in quality

743. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (reciting the district court’s detailed factual
findings, including its observation that public texts also described the magnetic properties of
potentially useful materials, that led to its conclusion that Caterpillar’s contribution was
insignificant).
744. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
745. Id. at 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623 (emphasis added) (quoting Fina Oil &
Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935, 1941 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
746. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623-24.
747. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1030

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

when measured against the dimension of the full invention.”748
Accordingly, because defendant had failed to present clear and convincing
evidence of his prior conception of a three-way integrated spool valve, it
reversed the district court’s conclusion that defendant was the sole inventor
of the ‘901 patent.749
In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Aradigm Corp.,750 plaintiff sued defendant under
35 U.S.C. § 256751 seeking to have two of its scientists listed as inventors
of U.S. Patent No. 5,888,477, owned by defendant.752 Following a jury
verdict, the district court ordered the PTO to add one of plaintiff’s scientists
as an inventor. Defendant appealed this decision.753
Defendant argued that the jury had been provided with erroneous
instructions at trial. First, it contended that the jury should have been
provided with a construction of one of the claims for which joint
inventorship was asserted. The Federal Circuit agreed that “the legal scope
of a claim must be known before the contributions of an alleged coinventor can be compared to that claim to determine whether the correct
inventors were named,”754 but found that defendant had waived this
argument because it had never requested construction of the claims and
thereby implicitly conceded that the meanings of the terms therein were
clear.755 Defendant then argued that the jury verdict form and one of the
jury instructions had included “prejudicially paraphrased” descriptions of
the claim.756 At trial defendant had objected to the paraphrasing, but had
not indicated to the district court why such paraphrasing was prejudicial.
The Federal Circuit again held that defendant had waived this argument
because it failed to indicate what was lacking in the paraphrased

748. Id. at 1380, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609 (quoting Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935, 1941).
749. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
750. 376 F.3d 1352, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1787 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
751. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000) (entitling the Director to issue a certificate correcting an
error in naming an inventor, provided that the error was not made with any deceptive
intention and on application of all the parties and assignees with proof of the facts).
752. Lilly also sued Aradigm for state law claims of unjust enrichment and breach of
contract. Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1368-70, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799-1800.
753. This was a cross-appeal. Lilly appealed the district court’s denial of injunctive
relief as a remedy for Aradigm’s breech of contract and unjust enfringment claims, for
which the jury only awarded Lilly two dollars in nominal damages. Id. at 1368-69, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
754. Id. at 1360, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
755. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
756. The jury was instructed that “[t]he ‘inventions’ at issue in this case include: . . . that
aerosolized lispro produces a relative bioavailability greater than twice that seen after the
inhalation of a similar amount of [regular] human insulin.” Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1792-93. The verdict form also described the invention of claim 6 as “inhaling an
aerosolized formulation of insulin lispro into the lungs, which produces a relative
bioavailability greater than twice that seen after the inhalation of a similar amount of
[regular] insulin.” Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793.
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description or specify what made it prejudicial:
Generically alleging that the wording of a jury instruction is confusing,
without suggesting the logical error the jury might make, does not give
the district court the information that it requires to see the alleged error
of its ways and to have a meaningful first opportunity to consider
changing its course.757

Despite concluding that defendant had waived its right to raise its
paraphrasing arguments regarding the jury instructions on appeal because
its objections were not sufficiently specific, the Federal Court applied
Seventh Circuit law758 and addressed those arguments on their merits. In
doing so, the Federal Circuit found that the description of the claimed
invention in the verdict form differed from the language of the claim itself
only in that the description did not recite as a “distinct first step [the]
aerosolizing of lispro” as did the claim.759 The description in the verdict
form, however, “necessarily encompassed the step of aerosolizing” in that
it required that the invention include “inhaling an aerosolized formulation”
of lispro.760 Turning to the asserted error in the instructions, Aradigm
contended that the description given in the instructions had only recited one
limitation that was present in the claim at issue. The Federal Circuit found
that Seventh Circuit law requires review of the jury instructions as a whole,
and that “in light of the verdict form, any alleged error in instruction 20 did
not prevent the jury from reasonably discerning the correct message.”761
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the law of inventorship does not
require that an inventor have contributed to the conception of each
limitation of any one patent claim.762
Defendant next argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury verdict that plaintiff’s scientist was a joint inventor of the ‘477 patent.
Plaintiff claimed that its scientist was a joint inventor of the ‘477 patent
because he had conveyed to the defendant’s scientists that “aerosolized
757. Id. at 1361, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
758. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792 (noting that Rule 51 requires objections to state
“distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection”); see also Wilk v. Am.
Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 218 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictating the need to look to “the
instructions as a whole, in a common sense manner, avoiding fastidiousness, inquiring
whether the correct message was conveyed to the jury reasonably well”); Avern Trust v.
Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1969) (“Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes the assignment of error when no specific objection to an instruction is
made.”).
759. Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1361, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
760. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
761. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793.
762. Id. at 1361-62, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. Aradigm also contested the
paraphrasing of the invention in the instructions and the verdict form on the basis that it
allowed the jury to find that Lilly’s scientist was a co-inventor when he had contributed “a
mere realization about the chemical properties of lispro” already a part of the public domain.
Id. at 1362, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
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lispro might be used to produce ‘a relative bioavailability greater than twice
that seen after the inhalation of a similar amount of human insulin’” during
joint development meetings between Lilly and Aradigm in 1995 and
1996.763 The Federal Circuit held that the jury’s verdict was not
sustainable because the jury had not been presented with substantial
evidence that this information had ever been communicated by the
plaintiff’s scientist. The evidence showed that plaintiff’s scientist had
discussed insulin at meetings with defendant, and had suggested to
defendant that it try lispro in its aerosol delivery devices. No evidence
existed, however, that directly showed that the plaintiff’s scientist had
conveyed to defendant that aerosolized lispro should be used “to produce a
relative bioavailability greater than twice that seen after inhalation of
human insulin.”764 The Federal Circuit held that, where the standard for
correcting inventorship was a clear and convincing standard, the jury’s
verdict could not stand on circumstantial evidence alone.765
In its appeal, plaintiff also alleged that the jury instructions were
erroneous in that they required plaintiff to prove that its scientist had
contributed to the conception of the claimed invention by clear and
convincing evidence. Plaintiff argued that joint inventorship disputes
under § 256 should be analyzed under the preponderance of the evidence
standard where the person allegedly omitted from an issued patent had a
co-pending patent application claiming the same subject matter as the
issued patent. Plaintiff based its argument on 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 and
Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co.766 Section 1.601 provides that a party
who does not have the earliest effective filing date in an interference
proceeding need only to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was the first to invent in order to succeed in the interference if the
two patents or applications at issue were co-pending before the PTO.767 In
this case, the general presumption of patent validity does not apply. In
Environ Products, the Federal Circuit had held that in a three-way priority
contest, between two issued patents and a patent application, all of which
had been pending before the PTO at the same time, the parties to the
priority contest only needed to prove their claim to original inventorship by
a preponderance of the evidence.768
The Federal Circuit explained that its holding in Environ Products was
not binding in this case because the issue there was priority of invention,
not correction of inventorship. Furthermore, it did not see a reason to
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.

Id. at 1363-64, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793.
Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795.
215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (2005).
Environ Products, 215 F.3d at 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1041.
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extend the holding of Environ Products to correction of inventorship cases.
The existence of co-pending applications does throw into question the
presumption of validity for the first-filed patent insofar as the
presumption involves an issue of timing or priority, namely that the
patentee was first to invent. The existence of co-pending applications,
however, does not undermine to the same degree the presumption that
each of the groups of inventors listed on the patent applications acted
independently.769

The Federal Circuit found that the clear and convincing burden of proof
as applied to joint inventorship disputes was justified because individuals
are prone to “reconstructing” the extent of their contribution to the
conception of inventions.770 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit opined that,
unlike a junior party to an interference proceeding, a person alleging nonjoinder would benefit from a lower standard of proof without assuming any
related risk. A junior party to an interference, on the other hand, risks its
own patent claims if it does not successfully demonstrate priority.771
Furthermore, plaintiff’s argument assumed that its scientist’s patent
application claimed the same subject matter as the claims of the ‘477
patent. In a priority dispute interference, however, the preponderance of
the evidence standard does not come into play until it has been adjudicated
or conceded by the parties that the competing patents or applications do in
fact cover the same subject matter.772 The Federal Circuit found this to be
an additional reason why it could not treat plaintiff’s inventorship claim as
the functional equivalent of the priority determination in an interference
proceeding.773 For these reasons the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that
it deserved a new trial because the jury instruction should have provided
that plaintiff could prove joint inventorship by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.774 presented an appeal
from a district court’s grant of summary that an alleged inventor’s claim of
joint inventorship was not adequately corroborated.775 The Federal Circuit
began by noting that a party seeking to correct inventorship must establish
that it contributed to the conception of the claimed invention “with more
than their own testimony concerning the relevant facts.”776 The court
explained that an alleged inventor must corroborate its inventorship claim

769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.

Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1366, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
Id. at 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797-98.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1327, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
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with reliable evidence such as: (1) ”records made contemporaneously with
the inventive process”; (2) “[c]ircumstantial evidence of an independent
nature”; and (3) “oral testimony from someone other than the alleged
inventor.”777 After reviewing the alleged inventor’s evidence, the court
held that the district court “correctly concluded that no reasonable juror
could find that [the] inventorship claim was corroborated.”778
I.

Double Patenting

In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Pharmachemie B.V.,779 the issue was
whether the exclusive licensee could invoke § 121780 as a defense to the
argument that the claims of the disputed later patent were invalid for
double patenting in light of a related earlier patent.781 The district court
granted summary judgment to the exclusive licensee, holding that the “the
divisional application that led to the [later] patent was filed as a result of,
and consistent with, the restriction requirement issued in 1973.”782 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that its precedent mandates that § 121
is available as a defense to double patenting only if the application for the
later patent “was filed as a result of a restriction requirement and is
consonant with the restriction requirement.”783 After canvassing the
prosecution histories of the earlier and later patents, the Federal Circuit
determined that:
There was, to say the least, some confusion at various points as to how
the various claims should be sorted out for purposes of restriction. But
even though at some points restriction requirements were imposed that
were similar to, or even identical to, earlier restriction requirements, each
requirement was nevertheless separately imposed with respect to each
separate application. The record this does not support the inference that
any of the various restriction requirements automatically carried forward,

777. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
778. Id. at 1329, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
779. 361 F.3d 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
780. Section 121 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application,
the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the
inventions . . . . A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a
requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application
filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the
Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or
against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other
application.
35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
781. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 361 F.3d at 1344-45, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
782. Id. at 1348, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
783. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
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in part or in whole, from one application to the next.784

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment
and remanded to the district court, explaining that given “the complexity of
the factual record . . . [w]hether further analysis of the sequence of
applications, restriction requirements, and responses by applicants may
reveal other grounds for concluding that the protection of Section 121
should be extended . . . is a matter for the district court to address in the
first instance.”785
In dissent, Judge Newman wrote that regardless of whether the patent
applicants complied with the restriction requirements by various applicants,
“the issuance of these actions was entirely discretionary with the
Commissioner.”786 The dissent reasoned that because no dispute existed
“that the applicant made the required election for each restriction
requirement, and the divisional and continuing applications at issue were
accepted by the examiner as properly filed . . . [Section 121] protected the
patentee from citation of the earlier patent against the later one.”787 The
dissent further noted that if the majority’s opinion
require[s] that the minutiae of the various discretionary restriction
requirements and the acceptance by the examiners of the applicant’s
compliances with those requirements are subject to appellate review, the
standard of review is that of the Administrative Procedure Act, not the de
novo untangling of internal procedures for which my colleagues remand
to the district court.788

III. INFRINGEMENT
A. Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit’s claim construction landscape during the early part
of 2004 was marred by a string of 2-1 decisions. The underlying tension
between different claim construction methodologies espoused by different
camps of judges came to a head when the Federal Circuit decided to hear
en banc the panel’s decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.789 This section
initially discusses the panel decision in Phillips and the subsequent order to

784. Id. at 1349, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
785. Id. at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. The court’s remand for further
proceedings is curious given the prior decisions holding that, similar to claim construction,
double patenting is a question of law subject to de novo review. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869, 1881 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
double patenting issue in this case is solely a matter of law.”).
786. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 361 F.3d at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman,
J., dissenting).
787. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting).
788. Id. at 1350-51, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting).
789. 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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hear the case en banc. The secton next offers the authors’ modest proposal
for a claim construction methodology. Given that the Federal Circuit’s
claim construction jurisprudence does not lend itself to easy classification,
the remaining parts of this section groups cases according to the following
criteria: (1) cases adopting a broad construction; (2) cases adopting a
narrow construction; (3) cases in which the inventors used a “coined term”;
(4) means-plus-function limitation cases; and (5) preamble limitations.
Finally, this section discusses miscellaneous issues involving claim
construction and discuss the various tools that the court employed in 2004
to arrive at its constructions.
1. Phillips v. AWH Corporation: The panel decision and the en banc
order
Phillips involved the proper construction of the term “baffles” in claims
directed to modular wall panels suitable for impact resistance.790 At the
district court, even though both parties stipulated that “baffles” should be
construed as a “means for obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of
something,” the district court determined that “the term was ambiguous
because ‘it does not identify the substance or force the flow of which it is
intended to check, impede, or obstruct.’”791 The district court then
reasoned that “the claim language ‘does not adequately describe the
function of the structure,” and therefore concluded that “the claim contains
means-plus-function language subject to construction under 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6.”792 Looking to the specification, the district court held that “every
textual reference in the Specification and its diagrams show baffle
deployment at an angle other than 90 to the wall faces.”793
On appeal, though holding that the district court erred in treating the
term “baffle” as a means-plus-function limitation,794 the Federal Circuit
explained that its “analysis does not end there . . . we must still read the
claims in view of the specification and determine whether the patentee has
otherwise limited the scope of the claims.”795 The Federal Circuit started
its analysis by noting that “[t]he ordinary meaning of a term must be
considered in view of the intrinsic evidence [such as] the claims, the
790. 363 F.3d 1207, 1209-10, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
791. Id. at 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97MK-212, slip op. at 23 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2002)).
792. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. “An element in a claim for a combination may
be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)
793. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
794. Id. at 1212, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
795. Id. at 1212-13, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
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specification, and the prosecution history,”796 and observing that a “claim
term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows that
the patentee distinguished the term from the prior art on the basis of a
particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a
particular embodiment as important to the invention.”797
In examining the intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit observed that the
“specification is rife with references to impact resistance, especially against
projectiles such as bullets and bombs,”798 and referred to the specification’s
“Disclosure of the Invention” section that stated that baffles are “disposed
at such angles that bullets which might penetrate the outer steel panels are
deflected.”799 The Federal Circuit then explained that:
[T]he specification addresses and distinguishes the prior art, asserting
that “[i]n secured facilities, and protective barriers, it is feasible that
projectiles may be encountered, such as bullets from high powered guns
or bomb fragments.” It continues by stating that “[t]here have not been
effective ways of dealing with these powerful impact weapons with
inexpensive housing in the prior art.”800

Focusing on the figures and diagrams in the asserted patent, the Federal
Circuit again emphasized that the patent’s objective was to prevent objects
from penetrating through walls because the specification taught that “if
bullets ‘were to penetrate the outer steel shell wall, the baffles are disposed
at angles which tend to deflect the bullets.’”801 The Federal Circuit thus
held:
From the specification’s explicit descriptions of the invention, we
conclude that the patentee regarded his invention as panels providing
impact or projectile resistance and that the baffles must be oriented at
angles other than 90. Baffles directed at 90 cannot deflect projectiles as
described in the [asserted] patent, and in any event, are disclosed in the
prior art.802

Addressing the dissent’s argument that its construction was limiting
claims to the preferred embodiment, the majority explained that
“[i]nspection of the patent shows that baffles angled at other than 90º is the
only embodiment disclosed in the patent; its is the invention. It is
impossible to derive anything else from the specification.”803
796. Id. at 1213, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
797. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswich Corp.,
288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
798. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
799. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
800. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (issued July
7, 1987)) (citations omitted).
801. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798).
802. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
803. Id. at 1214, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1038

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

In dissent, Judge Dyk wrote that the majority’s opinion “effectively
limits the claims to the preferred embodiment, contrary to our recent
decision in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. . . . and numerous other
decisions of this court. In doing so, the majority decision attempts to work
a major and unfortunate change in our recent claim construction
jurisprudence.”804 The dissent explained that the majority’s decision
imposed an “additional structural limitation upon the patentee’s preferred
embodiments that limits baffles to structures ‘oriented at angles other than
90º.’ This is contrary to the plain meaning, and there is no suggestion that
the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, gave a special meaning to the
term baffles.”805
Addressing the three grounds proffered by the majority opinion, the
dissent found that “[n]one is convincing.”806 With regard to the majority’s
position that baffles angled at other than 90º was only embodiment
disclosed, the dissent noted that the court’s jurisprudence has “expressly
rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment,
the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to the
embodiment.”807 With regard to the majority’s reasoning that the object of
the invention required baffles orientated at angles other than 90º, the
dissent reasoned that the specification “merely identifies impact resistance
as one of several objectives of the invention.”808 Again relying on LiebelFlarshiem the dissent noted that the “fact that a patent asserts that an
invention achieves several objectives does not require that each of the
claims be construed as limited to structes that are capable of achieving all
of the objectives.”809 Finally, with regard to the majority’s position that
any broader construction of the term “baffles” would read on the prior art,
the dissent explained that “[t]he ‘axiom’ that claims should be construed to
preserve validity is not an invitation to narrowly construe ambiguous claim
language contrary to its plain meaning.”810
Four months after the panel opinion, the Federal Circuit “determined to

804. Id. at 1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (Dyk, J., dissenting); see also Leibel
Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(reversing the district court’s order granting summary judgment of noninfringement and
rejecting the contention that a patent must be construed as being limited to one embodiment
if the patent only describes a single embodiment).
805. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1217, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (Dyk, J., dissenting)
(quoting Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (Lourie, J., writing for
the majority)).
806. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
807. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting Leibel-Flarsheim,
358 F.3d at 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807).
808. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
809. Id. at 1217-18, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting LiebelFlarsheim, 358 F.3d at 908, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809).
810. Id. at 1218, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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hear th[e] case en banc in order to resolve issues concerning the
construction of patent claims raised by the now-vacated panel majority and
dissenting opinions.”811 In so doing, the court set forth seven questions for
which it invited submission of additional briefs from the parties as well as
amicus curae:
Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and
similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the
patentee’s use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be
consulted, in what order?
If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim
interpretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim
language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has
acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear
disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language in the specification will
satisfy those conditions? What use should be made of general as
opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary
meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same
term?
If the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable
definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to
determine what definition or definitions should apply?
If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification,
what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the
ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the
invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single
embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are
disclosed?
Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority
and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting
approaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary
methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a
patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish
the claim coverage it seeks?
When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole
purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and
112?
What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of
ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed
claim terms?
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc. . . . and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS
811. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1766
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Technologies, Inc. . . . is it appropriate for this court to accord any
deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so,
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?812

Judge Rader concurred with decision to hear the case en banc and
suggested that the court receive further commentary on an additional
question:
Is claim construction amenable to resolution by resort to strictly
algorithmic rules, e.g., specification first, dictionaries first, etc.? Or is
claim construction better achieved by using the order or tools relevant in
each case to discern the meaning of terms according to the understanding
of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, thus
entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or statute?813

Chief Judge Mayer, however, dissented from the court’s decision to hear
the case en banc,814 and in an opinion echoing his earlier dissents in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.815 and Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc.,816 the Chief Judge explained:
Until the court is willing to reconsider its holdings in [Markman] . . . and
[Cybor Corp.] . . . that claim construction is a pure question of law
subject to de novo review in this court, any attempt to refine the process
is futile. Nearly a decade of confusion has resulted from the fiction that
claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that it depends
on underlying factual determinations which, like all factual questions if
disputed, are the province of the trial court, reviewable on appeal for
clear error. To pretend otherwise inspires cynicism.817

While the Federal Circuit’s decision to address these seven questions en
banc is ambitious in scope and appears a good idea in the abstract, Phillips
may ultimately present a situation in which the initial en banc order overpromises and the ultimate resolution, if any, under-delivers in terms of
resolving the Federal Circuit’s fundamental conflicts regarding the
mechanics of claim construction. This is especially true because, as
explained above, many of the questions on which the court desired briefing
were never even raised by the parties in Phillips, much less disputed.818
Indeed, at the district court, the parties stipulated to the construction of the

812. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
813. Id. at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Rader, J., concurring).
814. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
815. 52 F.3d 967, 989, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., concurring), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
816. 138 F.3d 1448, 1463, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
817. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
818. For example, the role of prosecution history, expert testimony, dictionaries, and
deference to district courts in claim construction either played no role in the panel and
district court’s opinion or received only passing reference.
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term “baffles” that ultimately gave rise to the en banc hearing.819
2.

A modest proposal for a claim construction methodology
Chief Judge Mayer dissented from the order granting an en banc
rehearing in Phillips, arguing that “[n]early a decade of confusion has
resulted from the fiction that claim construction is a pure question of law”
and that a “shuffling” of the Court’s precedent based on that “fiction”
would not resolve that confusion.820 We agree with Chief Judge Mayer’s
view of the Federal Circuit’s precedent and propose a solution.
It is a staple proposition that claim construction begins with the words of
the claims and that claim terms are, in the first instance, to be given their
ordinary meanings as they are understood by persons of skill in the art at
the time of invention.821 The next step, after ascertaining the ordinary
meaning, is to review the intrinsic evidence to determine whether the
disputed claim terms should receive meanings that differ from the ordinary
meanings of the words. We believe that the problem lies in treating the
first step as a pure question of law.
The Court has struggled to create a purely legal claim construction
analysis because the determination of the “ordinary” meaning of a claim
term is not a question of law. For example, determining what the term
“mosfet” meant to an electrical engineer in 1995 simply is not something
that may be determined as a question of law. Rather, it is a question of fact
that requires evidence necessary to identify the characteristics of a person
of ordinary skill and to determine how such a person understood the term
“mosfet” at the relevant time. Various Federal Circuit decisions have
vacillated between using specification822 and dictionaries from the relevant
time823 because the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is tethered to the idea of
claim construction as a pure question of law. But it is not really the role of
the specification to define terms as they would ordinarily be understood by
a person of skill. Instead the specification functions to teach the new

819. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1419
(discussing Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *32).
820. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
821. Nathaniel Durrance, How The Doctrine Of Equivalents May Save Claim
Construction, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 73, 94 (2005) (explaining that the plain meaning of a claim
must be determined first and without reference to the offending device).
822. See, e.g., Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning this
proper context is the patent specification, wherein the patent applicant describes the
invention.”).
823. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate, perhaps even
preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim
construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed,
plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field.”).
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invention and to define terms, when necessary, that would not be
understood by the person of ordinary skill (at least not understood in the
way intended by the inventor). Dictionaries are a more apt tool for
determining the ordinary meaning of a term at a relevant time, but they are
only one such resource and they often provide inconsistent or conflicting
meanings, thereby requiring the court to choose amongst them without
making a finding of fact.
A better methodology would be to acknowledge that step one of the
claim construction process—ascertaining the ordinary meaning—is a
question of fact and allow trial courts to review all relevant evidence, such
as dictionaries, expert testimony, and treatises, and make a factual finding
as to the ordinary meaning of a disputed term. That finding would be given
deference by the court and would serve as a default. The next step in the
process, the review of the patent, would remain a question of law reviewed
de novo by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The trial court would
review the intrinsic evidence to determine if the patentee used a disputed
term in a way that is inconsistent with the previously ascertained ordinary
meaning. This is a question of law because it only requires the court to
analyze legal documents (the patent and the prosecution history) to
determine the legal significance of the words chosen by the patentee as
well as legal significance of the public record in the patent office. For
example, the trial court would review the claims to determine if the
doctrine of claim differentiation indicates that a particular construction is
appropriate. Likewise, the court would review the specification to see if
the patentee defined the term (explicitly or implicitly) or if the described
purpose of the invention indicates that a particular construction is
appropriate or if the patentee indicated that a described element was
particularly important to the patented invention. The court would review
the prosecution history to see if the patentee or the PTO indicated that a
particular term should be given a construction different than the ordinary
meaning. This type of analysis of legally operative documents is what
courts are trained to do. Courts, however, have no training which would
allow them to ascertain the ordinary meanings of words, other than through
the review of evidence and the assessment of credibility.
We propose, therefore, that the Federal Circuit adopt a process whereby
the district court would ascertain the ordinary meanings of disputed terms
as a question of fact and review the patent and the prosecution history as a
question of law to ascertain if those documents indicate that a term should
receive a particular meaning. Where the ordinary meaning and the
meaning derived from the intrinsic evidence are different, the meaning
derived from the intrinsic evidence would be adopted as long as the court
finds that such an intrinsic meaning exists. If the district court does not
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conclude that the intrinsic evidence indicates a particular definition for the
term, then the ordinary meaning applies.
3.

“Broad construction” cases
In Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,824 the Federal Circuit held
that a claim reciting the language, “heating the resulting batter coated
dough to a temperature in the range of about 400 degrees F to 850 degrees
F . . . means what it says” and required the dough itself, not the oven, to be
heated to the stated temperature.825 The disputed claims were directed to
the process of producing a “light, flaky dough product.” Plaintiff appealed
after the lower court granted summary judgment of noninfringement
against it. The Federal Circuit affirmed despite the fact that the district
court’s claim construction produced a nonsensical result—the dough would
be burned to a crisp if it was heated to 400-850°F.826 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that nothing in the specification or the prosecution history
suggested that the patentees meant “to” to mean “at,” and a court is not
required to redraft claims that, under their only reasonable interpretation
make no sense, especially where the patentee himself drafted the claims.827
In fact, according to the Federal Circuit, the prosecution history appeared
to indicate that plaintiff intended to use “to” instead of “at,” implying that
the dough itself should obtain the specified temperature range rather than
the oven in which it would be heated. The temperature range language was
added to the claims in response to the examiner’s rejection of them for
failing to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112.828 The original
application contained another claim as well as a description in the
specification that employed the word “to” to relate the concept of heating
dough to the stated temperature range, while in an example, the word “at”
took the place of “to.” Thus, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the patentees
had a choice between using “to” or “at” and consciously chose “to” when it
amended the claim.829
Plaintiff argued that the district court was wrong because it did not
construe the claim terms as one of ordinary skill in the art would do.
Plaintiff’s position rested on a declaration of its baking expert, in which the
expert stated that he would not interpret the claims to require the dough
itself to be heated to 450 - 850°F because the resulting product would be
“unusable.” The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, explaining that the
declaration lacked any explanation of how “to” would be interpreted to
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.

358 F. 3d 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
Id. at 1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860.
Id. at 1375, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1860.
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mean “at” in the art and thus restated the argument to rewrite the claim
simply because the paternal prices would not perform the intended
function, which it had already rejected.830
In Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd.,831 plaintiff
appealed a district court’s construction of several terms in four of its
patents directed to methods for screening substances for protein “inhibitors
and activators.” A representative claim included one of the disputed terms,
“inhibitor or activator of a protein,” in its preamble as follows: “A method
of determining whether a substance is an inhibitor or activator of a protein
whose production by a cell evokes a responsive change in a phenotypic
characteristic other than the level of said protein in said cell per se.”832 The
claimed method used two cell lines, one which produced more of the
protein of interest and that exhibited a greater phenotypic response to such
protein than the other. The district court construed the term “inhibitor or
activator of a protein” to mean “a substance that has a greater effect on the
phenotype of cells that express the protein of interest at a higher level than
on the phenotype of cells that express the protein of interest at a lower level
or not at all.”833 Under this construction, plaintiff stipulated that all four of
its patents were invalid and noninfringed. On appeal, however, plaintiff
argued that the term “inhibitors or activators” of proteins should have been
limited to substances that directly bind to the target protein; the district
court’s construction would cover substances that operated to achieve the
recited result by both direct and indirect means.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s broader construction for
several reasons, including its finding that the specification expressly
defined “inhibitor or activator of a protein” as a substance that yields a
positive response to the claimed method, encompassing substances that do
not directly bind to the protein of interest.834 Plaintiff attempted to argue
that a narrower construction was required under Athletic Alternatives, Inc.
v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.,835 which, plaintiff asserted stood for the
proposition that the notice function of patent law requires that the narrower
meaning prevails in the event of a tie between a broader and narrower
meaning. Plaintiff also relied on Rhine v. Casio, Inc.,836 which stated that
830. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1860.
831. 366 F.3d 1348, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
832. Id. at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
833. Id. at 1351, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (internal quotations omitted).
834. Id. at 1352, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
835. 73 F.3d 1573, 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Where
there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is
an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having
the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by
adopting the narrower meaning.”).
836. 183 F.3d 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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“[c]laims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”837
The Federal Circuit found neither of plaintiff’s attempts to invoke
canons of construction to support its limited meaning to be persuasive.
First, it found that plaintiff misinterpreted Athletic Alternatives,
characterizing that case as “unusual” and not on point because in that case
the patent applicant had made two “contradictory and irreconcilable
affirmative representations of the contested limitation,”838 and for that
reason the court held that the narrower definition should trump the broader
one. As for plaintiff’s reliance on Rhine, the Federal Circuit said that
neither it nor the district court reviewed validity, and therefore plaintiff’s
“stipulation of invalidity alone is insufficient to invoke this canon.”839 The
Federal Circuit also determined that it was only required to turn to a
construction that preserves validity if, after applying “all the available tools
of claim construction . . . the claim is still ambiguous.”840
In Fuji Photo Film Co. V. International Trade Commission,841 Fuji
sought enforcement, modification, and clarification of the International
Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) previously issued cease-and-desist and
general exclusion orders directed to imported disposable 35-millimeter film
cameras that allegedly infringed Fuji’s utility and design patents. The ITC
adopted the orders of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to whom the
case was assigned and Fuji appealed them. Specifically, Fuji appealed the
constructions of claims in four of its patents: the ‘168 patent, the ‘087
patent, the ‘495 patent, and the ‘649 patent.
Fuji first asserted error in the ITC’s construction of Claim 1 of Fuji’s
‘168 patent, which contained a limitation directed to the front cover section
of a camera. The limitation read:
[A] front cover section which . . . closes said open front of said main
case section to cover the majority of said taking lens and said shutter
means and said film transporting means, said front cover section being
formed with at least one opening for partly receiving therein a member
of one of said means . . . .842

Fuji argued that several named parties’ cameras infringed Claim 1
because they all had front covers with openings which received the film
transporting means, the shutter means, or the taking lens.843 The ITC
disagreed based on its constructions of “opening” and “said means.”

837. Id. at 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (internal quotations omitted).
838. Housey Pharms., 366 F.3d at 1356, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
839. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
840. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
358 F.3d 898, 911, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
841. 386 F.3d 1095, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
842. Id. at 1098, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
843. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
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The ITC construed “opening” to mean “hole, breach, or aperture.” Fuji
argued that the term should include “[a]n open space serving as a passage
or gap,” or “an unobstructed or unoccupied space or place.”844 The Federal
Circuit agreed with the ITC’s construction, holding that the term “opening”
was used throughout the specification to refer to perforations in the surface
covering the body of a disposable camera.845 Fuji argued that “opening”
must be interpreted to include an open space because the specification
stated that the lens hole in the front cover was defined by a “circular boss,”
that the circular boss consists of a hollow bulge in the front cover section,
and that the hollow bulge is “for receiving therein the taking lens.”846 The
Federal Circuit dismissed this argument because the sentence on which Fuji
relied “significantly” did not refer to the circular boss as an “opening.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded the sentence did not support Fuji’s
argument at all.
The ITC construed “said means” to include the “shutter means” and the
“film transporting means,” but not the “taking lens.”847 The ITC based its
decision on the fact that “taking lens” was not denominated as a “means” in
the claim. Fuji disputed this construction, pointing out that other parts of
the patent referred to the taking lens as a “means” and discloses cameras in
which the taking lens is received by a hole in the camera’s front cover. The
Federal Circuit found the plain language of the claim to be dispositive.
Because the word “means” was used in reference to two of the three
components set forth in the “front cover section” limitation but not the
third, and because the same distinction existed in the preamble to the
claims, which referred to a “taking lens, shutter means, and film
transporting means,” the ITC’s construction was strongly supported.848
The Federal Circuit distinguished Fuji’s construction, “which requires that
the word ‘means’ be read into a portion of the claim where it is
conspicuously absent.”849 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit found that the
specification did not require a construction different from that which it
ascertained from the plain meaning of the claims. Rather, in every
embodiment described by the patent, the lens was never the sole element
that was partly received by an opening in the camera cover. Therefore, the
claim as construed was not at odds with the specification and did not
produce a nonsensical result.850
The Federal Circuit also rejected Fuji’s argument that the omission of the
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.
850.

Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
Id. at 1099, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
Id. at 1100, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
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word “means” after “taking lens” was an inadvertent error. During
prosecution, the examiner had made clear that he understood “said means”
to refer to two, not three, means when he stated that “said means”
“referr[ed] back to the previous two means.”851 The applicant never
disputed this understanding. Therefore, although it explained that “caution
must be used in attaching weight to an applicant’s silence in response to an
examiner’s statement about claim scope,”852 the Federal Circuit
characterized the applicant’s failure to correct the examiner’s
understanding as well as its failure to correct the claim by amendment or
other measure as supporting its decision that the omission of “means” was
not inadvertent.853
Fuji argued that because claims depending on Claim 1 referred to “said
taking lens means,” and because the phrase “taking lens means” was used
twice in the specification, “taking lens” in Claim 1 should be construed as
“taking lens means.” The Federal Circuit again disagreed with Fuji,
reasoning that although “taking lens means” was used twice in the
specification, “taking lens” without the word “means” was used thirteen
times. The Federal Circuit thus concluded that there was “no basis for
assuming that the use of the term ‘taking lens’ without the term ‘means’
was simply a one-time departure from a contrary usage employed
throughout the patent.”854 The fact that the “Summary of Invention”
section employed the term “taking lens means” and stated that the front
cover of the camera has “at least one opening for partially receiving therein
a member of at least one of the means” made no difference, as the
“Background of the Invention” section referred to the “present invention”
as having “a taking lens, a photographic transporting means, [and] an
exposure means.”855 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
inconsistency between Claim 1’s use of “taking lens” and the dependent
claims’ use of “taking lens means” could have just as easily been resolved
by deleting “means” in the dependent claims as inserting “means” into
Claim 1.856
851. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73.
852. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
853. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. Noting that Fuji’s argument, if successful,
would broaden the scope of the claims, the court recited the general rule that “as between
the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and
the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection
for particular subject matter.” Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (internal quotations
omitted).
854. Id. at 1101, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
855. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
856. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. The court also rejected Fuji’s argument that the
court’s constructions conflicted with the claim construction adopted in the original
investigation of the case. The construction adopted originally was the product of a
stipulation made by one of the respondents in the prior case. Because the present case
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The Federal Circuit turned next to Fuji’s arguments with respect to the
construction of the ‘649 patent. Claim 1 of the ‘649 patent recited a
method for assembling a disposable camera consisting of three essential
steps: winding a film taken from a light tight container in a darkroom,
loading the film into the camera, and affixing the back cover of the
camera.857 Although the words “in a darkroom” appeared only in the first
of the three steps, the ITC argued that “in a darkroom” should be read into
the other two steps as well. It found support for this construction in the
specification, in which all embodiments describe the three steps being
performed in a darkroom. The Federal Circuit determined that the
inclusion of “in a darkroom” in the first step and its omission from other
two steps provided strong textual support for Fuji’s argument that the
second steps are not required to be performed in a darkroom. The Federal
Circuit held that the ITC’s statement that “there is no suggestion in the ‘649
patent that the steps 2 and 3 could be performed outside a darkroom . . .
ha[d] it backwards.”858 Rather, “the proper question was whether the
specification indicated that the second and third steps cannot be performed
outside a darkroom, and thus must be interpreted more narrowly than its
language appears to require.”859 For all statements in the specification
which the ITC said supported its construction, the context indicated that the
statement was describing a preferred embodiment, not the invention as a
whole.
The Federal Circuit also disposed of the theory that the second and third
steps must occur in a darkroom because it would be difficult to successfully
perform them outside of a darkroom—Fuji’s expert testified that the steps
could be performed outside of a darkroom so long as the film was protected
from light during the processes of loading the camera and securing the back
cover.860 Furthermore, although the specification referred to the need to
avoid exposing the film to light during these steps, the Federal Circuit
found nothing in the specification that said the only method of light
avoidance is performance of the steps in a darkroom.
In Bilstad v. Wakalopulos,861 Bilstad appealed from a Board of Patent
Appeals and Interference judgment in favor of Wakalopulos that found
Bilstad’s patent application lacked a sufficient written description under §
112.862
Bilstad provoked an interference by copying claims of
affected different respondents, none of which were parties to the prior stipulation, the
original constructions were not binding. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-74.
857. Id. at 1104, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75.
858. Id. at 1105, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
859. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
860. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777.
861. 386 F.3d 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
862. Id. at 1118, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786 (affirming the Board’s decision but
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Wakalopulos’s patent into its patent application. The technology to which
the application and patent were directed was an apparatus for sterilizing
three-dimensional objects using ionizing radiation without hurting the
objects. The relevant portions of the interference count read as follows:
“A sterilization apparatus comprising . . . an electron beam tube . . . and a
moveable member manipulating objects in a plurality of directions within
the reactive volume wherein the manipulated objects are sterilized.”863
During the interference proceedings, Wakalopulos filed a motion seeking
judgment that Bilstad’s claim, designated to the interference count was not
patentable because it lacked an adequate written description under § 112
for the claim limitation “a moveable member manipulating objects in a
plurality of directions within the reactive volume.”864 After conducting a
hearing on Wakalopulos’s motion, the Board granted judgment in favor of
Wakalopulos. The Board focused on the term “plurality,” which it
construed to connote an indefinite numerical range from two to infinity. In
contrast to the wide range denoted by “plurality” in the count, the written
description of Bilstad’s application described manipulation in only a “small
number of directions.”865
Bilstad argued on appeal that the Board incorrectly construed plurality.
Specifically, it contended that the Board contradicted Federal Circuit
precedent by combining dictionary definitions to achieve a range of two to
infinity.866 The Federal Circuit saw no error in the Board’s construction of
plurality. Confronted with opposing arguments from the parties as to the
meaning of the term, the court found that the Board looked to a dictionary
to ascertain the ordinary meaning of plurality, then looked to the written
description for context in ascertaining the appropriate meaning of
“plurality” found in the dictionary. It then properly determined that the
dictionary definitions, Bilstad’s proffered definition, and Wakalopulos’s
proffered definition were all consistent with the written description and
construed the term to encompass all of the definitions. The Federal Circuit
approved of these steps taken by the Board to derive the correct
construction of “plurality,” citing precedent stating that “if more than one
dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic
record, the claim terms may be construed to encompass all consistent
remanding the case to the Board in order to apply the correct standard).
863. Id. at 1119, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
864. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.”).
865. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1122, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90.
866. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1050

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

meanings.”867 The fact that the Board’s definition did “little more than
incorporate the several distinct [dictionary] definitions into a single one
covering the entire scope of ‘plurality’” was not problematic because “the
Board did not change the scope of the term or alter the ordinary meanings
in any significant way.”868
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,869 defendant asserted error in the
district court’s construction of “pure” and “having a purity of at least 95%”
in plaintiff’s claims directed to a pharmaceutical product and a process of
manufacturing such product. The district court’s construction of both terms
excluded from consideration of purity “excipients.” Thus, plaintiff’s
process claim requiring “a highly pure solution of cefuroxime axetil” was
construed to cover processes that used a solution that contains excipients in
addition to cefuroxime axetil, and its product claim requiring “cefuroxime
axetil . . . having a purity of at least 95%” was construed to cover
formulations of cefuroxime axetil with more than five percent other
ingredients.870
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s constructions of both
terms. It proffered three reasons for its decision. First, the Federal Circuit
held that the ordinary meaning of “impurity” included “unwanted reaction
products formed during synthesis,”871 and the specification described the
types of molecules that are considered impurities consistently with this
ordinary meaning. Because “excipients” are “inactive ingredients that are
routinely and purposefully added to the active ingredient to enhance the
performance of the active ingredient,”872 excipients were excluded from the
ordinary meaning of impurity.
Second, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if excipients were considered
impurities, then one of the patent claims would have to be construed to
exclude a preferred embodiment, in violation of the principle that claims
“should rarely, if ever” be construed as such.873 Finally, the Federal Circuit
found that a construction that would exclude compositions that contained
more than five percent of ingredients other than cefuroxime axetil would
conflict with the specification of the product patent, which lists
pharmaceutical examples which all contained less than ninety-five percent
867. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790 (quoting Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive
Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
The court also found that the definition of “plurality” attributed to it by the Board was
consistent with the disclosure of Wakalopulos’s patent. Id. at 1122-23, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1790.
868. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1123, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.
869. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
870. Id. at 1344-45, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
871. Id. at 1347, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
872. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
873. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
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cefuroxime axetil.874
In Mars v. H.J. Heinz Co.,875 plaintiff brought suit for infringement of its
patent directed to a “dual-textured pet or animal food product comprising
[among other things] a soft inner component of a dual texture pet or animal
food product containing a mixture of lipid and solid ingredients.”876 The
first issue on appeal was whether “ingredients” should be construed to
mean only starting materials. The Federal Circuit held that the term was
not so limited. First, the Federal Circuit found that dictionary definitions
indicated that the ordinary meaning of “ingredient” could refer to either
starting materials or to the components of a mixture after they have been
combined.877 The Federal Circuit further looked to the claims themselves
that were drawn to “a mixture . . . of ingredients.” The context of the term
“ingredients” in the claim “strongly suggests that ‘ingredients’ refers to the
components after they have been combined to form that ‘mixture.’”878 The
Federal Circuit referred to its previous decisions in PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte
Chemical Co.879 and Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,880 in
which it “equated a composition with a mixture and construed the term
‘composition’ to refer to the claimed ingredients after they were joined
together.”881 Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed defendant’s argument
that the examples appear to use the term “ingredients” to refer to starting
materials by saying that this was “not a sufficient reason . . . to deviate
from the ordinary meaning of the claim language,” and furthermore, the
statements cited by defendant did not use the term mixture of
ingredients.882
The second issue on appeal was whether the correct construction of
“containing a mixture of lipid and solid ingredients” was limited to include
mixtures containing only solid and lipid ingredients and exclude mixtures
containing ingredients in addition to solid and lipid ingredients.883 The
Federal Circuit again held that the term was not as narrow as defendant
contended, and cited a general purpose dictionary and the Manual Patent
Examing Procedure to show that “containing” is open-ended and does not
exclude additional, unnamed ingredients. Furthermore, the parties agreed

874. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
875. 377 F.3d 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
876. Id. at 1372, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
877. Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
878. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
879. 304 F.3d 1235, 1244, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
880. 64 F.3d 1553, 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The
chemical composition exists at the moment the ingredients are mixed together.”).
881. Mars v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837, 1841
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
882. Id. at 1375, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
883. Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
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that “mixture” means “a portion of matter consisting of two or more
components in varying proportions that retain their own properties,” and
that nothing within this ordinary meaning of “mixture” barred additional,
unnamed ingredients.884
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s reasons for
limiting the term to exclude mixtures containing ingredients in addition to
solid and lipid ingredients were lacking. The Federal Circuit reasoned that
the district court erred in concluding that the patentee had used the terms
“containing” or “mixture” inconsistently with the ordinary, open-ended
meanings of these terms. The district court had relied on portions of the
specification which provided that the soft inner component should “not
exceed 100 wt%’ of lipids and solids and that ‘the most preferred
embodiment comprises about 60 wt% solids and 40 wt% lipids.’”885 The
specification’s full description of “preferable” embodiments, however,
allowed for the possibility that the sum weight percent of solids and lipids
was less than 100%, where it stated that “[i]t is preferable for the inner
portion or component to comprise about 40-90 wt solids and about 10-60
wt lipids,”886 and even stated that the “sum of the wt of solids and lipids, in
all cases, [does] not exceed 100wt.”887
Furthermore, it rejected defendant’s argument that the patentee had
limited the scope of its claims during prosecution of a related application
when it replaced claims requiring an inner component “containing at least
an ingredient comprising a lipid, wherein said [inner] component has a total
moisture content less than about 25 wt%,” with claims requiring an inner
component “containing a mixture of lipid an solid ingredients forming a
cream-like matrix . . . and a total moisture content less than about
15wt%.”888 Although the amendment narrowed the total moisture content
limitation, the Federal Circuit found that “the extent to which additional
subject matter, if any, has been surrendered is ambiguous.”889
The Federal Circuit also rejected defendant’s claim that the scope of
“containing” should be limited to include only the specified ingredients
because the patentee used “containing at least” to describe the components
of the outer shell of the claimed dual-textured animal food. The Federal
Circuit dismissed this argument, reasoning that the phrase “at least” to not
be required to make the outer shell limitation open-ended, and instead, it
884. Id. at 1376, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
885. Id. at 1372, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
886. Id. at 1376, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,312,746
(issued Nov. 6, 2001)).
887. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,312,746 (issued Nov.
6, 2001)).
888. Id. at 1377, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
889. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
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was added to clarify that “not all, but ‘at least’ one, of the listed ingredients
must be present in the outer shell.”890 In contrast, “at least” was not used in
conjunction with the inner component because the inner component was
intended to contain both solids and lipids.
For its final argument, defendant contended that the patentee had
disclaimed the addition of water in any amount to the starting materials
used to make the inner component by its statements in the specification that
“it is desirable to provide a palatable edible product without the use of
water,” and that “the soft inner portion that is coextruded in the center of
the extruded rope does not contain any added water . . . .”891 The Federal
Circuit concluded that these statements cited by defendant did not “amount
to the ‘clear disclaimer of particular subject matter’ required by [its]
precedent to narrow the ordinary meaning of the claim language.”892
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit observed other statements in the
specification and claims that made clear that water is present in the inner
component, including “water activity” and “total moisture content”
limitations for the inner component and statements that the inner
component has certain “moisture components.”893
Holding that the district court had erred in its construction of Mars’s
claims, the Federal Circuit concluded that genuine issues of fact remained
as to whether the accused products infringed the patents as properly
construed and remanded for further consideration.894
In Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. (d/b/a Conagra
Refrigerated Foods),895 the patentee appealed a district court’s grant
summary judgment of invalidity and unenforceability of its patent covering
a “Method of Browning Precooked Whole Muscle Meat Products.”896 The
district court found the asserted patent claims invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) based on the invention’s prior sale and public use.897 On appeal,
the patentee argued that the district court failed to construe the disputed
890. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1843.
891. Id. at 1378, 1378 n.6, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844, 1844 n.6.
892. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
893. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
894. Id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
895. 375 F.3d 1341, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
896. Id. at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. Unitherm and Jennie-O Foods, Inc.
together sued Conagra for a variety of claims, including for a declaratory judgment that its
patent was invalid and for tortious interference with Unitherm’s prospective economic
relationships, and Unitherm separately sued Conagra for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act
(Walker Process claim). Only the court’s judgment with respect to the declaratory judgment
of patent invalidity is related to patent law and therefore is the only part of the court’s
opinion discussed here. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
897. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (entitling a person to patent an invention, unless it was “patented
or described in a printed publication . . . or in public use . . . more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent.”).
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claim terms and incorrectly construed the term “golden brown” according
to its plain and ordinary meaning, instead of limiting its scope to the color
described in the patent’s five examples.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee on both counts.898 First,
the Federal Circuit held that because the patentee failed to identify any
“disputed claim terms” in its summary judgment brief or in its brief on
appeal other than the term “golden brown,” the district court was free to
have construed only that term in granting summary judgment.899 The
patentee’s generalized contention that the district court should have
conducted a Markman hearing did not suffice to show that a genuine issue
of material fact precluded summary judgment.900 Second, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court had properly concluded that the term
“golden brown” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning where it
had found that (1) the patentee had not acted as its own lexicographer and
explicitly defined the term and (2) dictionary definitions of “golden brown”
did not conflict with any definition found in, or ascertained by, a reading of
the intrinsic evidence.901 The Federal Circuit labeled patentee’s attempt to
limit the meaning of “golden brown” to the color descriptions provided in
the patent examples a “violation of our precedent counseling against
importing limitations into the claims.”902 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
the examples represented “neither clear nor explicit disavowal of the
common meaning,” and “[i]n fact, [were] . . . precisely what they purport to
be: examples of Hunter-Lab Color Meter measurements falling within the
commonly understood range of ‘golden brown.’”903
Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.904 involved claims directed to a
remote-controlled portable search light.905 While certain unasserted claims
expressly recited that the search light rotate through 360 degrees, the
disputed claim called for a “horizontal drive means for rotating . . . [a] lamp

898. Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
899. Id. at 1346-47, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
900. Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
901. Id. at 1351-52, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712 (citing Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573,
1578 n. 6, for the proposition that “judges may rely on dictionary definitions when
construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents”).
902. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
903. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (emphasis added) (citing Texas Digital Sys. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-04, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
for the proposition that the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is only rebutted
where the patentee “clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different from its
ordinary meaning,” or used “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”).
904. 355 F.3d 1327, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
905. Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
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unit in a horizontal direction.”906 The issue before the Federal Circuit was
whether this language required a search light to be capable of rotating
through 360 degrees.907 Conceding that the disputed claim did not recite a
360 degree rotation, defendant argued that such a construction was
mandated by the specification and prosecution because “the scope of the
claims cannot exceed what is supported by the written description of the
patent.”908 Seeking support in the specification, defendant relied on a
passage stating that a “searchlight apparatus in accordance with the present
invention includes a lamp unit mounted in a housing which has a . . .
horizontal drive mechanism for rotating the lamp unit in a horizontal
direction through at least 360 degrees.”909
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s analysis of the specification,
explaining that although the inventors described their invention as having
the ability to rotate through 360 degrees, “this particular advantage is but
one feature of the invented search light. The written description describes
other significant features as well.”910 The Federal Circuit then reasoned
that the “patentees were not required to include within each of their claims
all of these advantages or features described as significant or important in
the written description.”911 The Federal Circuit further explained that the
specification’s description of lone embodiment as capable of rotating
through 360 degrees was not determinative because an “applicant is not
necessarily required . . . to describe more embodiments than its preferred
one, and we have outright rejected the notion that disclosure of a single
embodiment necessarily limits the claims.”912
Regarding the prosecution history, defendant argued that the inventors
acted as lexicographers requiring that the term “rotating” as used in all the
claims be capable of rotating through 360 degrees.913 To support its
contention, defendant cited to the arguments in which the patentee
overcame the prior art by arguing that “the claims in issue have been
amended to recite rotation through at least 360 degrees and avoid an
incidental disclosure of rotation which could be imputed to Lipman.”914
The Federal Circuit again found defendant’s argument unconvincing,
explaining that “we find no clear or express statement by the patentees
giving ‘rotating’ a special meaning” because the patentee’s statements were
906. Id. at 1330, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
907. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
908. Id. at 1331, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
909. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
910. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
911. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
912. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing to Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
299 F.3d 1313, 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
913. Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
914. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
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subject “to multiple reasonable interpretations.”915 In particular, the
Federal Circuit explained that the patentee’s statements could be
understood “to distinguish only those claims that explicitly recited a 360
degrees limitation,” and thus concluded that that statements “do not rise to
level of a clear disavowal of scope with respect to” the disputed claim.916
The majority opinion also rejected defendant’s argument that the claims
must require a 360 degree rotation because the claims were written in
means plus function format pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6.917 Focusing on the
functional language, the majority reasoned that “the function of the
‘horizontal drive means’ is ‘rotating said lamp unit in a horizontal
direction’” and nothing in such language requires a 360 degree rotation.918
Then looking to the structure corresponding to the recited function, the
majority noted that although the assembly structure “may be capable of
rotating through 360 degrees, we see nothing in the written description that
compels limiting the function to only this degree of rotation, or to rotation
through any particular angle at all.”919
In dissent, Judge Archer construed the claim language as requiring
rotation through 360 degrees because the claims were written in means plus
function format, and the only “structure in the specification which
describes the horizontal rotating means expressly states that it is ‘free to
rotate through greater than 360 degrees in either direction.’”920 The dissent
thus reasoned that “only devices capable of rotating through 360 degrees
and their equivalents are covered by this claim limitation; a device
incapable of rotating through 360 degrees is not.”921 In addition to the
specification, the dissent noted that the patentee distinguished his claims
from the prior art by arguing that the prior art reference “would not be
rotatable so as to be able to sweep through 360 degrees or greater as
achieved by applicants’ invention.”922 In light of these arguments, the
dissent concluded that the applicants “defined ‘rotate’ . . . to require that
the horizontal drive means for rotating be capable of rotation through 360
degrees.”923
International Rectifier Corp. v. Ixys Corp.924 involved claims directed to
metal-oxide-silicon field effect transistors (“MOSFET”) devices having a
915.
916.
917.
1486.
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.

Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
Id. at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000); Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1333-34, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
Id. at 1334, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
Id. at 1341, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (emphasis added).
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
361 F.3d 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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limitation reciting “at least [a] first base region being a cellular polygonal
region . . . and [a] first source region having the shape of an annular ring
disposed within [the] cellular polygonal first base region.”925 On appeal,
the claim terms in dispute were “polygonal” and “annular.”926
With respect to “polygonal,” the issue on appeal was whether the district
court properly construed the term to mean that the “corners of the
polygonal regions may take the form of spherical junctions (i.e., round)
after processing and are not necessarily formed by straight lines
intersecting at a point to form a well defined angle.”927 In particular,
defendant argued that the district court improperly departed from the
ordinary and customary meaning of polygonal, which would require that
the polygon corners have straight lines joining together in well-defined
angles.928
The Federal Circuit began its analysis “with an examination of the
possible dictionary definitions of the word ‘polygon.’”929 Having reviewed
different versions of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,930 the
Federal Circuit reasoned that “[b]y necessity, the boundary of a closed
plane figure will also include multiple included angles formed at the
intersection of the straight lines.”931 The Federal Circuit next looked to the
specification to determine “whether the patentee acted as his own
lexicographer, or otherwise disavowed or disclaimed the full scope of the
ordinary and customary meaning of [polygonal].”932 In so doing, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that the “depictions and descriptions of the patents
are consistent with the ordinary definition of the word ‘polygon.’”933 The
Federal Circuit therefore held that the construction allowing the polygonal
corners to be round rather than formed by straight edges was erroneous.934
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s
argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the
processing techniques for MOSFET transistors would “necessarily blur[]
the outline of the regions.”935 The court explained that “[w]hile [the
plaintiff] is correct that the meaning of claim terms must be considered
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, that does not mean
925. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
926. A third claim term on appeal was “adjoining.” Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
927. Id. at 1370, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
928. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
929. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
930. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
931. Id. at 1371, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
932. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
933. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. The court also noted that “neither party argues
that anything in the prosecution history affects the scope of the any of the disputed claim
terms.” Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
934. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
935. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
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that the inventor’s choice of words may be ignored.”936 The Federal Circuit
thus concluded that nothing in the intrinsic evidence “suggest[s] that the
recognition of these diffusion effects by those skilled in the art warrants the
re-definition of the term polygon to mean anything other than ‘a closed
plane figure bounded by straight lines.’”937
With respect to the term “annular,” the issue was whether the district
court’s construction of the term as encompassing shapes not ordinarily
considered to be annular, such as hexagonal and ovals shapes, was overly
broad.938 Though observing that the dictionaries indicated that the term’s
ordinary meaning is “of or relating to an area formed by two concentric
circular regions,”939 the Federal Circuit determined that the patentee acted
as a lexicographer and expressly defined “annular” to include more than
just circular shapes.940 Specifically, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
inventor “deviated from th[e] ordinary and customary meaning, and used
the word ‘annular’ to describe structures that are . . . polygonal. In
particular, [the specifications] illustrate[] base and source regions of
concentric squares and . . . of concentric hexagons.941
The text
accompanying these figures refers to these shapes as ‘rings.’”942 Given
such statements in the specification, the Federal Circuit held that “the
patentee acted as his own lexicographer, and the patentee’s definition
trumps the ordinary and customary meaning that otherwise would have
attached.”943
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.944 involved a claim covering
the chemical compound “crystalline paroxetine hydrocholride
hemihydrate” (“PHC hemihydrate”) having antidepressant properties.945
Relying on the patent specification’s discussion of “the superior handling
properties of the hemihydrate form that improve the manufacture of PHC,”
the district court construed the claim as limited to “commercially
significant amounts of PHC hemihydrate.”946
Reversing this construction on appeal, the Federal Circuit began its
analysis by noting that claim construction requires courts “to place the
claim language in its proper technological and temporal context.”947

936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id. at 1372, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215-16.
Id. at 1373, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
Id. at 1313, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
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Turning to the claim itself, the court explained that the “language is not
ambiguous, but rather describes a very specific compound. The record
repeatedly shows that artisans in this area of technology at the time of
invention would have understood that the claim embraces PHC
hemihydrate without further limitation.”948 With regard to the remaining
intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit explained that the specification does
not “redefine the compound in terms of its commercial properties, but
emphasize[s] that the new compound exhibits favorable characteristics.”949
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “[a] description of characteristics
does not redefine a compound with an established and unambiguous
structural definition.”950 The Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion
upon review of the prosecution history, noting that “nothing in the
prosecution history . . . defines the invention in terms of commercially
significant quantities.”951
The Federal Circuit also addressed the district court’s public policy
consideration that absent a “commercially significant quantity” limitation,
the claim would cover trace amounts of the claimed compound thereby
producing “absurd results” that would “not serve any policy of patent law”
by precluding “attempts to make prior art PHC anhydrate compound.”952
The Federal Circuit explained that claim construction “is not a policydriven inquiry,” and claim scope cannot “be broadened or narrowed based
on abstract policy considerations regarding the effect of a particular claim
meaning.”953
In Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc.,954 the issue was whether the
phrase “upon detection of a suitable stable endpoint” in claims directed to
measuring glucose concentration in a blood sample was limited to use of
“predetermined timing methods,” as required by the district court’s
construction.955 In reversing the construction below the Federal Circuit
began by noting that the “claim language itself governs the meaning of the
claim.”956 Focusing on the context of the claim language, the court
reasoned that the disputed phrase “does not explicitly require a
predetermined time for the reaction, but instead measures the endpoint by
948. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
949. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
950. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
951. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
952. Id. at 1313-14, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
953. Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. This reasoning appears to provide a
clear answer to one of the en banc questions to be addressed in Phillips. Namely, whether
claim language should “be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity
under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
954. 381 F.3d 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
955. Id. at 1354-55, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
956. Id. at 1355, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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the stability of reflectance . . . [and] emphasizes that the method does not
require any determination of a starting point for application of the blood
sample to the matrix.”957 Thus, based on the claim language, the Federal
Circuit determined that the claim “limits the endpoint by reference to
suitable stability in the reflectance readings, not by reference to a
predetermined time.”958
Turning to the remaining intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit
determined that the specification supported its construction because, “[i]n
discussing the invention as a whole,” the specification provides examples
illustrating “that a ‘suitably stable endpoint’ varies between unspecified
points in time.”959 The Federal Circuit also observed that although the
predetermined timing method was the only embodiment disclosed in the
patent, “the specification limits its discussion of predetermined timing
methods to preferred embodiments.”960 Explaining that “the applicant’s
choice to describe only a single embodiment does not mean that the patent
clearly and unambiguously disavowed other embodiments,” the Federal
Circuit determined that the district court erroneously “plac[ed] too much
emphasis on the specification’s discussion of the preferred embodiments,
rather than the meaning of the claims themselves.”961
The Federal Circuit also noted that the prosecution history established
that the claims were not limited to a predetermined timing method because
claim language in related patent applications evolved from “‘predetermined
time period’ to ‘predetermined incubation period’ to ‘suitably stable
endpoint’” thus showing that the patentee “purposefully sought in the
[asserted] patent claim scope broader than the predetermined timing
method.”962 In addition, the Federal Circuit used prior art cited during
prosecution of the disputed claims as a tool to underscore that persons of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim language to be broader
than use of predetermined timing methods.
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,963 an issue on appeal
was whether the claim phrase “a plurality of lamp supports . . . for
engaging and supporting . . . fluorescent lamps”964 was properly construed
by the district court as limited only to structures providing support from
below.965 The Federal Circuit reversed this construction, explaining that

957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.

Id. at 1356, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1356-57, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1357, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id. at 1364, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
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although the intrinsic evidence clearly shows that the lamp supports may
provide support from below, nothing in the intrinsic evidence restricts the
claims solely to such an embodiment.966 In particular, the Federal Circuit
explained that the disputed claim language “is not by its terms limited to
supports that engage and support the lamps from below, and there is no
language in the written description that limits the term ‘supporting and
engaging’ to support and engagement from below.”967 The Federal Circuit
further explained that although the asserted patent contained several figures
“show[ing] lamp supports that provide support from below the lamps, the
scope of the claims is not limited to particular embodiments depicted in the
figures or described in the written description.”968 The court further
elaborated that
[t]he ordinary meaning of the terms “supporting and engaging” includes
more than support or engagement from below, and the fact that the
patentee has not included figures depicting support and engagement from
other orientations is not sufficient to limit the claim language to the
particular orientation depicted in the figures.969

The Federal Circuit also noted that several figures in the asserted patent
depicted a device that “appears to clip around the lamps and thus provides
support and engagement for the lamps that would be effective in other lamp
orientations.”970 In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s
argument that such a clip was unclaimed and thus dedicated to the public,
explaining that this “argument misses the relevance of the clip”971 because
plaintiff “does not point to the clip as a claimed feature, but instead refers
to the clip to show that its use of the terms ‘supporting and engaging’ was
not meant to be limited to support and engagement from below.”972
In In re Bigio,973 the question was whether the Board properly construed
the term “hair brush” as including “not only brushes that may be used for
human hair on [a] scalp, but also brushes that may be used for hairs on
other parts of animal bodies (e.g., human facial hair . . . or pet hair).”974
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the “PTO gives a
disputed claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation during patent
prosecution . . . . The ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ rule recognizes
that ‘before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended as part of the

966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.

Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346-47.
Id. at 1365, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
381 F.3d 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1323-24, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
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examination process.’”975 In affirming the PTO’s construction, the Federal
Circuit examined the claim language and determined that “the word ‘hair’
preceding ‘brush’ throughout the body of the claim does not alone limit the
claim to brushes for scalp hair. At best, the word ‘hair’ carries the meaning
that the claimed invention involves brushing some kind of hair.”976
Regarding the specification, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO correctly
declined to import limitations from the specification that would limit the
claims only to scalp hair because “[a]bsent claim language carrying a
narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the
specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim
the broader definition.”977 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that
because “the term ‘hair brush’ alone does not specify the kind of hair to be
groomed by the claimed invention . . . the term may reasonably encompass
not only scalp hair brushes but also facial hair brushes.”978
In In re American Academy of Science Tech Center,979 the owner of a
patent directed to a computer network sought review of the Board’s
decision upholding an examiner’s rejection of all claims as anticipated by
several references.980 The patented network distributed the processing of
user applications among several computers, in contrast to a system in
which one mainframe computer processed user applications and was
connected to several “dumb terminals” with which users would interface.981
The claims under consideration required a “plurality of independent, not
necessarily uniform, general purpose user computers” that are “connected
to a data center computer.”982 The claims also recited the “user application
program” to “indirectly issu[e] data base calls.”983 One of the four
references relied upon by the examiner and the Board described a system in
which several mainframe computers interfaced with a single database.984
Another disclosed the networking of several personal computers to a
database computer that is connected to a database.985 The examiner found
that the mainframe computer in the first reference and the personal
computers of the second reference anticipated the “general purpose user
computers” element of the claims.986
975. Id. at 1324, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822
F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
976. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
977. Id. at 1325, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
978. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
979. 367 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
980. Id. at 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828.
981. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828.
982. Id. at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
983. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
984. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
985. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
986. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
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On appeal, American Academy argued that “user computer” should be
limited to refer only to single-user computers, pointing to the Background
of the Invention section of the specification that points to deficiencies with
multi-user computers such as mainframes.987 The Federal Circuit disagreed
with American Academy’s characterization. Although the Background
highlighted the problems inherent in performing all the processing
necessary to run multiple user applications at a central computer, the
Federal Circuit also noted that the specification did not “disclaim” the
networking of mainframes to a central computer that performs the function
of database access.988 The Federal Circuit opined that the Background
section appeared to allow such a configuration and that “[i]n such a case,
several less expensive mainframe computers could be used to manage the
processing of an increasing number of user applications while the overhead
associated with communication among processors would be limited to
communications related to the storage and retrieval of data.”989
American Academy countered that by describing the invention as
including a “plurality of user stations each dedicated to servicing a user
(which could be a person, another device, or machine),” the definition of
“user computer” could not include “multi-user computers.”990 The Federal
Circuit nevertheless agreed with the PTO that “machine” could include a
mainframe computer, that statements in the specification that distinguished
“user computer” from a data center computer in terms of function, and that
indicated that a “variety of configurations” could be used to enable the user
computer to serve its function suggested that a construction of “user
computer” that would include multi-user computers would not be
unreasonably broad.991
The Federal Circuit also refused to find any fault with the Board’s
decision to discredit declarations submitted by American Academy which
ostensibly supported its construction of “user computer.”992 The Federal
Circuit explained that the Board was entitled to conclude that the lack of
factual corroboration warranted discounting the opinions expressed
therein.993
987. Id. at 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
988. Id. at 1366, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
989. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
990. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
991. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
992. Id. at 1368, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
993. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833-34. The Federal Circuit also rejected American
Academy’s argument that the prosecution history supported its construction. During
prosecution of the application that matured into the patent, the applicant described a
reference cited by the PTO as including remote transaction terminals and a host computer
which processed the transactions. Neither the applicant nor the examiner referred to the
host computer as a “user computer,” and American Academy argued that this was evidence
that the user computer was limited to serving one user. The Federal Circuit, however, said
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Finally, the Federal Circuit refused to find that the Board’s construction
of “user computer” was fatally inconsistent with the construction adopted
by the district court during American Academy’s litigation against an
accused infringer.994 The district court had construed “user computer” to
mean “a computer that serves one user at a time.”995 The Federal Circuit
opined that the Board is “required to use a different standard for construing
claims than that used by district courts,” in that it must “give claims their
broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.”996
American Academy also contended that the Board’s construction of the
term “indirectly issuing” to mean “requiring only that a request from the
host computer go through some other component before it is sent to the
database”997 was erroneous. American Academy urged that the term should
be limited in its meaning to “a user computer application program issuing a
call for data as though from resident storage, coupled with an intermediate
step redirecting the call to the remote data center computer.”998 American
Academy pointed to the specification’s description of the preferred
embodiment in which a “data base simulator program” enabled an
application program running at a user station to request storage or retrieval
of data from a data center as though it were requesting data from a data
base that resided on the user station.999
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, stating that its precedent
“caution[s] against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred
embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only
embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”1000
The Federal Circuit found no such clear disclaimer in the specification
here.1001 Rather, it again found that the specification described the
invention in broad terms and lucidly identified the data base simulator as “a
preferred embodiment, and just one of the ‘variety of conventional protocol
procedures.’”1002 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not find that “indirectly
that the applicant distinguished the cited reference on the basis that the application programs
were run on the host computer instead of the remote terminals, likening the disclosed system
to that of the “dumb terminal” configuration that the invention was intended to replace.
Thus, the court found, this was the reason why it would not have made sense for the
applicant to refer to the host computer as a “user computer.” Id. at 1368-69, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1833-34.
994. Id. at 1369, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
995. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
996. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
997. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
998. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
999. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,714,989 (issued Dec.
22, 1987)).
1000. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358
F.3d 898, 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1001. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
1002. Id. at 1370, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834.
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issuing” was limited to the use of a data base simulator.1003
In Nystrom v. Trex Co.,1004 plaintiff appealed the district court’s
construction of disputed claim terms in its patent directed to wooden planks
used in the construction of outdoor decks.1005 The disputed claim terms
construed by the Federal Circuit included “board,” “manufactured to,” and
“convex top surface.”1006
The Federal Circuit construed “board” as used in the claims to require
“an elongated, flat piece of wood or other rigid material.”1007 The Federal
Circuit rejected defendant’s proposed construction, adopted by the district
court, which would further limit “board” to mean “a piece of elongated
construction material made from wood cut from a log.”1008 Defendant
manufactures decking planks “made from composites of wood fibers and
recycled plastic.”1009 Defendant argued that both dictionary definitions of
“board” and the prosecution history supported its limited construction.1010
Beginning its claim construction analysis with the words of the claim,
the Federal Circuit found that although some dictionaries included
definitions of “board” that limited the term to planks of wood cut from a
log, others did not.1011 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that “these
definitions show[ed] that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘board’
encompasses both a piece of cut wood or sawn timber and a similarlyshaped item made of a rigid material.”1012 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
held that plaintiff had not disclaimed boards made from materials other
than logs, as he described his invention as “a decking board which is
shaped to shed water from its upper surface, and which also yields a
superior product when cut from a log.”1013 The Federal Circuit concluded
the phrase “when cut from a log” to implicitly recognize that the
invention’s boards may be cut from a material other than a log. Finally, the
Federal Circuit found support for its broader construction in the claims
themselves where some claims were expressly limited to “wood decking
board[s]” having “curved growth rings.”1014
The Federal Circuit also found no support for defendant’s proposed

1003. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1004. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1005. Id. at 1107, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1006. Id. at 1108-09, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243-44.
1007. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
1008. Id. at 1110, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
1009. Id. at 1109, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1010. Id. at 1111, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
1011. Id. at 1111-12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1012. Id. at 1112, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1013. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (emphasis in original).
1014. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246-47 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,474,831 (issued Dec.
12, 1995)).
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construction in the prosecution history.1015 Defendant pointed to a
statement made by plaintiff in overcoming an obviousness rejection that a
cited reference “[was] clearly not concerned with materials made from
wood.”1016 Rather than a disclaimer, the Federal Circuit interpreted that
statement to be simply “an argument against the examiner’s obviousness
rejection.”1017 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the argument
was made to show why there was no motivation to combine the cited
reference with another cited reference and therefore the argument was
“insufficient to restrict the scope of [plaintiff’s] claims.”1018
The Federal Circuit next turned to the definition of “manufactured to
have.”1019 The district court restricted this term to “a manufacturing
process utilizing woodworking techniques” based on the statements in the
specification that “‘the advantages of the invention’ were achieved through
‘cutting or milling and the like.’”1020 In light of its construction of “board,”
the Federal Circuit found no reason to limit “manufactured to have” to
woodworking techniques.1021 Furthermore, it noted that even the district
court acknowledged that the “cutting or milling” language was used to
describe a preferred embodiment. The Federal Circuit therefore held that
“manufactured to have” in the context of the claims at issue meant that “the
convex top surface is shaped by manufacturing.”1022
Finally, the Federal Circuit analyzed the meaning of “convex top
surface.”1023 The district court again limited this term on the basis of
statements made during prosecution, holding that the term meant “an upper
surface with an outward curve that has a ratio of its radius of curvature to
width of the board between 4:1 to 6:1.”1024 The statements relied upon by
the district court were made in a supplemental amendment to one particular
claim, of the patent Claim 16. Plaintiff indicated in conjunction with that
amendment that it had tried several different radii of curvature and
discovered that a ratio of radius of curvature to width of the board of about
5:1 “produced the desired result, i.e. it shed water and did not produce an
uneven sensation to someone standing on it.”1025 Plaintiff noted that the
basic objectives of the invention could be met by boards with curvature to
width ratios within a “narrow” range of 4:1 to about 6:1, but that “anything
1015.
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.

Id. at 1112-13, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id. at 1113-14, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247-48.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247-48.
Id. at 1114, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id. at 1115, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49.
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much outside this range does not provide satisfactory performance and/or is
not acceptable to the consumer.”1026
The Federal Circuit held that the dictionary definition of “convex” is
“having a surface or boundary that curves or bulges outward, as the exterior
of a sphere,” and that this definition was consistent with the
specification.1027 Plaintiff’s statements during prosecution relied upon by
the district court, it found, were only directed to Claim 16 and were not
intended to limit “convex” in every instance that term was used within the
entire patent.1028 It also reasoned that the district court had ignored the fact
that Claim 16 already contained the limitation that required “said top
surface having a radius of curvature that is approximately five times as
great as the width of the board” prior to the amendment involving the
statements at issue.1029
4.

“Narrow construction” cases
In Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.,1030 Multi-Tech sued
Net2Phone for infringing three of its patents directed to systems and
methods for simultaneously transmitting voice and/or computer data to a
remote site over a telephone line, (the ‘649, ‘647, and ‘532 patents).1031 Six
months later, Microsoft brought an action in the same court against MultiTech to invalidate the same patents Multi-Tech was asserting against
Net2Phone, and Multi-Tech countersued Microsoft for infringement. The
court issued a single Markman order construing the claim terms in dispute
in the two cases and entered final judgment of non-infringement against
Multi-Tech in both cases where Multi-Tech conceded that neither
Microsoft nor Net2Phone’s accused systems met the limitations of the
asserted claims as the court had construed them. Multi-Tech then appealed
the district court’s claim construction and Microsoft’s invalidity claims
were stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s resolution of claim construction
and infringement issues.
For its argument, Multi-Tech first addressed the district court’s
construction of claim limitations referring to the “sending,” “transmitting,”
and “receiving” of data packets, which limited those activities to the
transmission of data packets over a direct point-to-point telephone line
connection, and as such did not cover transmission over a packet-switched

1026. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1027. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 402 (4th ed. 2000)).
1028. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1029. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1030. 357 F.3d 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1031. Id. at 1342, 1344, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816, 1819.
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network such as the Internet.1032 The Federal Circuit agreed with the
district court’s construction. Although only one of the claims at issue
explicitly stated that the transmission of data packets must occur “over a
telephone line,” the specification, identical for all patents at issue,
“repeatedly and consistently describe[d] the local and remote systems of
the claimed inventions as communicating directly over a telephone
line.”1033 All of the specification’s preferred embodiments described
hardware components that “‘communicat[ed] over a standard telephone
line,’” and it disclosed that the system “‘allows the user to connect to
remote locations equipped with similar system or with modems, facsimile
machines, or standard telephones over a single analog telephone line.’”1034
The Federal Circuit particularly emphasized that statements describing
transmission over a telephone line were found in the Summary of Invention
section of the specification and were not limited to preferred
embodiments.1035
Multi-Tech attempted to argue that its descriptions of the claimed
inventions were limited to just the “ends” of the communication system,
but the Federal Circuit rejected this argument because the description
referred to the transfer of data packets “over” and “through” telephone lines
about two dozen times. Thus, the Federal Circuit could not avoid the
“inescapable conclusion” that communications contemplated by MultiTech’s patents occurred directly over telephone lines.
As further support for its construction, the Federal Circuit pointed to the
prosecution history of one of the three patents, in which Multi-Tech had
summarized its invention as part of its response to an examiner’s office
action rejecting its claims as obvious over prior art. Multi-Tech’s summary
described its invention as a system which operates “over a standard
telephone line,” one that “establishes a point-to-point connection between
the telephone equipment on each end of the line,” and in which “packets
[are transmitted] across a POTS [(“plain old telephone service”)].”1036
Multi-Tech argued, however, that these statements were made during
prosecution of only one of the patents at issue, and not during prosecution
of the other two.1037 Therefore, Multi-Tech contended that the statements
were inapplicable to the construction of the claims belonging to its two
remaining patents at issue, one of which was issued before the statements

1032. Id. at 1346, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
1033. Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1034. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,452,289 (issued Sept.
19, 1995)).
1035. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1036. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
1037. Id. at 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
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were even made.1038 The Federal Circuit disagreed,1039 Holding that the
statements made during prosecution of the ‘649 patent were also
“pertinent” to the construction of the claims in both the ‘627 and ‘532
patents because all three patents shared the same specification, and
therefore represented Multi-Tech’s own understanding of the inventions
disclosed in all three patents.1040 Even though the examiner of the
applications giving rise to the ‘627 and ‘532 patents did not rely on the
statements made during prosecution of the ‘649 patent, the Federal Circuit
had on numerous occasions held that the patentee’s own statements were
relevant to claim interpretation regardless of whether or not the examiner
relied upon them in issuing the patent.1041 According to the Federal Circuit,
“[w]e take the patentee at its word and will not construe the scope of the
‘649 patent’s claims more broadly than the patentee itself clearly
envisioned.”1042
Even though its resolution of the medium of transmission issue disposed
of the need for the Federal Circuit to proceed to construe other claim
limitations, it went on to construe the terms “multiplexing,” “headers,”
“speaker phone” and “digitizing” in the interest of judicial efficiency.1043
The district court had concluded that Multi-Tech acted as its own
lexicographer and construed the term “multiplexing” in accordance with
Multi-tech’s definition to be “the combining of voice data (“V-data”) and
conventional data (“C-data”) for transmission through the same channel by
dynamically changing the time allocations for transmission of each type of
data, such that V-data has higher priority over C-data and C-data is
substituted for silence packets which are detected and discarded.”1044
Multi-Tech argued that the district court’s construction improperly
imported limitations from the specification into the claims.1045 Although it
agreed that it had “acted as its own lexicographer” in this instance, MultiTech disagreed with the district court’s construction to the extent that it
limited “multiplexing” to require the prioritization of V-data over C-data
and the substitution of C-data for silence packets.1046 The Federal Circuit
only partly agreed with Multi-Tech, holding that the district court
improperly construed “multiplexing” to require detection and discarding of
silence packets and the transmission of computer data packets during
1038. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
1039. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
1040. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
1041. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
1042. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
1043. Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
1044. Id. at 1345, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,452,289
(issued Sept. 19, 1995)).
1045. Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
1046. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
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periods of silence because those features were described only in association
with preferred embodiments of the invention. They were nowhere
described as “necessary for the multiplexing function.”1047 Furthermore,
these features were separately claimed in independent claims not at issue,
and thus the doctrine of claim differentiation weighed against their
limitation of independent claims reciting only “multiplexing.” Because the
specification provided that V-data was prioritized over C-data “to ensure
the integrity of the real-time voice transmission,” and because the Federal
Circuit considered maintaining such integrity to be “central to the
functioning of the claimed inventions,” the term “multiplexing” must be
defined to require such prioritization.1048
The Federal Circuit next addressed the term “headers.” Several claims at
issue recited limitations in which “headers” were placed on or otherwise
associated with various data packets transmitted in the systems. MultiTech argued that “headers” should be given its ordinary meaning and be
defined as “information structures that precede units of data, such as
packets.”1049 The district court, however, required that “headers” attached
to voice data packets identify whether the packets contained speech or
silence, and Microsoft further argued on appeal that computer data packet
headers must identify packet type and packet length. The Federal Circuit
took yet a fourth view. Starting with the presumption that “headers”
carried its own ordinary meaning of “information structure[s] that precede[]
and identif[y] the information that follows,” the court next looked to the
claim language and found that it separately referred to “headers” associated
with voice data packets and those headers associated with computer data
packets.1050 Furthermore, the specification explained that the voice data
packets used different headers than computer data packets so that sites
receiving the data could distinguish between the two types of data packets,
and that such distinction was necessary to enable prioritization. Thus, it
held that “headers” required information identifying whether the packets
that followed them contained voice or computer data. But further
limitation of the term advanced by the district court and Microsoft was
inappropriate, as the asserted limitations were found only in conjunction
with the preferred embodiments disclosed by the patents and were merely
illustrative of how the headers could be configured. Thus, “headers” did
not need to identify the type and length of the computer data packets or
whether the voice packets contained speech or silence.
The Federal Circuit next addressed the terms “hands-free speaker
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.

Id. at 1351-52, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25.
Id. at 1352-53, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

1071

phone,” “full-duplex speaker phone,” and “full-duplex hands-free speaker
phone.” The district court had limited the “hands-free” speaker phones to
those speaker phones with the traditional telephone hardware, including a
handset and headset. Multi-Tech argued that the hands-free phones were
not limited to any structure beyond a speaker and a microphone and the
Federal Circuit agreed. Neither the claims nor the specification described
any particular physical housing for the hands-free phones, and the
specification repeatedly described the hands-free interface as simply a
microphone and a speaker. Furthermore, claims dependent on those that
merely recited “hands free speaker phone” required headset hardware.
Finally, the court concluded that to require more structure than just a
speaker and a microphone would “impermissibly exclude a preferred
embodiment from the claim limitation.”1051
The Federal Circuit did, however, follow the district court’s lead in
requiring “speaker phone” limitations to require the use of “echo
cancellation.” The specification “clearly mandate[d] the use of acoustical
and line echo cancellation” where it provided that the “‘use of the speaker
and microphone necessitates the use of an acoustical echo cancellation
algorithm to prevent feedback from destroying the voice signals,’” and that
“‘a line echo cancellation algorithm is needed no matter which telephone
interface . . . is used.’”1052
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of
the term “digitizing” where it found that the parties did not dispute its
construction:
Multi-Tech argued that the district court improperly
construed it as necessarily being performed by “the codec circuit” that was
disclosed in the preferred embodiments of the specification, while
Microsoft responded that the court did not interpret the term to require such
performance by the codec circuit.1053
In Searfoss v. Pioneer Consolidated Corp.,1054 plaintiff appealed the
decision of the district court to grant summary judgment of noninfringement.1055 Plaintiff sued for infringement of its patent related to
moveable cover systems for trucks. Plaintiff sued exclusively under the
doctrine of equivalents and did not allege literal infringement.
The district court found that defendant’s truck covers did not infringe
because they did not meet at least two elements of the asserted claim. The
first, “actuation means for connecting said tension bail to said extension
assembly and applying a downward force through said tension bail center
1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.

Id. at 1353-54, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-26.
Id. at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
374 F.3d 1142, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1144, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
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section to said cover,”1056 had been construed by the court in its Markman
order to be a means-plus-function term with two claimed functions: (1) to
connect the tension bail and extension assembly, and (2) to apply a
downward force through the tension bail to the cover.1057 The district court
further construed the “connecting” function to require in the context of the
asserted claim a “direct pivotal connection” between the extension
assembly and the tension bail such that “connecting” was synonymous with
“attaching.”1058 Thus, it held, this claim term excluded means in which the
tension bail and extension assembly were indirectly connected, and
especially excluded means in which they were tangentially connected
through the cover, “because one function of the actuation means is to apply
downward force to the cover and a construction of actuation means to
include cover would be ‘nonsensical.’”1059
The district court also held that a “direct pivotal connection” was
required to perform the second function of the actuation means, to apply a
downward force through the tension bail cover. It rejected plaintiff’s
argument that the downward force was merely gravity1060 because the
actuation means was “described in relation to its function of applying
downward force” and therefore “there must be some relation between the
actuation means and the downward force.”1061 Furthermore, the court
looked to the claim language that stated that the downward force is
substantially reduced while the cover is winding back on its reel, and the
court found that “the direct pivotal connections between the tension bail
and the extension assembly are what makes this possible.”1062
The court held that no reasonable jury could find that the asserted claims
were infringed under the doctrine of equivalents1063 because the defendant’s
system did not contain an equivalent of an “actuation means.” Plaintiff
appealed both the construction of the asserted claim and the court’s
decision to grant summary judgment based on that construction.1064
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by first stating that the “actuation
means” term was not a means-plus-function term as construed by the
district court at all, but rather, because the claim specifically recited the
structure that performed the claimed function the presumption resulting
1056. Id. at 1145, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1057. Id. at 1146, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1058. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20.
1059. Id. at 1147, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520 (quoting Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol.
Corp., No. 99-CV-76394-DT, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27471, at 6-7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13,
2002)).
1060. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1061. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1062. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1063. Id. at 1148, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.
1064. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
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from the use of the word “means” had been overcome.1065 The Federal
Circuit held, however, that this error was harmless because, as both parties
agreed, the scope of the claim would have been identical had it been
construed under a means-plus-function term or under the doctrine of
equivalents.1066
Next the Federal Circuit turned to the district court’s construction of
“connecting.” Plaintiff argued that neither defendant nor the district court
had pointed to anything in the specification to overcome the heavy
presumption that “connecting” should be construed in accordance with its
ordinary meaning derived from several non-technical dictionaries to
encompass both direct and indirect connections. Citing the general law that
“what the claim terms would mean to laymen is irrelevant,” the Federal
Circuit concluded that what the district court had done was proper.1067 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court had “acknowledged the
competing general dictionary definitions of ‘connect’” but had also
consulted the written description “as it must.”1068 There, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court, it was evident that “as used in claim
3, the term ‘connecting’ refers to a ‘direct pivotal connection between the
tension bail and the extension assembly’ because the patent referred to the
term ‘connecting’ as synonymous with ‘attaching.’”1069
The Federal Circuit found support for this decision in the fact that all
relevant figures of the patent showed a direct connection between the legs
of the tension bail and those of the extension assembly, and that the
specification made reference to such direct connections throughout.1070
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that any
construction which would permit a connection “through the cover” would
be problematic because the cover would then be part of the actuation
means, and therefore would apply a downward force to itself according to
the rest of the claim language.
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,1071 plaintiff
sued defendant for infringement of two patents directed to compositions of
cyclosporine, a compound used to prevent organ rejection in transplant
patients.1072 One of the claimed compositions at issue comprised three
1065. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. The description of the structure which overcame
this presumption is as follows: “said actuation means including first and second pivot
connections respectively between said first and second tension bail legs and a midpoint t on
said respective first and second extension bail legs.” Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1066. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1067. Id. at 1149-50, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1068. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1069. Id. at 1150, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1070. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1071. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1072. Id. at 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
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components in addition to the active cyclosporine ingredient: (1) “a
hydrophilic component,” (2) a “lipophilic component,” and (3) “a
hydrophilic surfactant.”1073 The district court granted defendant’s postverdict motion for a JMOL that it did not infringe this particular patent
claim, and plaintiff appealed. Specifically, plaintiff argued that the district
court had too narrowly construed the term “lipophilic component” to
exclude lipophilic components which acted as “surfactants.”1074
The district court had held that the patent disavowed lipophilic
components that acted as surfactants in stating that “[s]uitable components
for use as lipophilic phase include any pharmaceutically acceptable solvent
which is non-miscible with the selected hydrophilic phase . . . . Such
solvents will appropriately be devoid or substantially devoid of surfactant
function.”1075 The court found further support for its decision from the fact
that the claim listed three excipients:
a hydrophilic component, a
lipophilic component, and a surfactant, and as such, suggested that each
component was separate and distinct.1076 Finally, support was found in the
prosecution history of the patent, which the jury found that defendant did
not infringe, where the patentee had acknowledged a distinction between
surfactants and lipophilic components.1077 In granting its JMOL, the
district court also had held that, as a matter of law, a jury could not find
that defendant’s product infringed under the doctrine of equivalents
because of the “specific exclusion principle.”1078
Plaintiff pointed out on appeal that parts of the specification taught that a
surfactant may form “part of” the lipophilic phase, and that these teachings
contradicted the district court’s findings that a surfactant can form no part
of the lipophilic component. The Federal Circuit agreed with plaintiff on
this point, but found that the specification’s teaching that a surfactant or a
mixture of surfactants can form “part of” the lipophilic phase necessarily
implies that the other part of the lipophilic phase must not be a
surfactant.1079 Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that the specification’s disclosure
indicated that a surfactant “could function alone” as the solvent of the
lipophilic phase was found to “directly contradict[] the express teaching of
the specification, and [could] not be used to give [the Court] appropriate

1073. Id. at 1330-31, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53.
1074. Id. at 1335, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
1075. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,342,625
(issued Aug. 30, 1994)).
1076. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1077. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1078. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1079. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. For example, the patent provided that if a
surfactant forms a part of the lipophilic phase, it does so as a “co-solvent.” Id., 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
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guidance to reach the correct claim construction.”1080 Thus, in view of the
intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit held that “lipophilic component”
must be construed to require a non-surfactant component.
Plaintiff also argued that “lipophilic phase” had been unnecessarily
limited to require “that the lipophilic component must be immiscible with
the hydrophilic phase in the absence of surfactants.”1081 The specification
provided only that “suitable components for use as lipophilic phase” may
include solvents that were nonmiscible with the hydrophilic phase.1082 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Novartis that this teaching did not require that
the entire lipophilic phase be nonmiscible, rather that only one of its
components should be immiscible.1083
In On-Line Technologies, Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH,1084
plaintiff appealed the district court’s claim construction and resultant grant
of summary judgment of non-infringement of its patent claims directed to
an improvement of a gas cell.1085 The gas cells contemplated by the patent
were used in infrared spectrometers to house gas samples for testing their
composition.1086 In the infrared spectrometer, an infrared light beam is
passed through the gas in the gas cell and a detector on the other side
measures the absorption of the light by the gas.1087 Plaintiff’s invention
improved the accuracy of the absorption reading by achieving a longer light
path of the beam in the gas cell while simultaneously reducing the effects
of astigmatism and light beam diffusion that had until then prohibited
effective lengthening of the beam.1088 Plaintiff sued defendant for selling
devices that allegedly infringed its patent.1089
At the district court level, defendant was granted summary judgment of
non-infringement because its devices had objective mirrors with toroidal
surfaces, not “substantially spherical” surfaces “having a cylindrical
component added thereto” as required by the asserted claim.1090 The
district court held that toroidal surfaces were excluded from the scope of
the claims because the patent’s specification described the contour of the
spherical objective mirrors as “approaching toroidal,” and interpreted this
statement to mean that the contemplated mirrors were not actually

1080. Id. at 1335-36, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
1081. Id. at 1336-37, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1082. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,342,625
(issued Aug. 30, 1994)).
1083. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1084. 386 F.3d 1133, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1085. Id. at 1135-36, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18.
1086. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18.
1087. Id. at 1135, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1088. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18.
1089. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1090. Id. at 1136-37, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118-19.
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In addition, extrinsic evidence was characterized as
toroidal.1091
establishing that “spherical objective mirrors with cylindrical corrections
are not the same as toroidal objective mirrors.”1092 The court further found
that because the specification disclosed toroidal surfaces but did not claim
them, the dedication-disclosure rule mandated that plaintiff could not use
the doctrine of equivalents to cover defendant’s toroidal mirrors.1093
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the term “substantially
spherical . . . having a cylindrical component added thereto” has no
“precise and generally understood meaning in the art as applied to
reflective surfaces.”
The Federal Circuit therefore searched the
specification for guidance as to the term’s meaning. There, it found that
the descriptions of the preferred embodiments referred to the curved
surfaces as toroidal surfaces and used the same language that was used in
the asserted claim. This explicit equation between a toroidal surface and a
substantially spherical surface having a cylindrical component added
thereto “made clear” that for purposes of the patent, a toroidal surface was
included within the scope of the claim. The Federal Circuit went on to
state that even if the specification had not been so explicit in its equation,
the reference in the description of the preferred embodiment to toroidal
surfaces would give rise to a “very strong inference” that the claim
included such surfaces within its scope. This was due to the court’s
precedent that claims should rarely if ever be construed to exclude the
preferred embodiments.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of
“approaching toroidal.” Considered in conjunction with the preferred
embodiments’ explicit reference to toroidal surfaces, the Federal Circuit
considered it clear that “approaching toroidal” did not intend to exclude
surfaces that were actually toroidal. To substantiate this point, the Federal
Circuit pointed to evidence that it was considered impossible to make any
surface perfectly toroidal, and to the fact that the specification and claims
described characteristics and functions of surfaces which were consistent
with those of a toroidal surface.1094 Thus, Federal Circuit held that the
district court construed the disputed claim too narrowly and vacated the
1091. Id. at 1137, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1092. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1093. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1094. Id. at 1138-39, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21. The Federal Circuit in any event
disagreed with Perkin-Elmer’s characterization of the extrinsic evidence and found that it
instead supported the construction advanced by On-Line. Specifically, it found that PerkinElmer’s evidence demonstrating a technical, mathematical distinction between a toroid and
a spherocylinder was refuted by On-Line’s expert’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would understand the disputed claim language to describe the toroidal surfaces
used by On-Line and Perkin-Elmer’s products as opposed to having the meaning attributed
to the term by mathematicians. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21.
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grant of summary judgment.1095
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,1096 plaintiff sued for
direct infringement and inducement of infringement of its patent directed to
a surgical mesh implant used to repair hernias.1097 The asserted claim
required “a hollow plug” wherein “the surface of said hollow plug [is]
conformable,” and “said hollow plug [is] extremely pliable.”1098 In its
claim construction order, the district court construed the asserted claim to
require “pre-formed pleats.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed this
construction. In an opinion written by Judge Michel, the Federal Circuit
explained that the pleating limitation was required because the patent’s
specification, particularly the Abstract and Summary of the Invention
sections, consistently described the plug as having pleats.1099 Although
Bard argued that Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.1100 required
the court to look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary and
customary meaning of the claim terms, the court rejected any interpretation
of Texas Digital that would have it disregard the intrinsic record.1101 It
acknowledged that two lines of claim construction cases exist. One,
outlined in Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications
Group, Inc.1102 and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,1103 “indicates that
the intrinsic record is the primary source for determining claim
meaning.”1104 A second, outlined in Texas Digital, “suggests that the
intrinsic record, except for the claims, should be consulted only after the
ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms to persons skilled in the
pertinent art is determined,” and which “emphasizes technical and generalusage dictionaries in determining the ordinary meaning.”1105 But even the
latter line of cases, the Federal Circuit said,
does not require, or even allow, the Court to disregard the intrinsic
record. Instead, these cases merely suggest a methodology that
emphasizes the use of dictionaries and claim that if courts adopt this
methodology, claim terms “will be more accurately determined” and
improperly narrow constructions “will be more easily avoided.”1106

The Federal Circuit deliberately refrained from settling the law on the
1095. Id. at 1140, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121-22.
1096. 388 F.3d 858, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1097. Id. at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1098. Id. at 860, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1099. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1100. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1101. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
1102. 262 F.3d 1258, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1103. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1104. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
1105. Id. at 862, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
1106. Id. at 862-63, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (quoting Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1205, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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issue of the “relationship between ordinary and customary meaning,
dictionary definitions and the intrinsic record,” explaining that it would
affirm the district court’s construction under the standard set forth by either
the Texas Digital or the Bell Atlantic line of cases.1107 Beginning by
consulting the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as
requested by plaintiff, the Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff’s
proffered general-use dictionary definitions of “conformable” and “pliable”
were unhelpful. The Federal Circuit found definitions of “conformable”
and “pliable” to be inapposite because the controlling issue was how “plug”
should be construed. The Federal Circuit also questioned the need to
consult the dictionary to derive the ordinary meanings of “conformable” or
“pliable” because these terms were commonplace. Finally, the Federal
Circuit said, referring to Texas Digital, “even under the cases [plaintiff]
cite[d], the ordinary and customary meaning of a term does not govern if
the intrinsic record contains clear lexicography or disavowal of claim
scope.”1108
The Federal Circuit next explained how the patent’s specification
required that the claim be limited to pleated plugs. The Summary of
Invention and Abstract both described the invention as being an implant or
plug having a pleated surface. It indicated that although “a statement’s
location is not determinative” statements that describe the invention as a
whole, rather than statements that describe only preferred embodiments, are
more likely to support a limiting definition of a claim term and are more
likely found in certain locations such as the Summary of Invention section
of a patent.1109
Plaintiff attempted to argue that statements indicating that the plugs of
the invention were pleated were merely “passing references,” by citing
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,1110 but the court found that in the
present case the patentee “explicitly defines the inventive plug as ‘having’
or ‘including a pleated surface.’”1111 By “defines,” the Federal Circuit
stated that it did not mean that the inventors acted as “lexicographers and
redefined words differently from their ordinary meaning in the art.”1112
Instead, the Federal Circuit said it used the term “merely to denote that the
specification makes clear at various points that the claimed invention is
1107. See id. at 863, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (predicting that a resolution to the
debate over whether dictionaries may be considered intrinsic evidence would soon be
forthcoming). The court was referring to its decision to rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376
F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1015.
1108. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
1109. Id. at 864, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
1110. 358 F.3d 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1111. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 864-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1112. Id. at 864 n.3, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 n.3.
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narrower than the claim language might imply based on a reading of the
specification as a whole.”1113
Plaintiff also contended that the statements referring to pleating did not
define the terms “conformable” or “pliable” as requiring pleating, but again
the court found that the focus on these terms was beside the point as the
patent described the plug or implant to have pleats.1114 Plaintiff also argued
that because the patent’s descriptions of preferred embodiments did not
describe the implant as pleated, the claim cannot be limited to pleated plugs
because that construction would counter the general rule that claims should
not be construed to exclude preferred embodiments. The Federal Circuit
held that the description of the preferred embodiment relied upon by
plaintiff unsurprisingly omitted reference to pleating because the
description focused on the “filler body” of the implant, which was only one
aspect of the claimed invention.1115 Additionally, because the patent
“globally defined the plug as having a pleated surface, the term ‘pleated’
need not be repeated each time a term describing some other aspect of the
plug is used.”1116 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the failure of the
applicant to insert “pleated” before “implant” in the description of the
preferred embodiment did not mean that a non-pleated plug was
disclosed.1117
Even though the Federal Circuit found that the specification sufficiently
demonstrated that the claimed plug must be pleated, it went on to
demonstrate that the prosecution history confirmed its analysis. The
Federal Circuit determined that during prosecution, the applicants had
overcome at least two rejections by referring to the pleated feature of its
invention. First, the applicants overcame a prior art reference by stating
that the implant disclosed in reference “does not contain pleats.” Second,
the applicants overcame an indefiniteness rejection by stating that the
“compressibility” of its plug derives from the configuration of the mesh
fabric of which it was comprised, not the mesh fabric itself. Third, in an
interview summary, the applicants restated their position that the prior art
reference was not invalidating because it did not contain pleats and that it
was “the texturing of the implant which permits the claimed plug to
conform to irregularities in the shape of the defect without kinking or
buckling.”1118 (The court construed the applicants’ emphasis on the
configuration and texturing of the mesh fabric to implicate pleating.)1119
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 n.3.
Id. at 864-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17.
Id. at 867, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1080

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

Similar arguments were made during reexamination of the patent. Some of
the applicants’ arguments that its claims required pleating during
prosecution and reexamination were not clearly made with reference to the
asserted claim at issue, and the Federal Circuit acknowledged that it would
be “improper” to rely on these arguments as the sole basis for limiting the
asserted claim to require pleating. During reexamination, however, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that the examiner had rejected the asserted claim
and one other claim over a prior art reference on the basis that these claims
did not require pleating, and the patentee responded by saying “[a]s
explained in the specification . . . the surface of the inventive plug is
pleated.”1120 The Federal Circuit found this to be an unequivocal statement
constituting a clear disclaimer of claim scope.1121
In W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C.,1122 the Federal Circuit
held that the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms must stand if
the written description and prosecution history are ambiguous as to whether
the patentee used the terms in an inconsistent manner.1123 Plaintiff sued for
infringement of its patent on a metal “Hydraulically Efficient Ribbed Pipe”
for use in storm drain and sewer applications. Claim one of the patent
recited pipe of “single piece construction . . . consisting essentially
of . . . ribs defining a corresponding plurality of open channels” formed in
the material that becomes the pipe wall.1124 The district court held that
defendant’s pipe did not infringe because it found the “open channel”
requirement was not met by the accused channels, which were closed with
metal inserts. Nor could the district court understand how a “single piece
construction” might include multiple pieces. It thus rejected plaintiff’s
position that the prosecution history required a departure from the ordinary
and customary meaning of the claim terms.1125 The district court further
rejected plaintiff’s theory as to the partially open transition term
“consisting essentially of.” Although it agreed that this term permits
additional elements that do not materially affect the basic and novel
properties of an invention, the Federal Circuit held that its presence in the
asserted claim did not extend the claim’s scope to include defendant’s
metal inserts, which materially affected cost, hydraulic efficiency, and
corrosion—all of which Hall stated were the novel and basic properties of
the invention.1126
The Federal Circuit readily concluded that the district court correctly
1120.
1121.
1122.
1123.
1124.
1125.
1126.

Id. at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
Id. at 868, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
370 F.3d 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1353, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
Id. at 1346, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
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construed the claims. It began by stating the general rule that where the
inventor does not act as his own lexicographer within the four corners of
the intrinsic evidence, the appellate court must rely on the plain and
ordinary meaning of these terms.1127 The Federal Circuit then reasoned
that, according to general use dictionaries, the term “open” means “[n]ot
shut in or confined, not surrounded by barriers,” and that “single piece”
was clear in meaning without resorting to a dictionary.1128 Further, the
Federal Circuit noted nothing in the specification or the prosecution history
clearly suggests that plaintiff intended to use these terms in a manner other
than according to their ordinary meanings.1129
The Federal Circuit then rejected defendant’s plea to read “open
channels” as meaning those that are free from reinforcing inserts, and
“single piece construction” to mean that only a single element contributing
to the structural integrity of the pipe.1130 The Federal Circuit pointed out
that, while plaintiff focused on the reinforcing elements of the prior art
Nyssen pipe during prosecution, the record does not dispositively show that
the company intended to use the disputed terms in any manner inconsistent
with their ordinary meanings. Further, the Federal Circuit added that,
while some statements from the prosecution history might be read to
support plaintiff’s theory as to the “single piece construction” language,
because this dialogue is not necessarily inconsistent with the term’s
ordinary meaning, the district court was correct in using the ordinary
meaning.1131
In Kinik Co. v. International Trade Commission,1132 the issue was
whether claims directed to a perform made from a “mixture containing a
liquid binder, powdered matrix material, and abrasive particles”1133 were
limited to mixtures containing a larger volume of liquid binder
concentration than powdered matrix material.1134 Recognizing case law
stating that, “while claims are to be interpreted in light of the
specification . . . it does not follow that limitation from the specification
may be read into the claims,”1135 the Federal Circuit explained that such
1127. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1128. Id. at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1129. W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C., 370 F.3d 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1130. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1131. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1132. 362 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1133. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1134. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1135. Id. at 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d
1573, 1581, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 835 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
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“precedent does not hold that claims are not limited by what is described
and enabled. Patent claims are directed to the invention set forth in the
specification.”1136
Reviewing the specification of the disputed patent, the court noted that
the claimed invention was “described with specificity . . . and this
specificity was illustrated in the examples.”1137 In particular, the Federal
Circuit observed that the specification “states that the prior art performs
having low binder volume are hard, stiff, and brittle. . . . The inventor’s
discussion of the disadvantages of the low binder prior art sheds light on
the scope of the invention.”1138 The Federal Circuit further explained that
“[e]ven the broadest descriptive test in the [] specification describes only
mixtures where binder volume exceeds matrix powder volume.”1139
Additionally, the Federal Circuit determined that the prosecution history
confirmed its reading of the specification because “[d]uring prosecution the
same specificity—the excess volume of liquid binder over matrix powder
in the perform mixture—was emphasized as a material distinction from the
prior art.”1140 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed
mixture required a greater volume of liquid binder than powdered matrix
because “[c]laims cannot be construed as encompassing prior art that was
distinguished in the specification and disclaimed during prosecution.”1141
Finally, addressing an ALJ’s reasoning that the term “mixture” should be
construed consistent with dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit
explained that the “issue, however, is not one dictionary definition of a
common word, but meaning of ‘mixture’ as used in the patent
documents . . . . The words of patent claims have the meaning and scope
with which they are used in the specification and prosecution history.”1142
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.1143 involved the proper
construction of the term “solubilizer.”1144 Although the parties agreed that
the ordinary meaning of “solubilizer” encompassed surfacants, co-solvents,
and complexation agents, defendant argued that the term’s use in the
intrinsic evidence required that it be construed as limited only to
surfacants.1145 While the district court rejected defendant’s effort to curtail
the term’s ordinary meaning, the court reversed. However, in so doing, the
1136. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1137. Id. at 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1138. W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C., 370 F.3d 1343, 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1135, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1139. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1140. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1141. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1142. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citation omitted).
1143. 384 F.3d 1333, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1726 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1144. Id. at 1135-36, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727-29.
1145. Id. at 1336, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728.
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court directly acknowledged that “[t]he district court’s lengthy and careful
opinions relied extensively on our recent case law, which is unfortunately
complex and inconsistent.”1146
The Federal Circuit began by addressing the competing theories of claim
construction that have emerged in its jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit
first noted that:
A long line of cases indicates that evidence intrinsic to the patent—
particularly the patent’s specification, including the inventors’
statutorily-required written description of the invention—is the primary
source for determining claim meaning. We have embraced that position
frequently . . . . Indeed, that proposition has been accepted in patent law
for many years . . . . [T]he goal of claim construction is to determine
what an ordinary artisan would deem the invention claimed by the
patent, taking the claims together with the rest of the specification.
Under this approach to claim construction, evidence extrinsic to the
patent is useful insofar as it ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art—
and thus better allow a court to place itself in the shoes of a person of
ordinary skill in the art’ reading the claims alongside the rest of the
specification.1147

The Federal Circuit also observed that at the same time:
Language in some of our recent cases suggests that the intrinsic record,
except for the claims, should be consulted only after the ordinary and
customary meaning of the claim terms to persons skilled in the art is
determined. The language in these cases emphasizes the use of technical
and general-usage dictionaries in determining the ordinary meaning.
Under this approach, where the ordinary meaning of a claim is evidence,
the inventor’s written description of the invention, for example, is
relevant only insofar as it provides clear lexicography or disavowal of
the ordinary meaning.1148

The Federal Circuit then explained that the “question becomes whether
the intrinsic evidence takes priority in our construction of the claim term
‘solubilizer,’ or if instead the ordinary meaning of the term, as determined
from sources such as treatises and dictionaries, controls our construction in
the absence of intrinsic evidence of clear lexicography or disavowal.”1149
The Federal Circuit, however, determined that it need not “decide which
approach is proper as a matter of law” because, even under plaintiff’s
proposed approach, the intrinsic evidence “clearly binds [plaintiff] to a
narrower definition of ‘solubilizer’ than the extrinsic evidence would
1146. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728.
1147. Id. at 1336-37, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728-29 (citations omitted).
1148. Id. at 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted)).
1149. Id. at 1337-38, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729.
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support.”1150
After reviewing the specification, the Federal Circuit reasoned that both
the Background of the Invention and the Description of the Invention
establish that the inventors used “solubilizer” as limited only to
surfacants.1151 In particular, the Federal Circuit explained that the
specification statement that “[t]he solubilizers suitable according to the
invention are defined below,” and then stated that “[t]he solubilizers
suitable for the preparations according to the invention are semi-solid or
liquid non-ionic surface active agents [i.e., surfacants] . . . .”1152 Rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that such statements referred to the preferred
embodiment, the court explained that “[w]e might agree if the specification
stated, for example, ‘a solubilizer’ . . . but in fact the specification
definitively states ‘the solubilizers suitable for the preparations according
to the invention.’”1153 The Federal Circuit further elaborated that while
plaintiff “seems to suggest that lexicography requires a statement in the
form ‘I define ___ to mean ___,’ . . . such rigid formalism is not
required.”1154
The Federal Circuit also held that the specification disavowed coverage
of nonsurfactant solubilizers, explaining that the “inventors’ lexicography
alone works an implicit disavowal . . . the rest of the specification goes
further.”1155 Again rejecting the argument that such statements of
disavowal simply addressed features of the preferred embodiment, the
Federal Circuit explained that:
[Plaintiff] seems to suggest that clear disavowal requires an “expression
of manifest exclusion or restriction” in the form of “my invention does
not include ___.” But again, such rigid formalism is not required:
Where the general summary or description of the invention describes a
feature of the invention . . . and criticizes other products . . . that lack that
feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of these other products (and
processes using these products).1156

The Federal Circuit also stated that “while it is of course improper to
limit the claims to the particular preferred embodiments described in the
specification, the patentee’s choice of preferred embodiments can shed

1150. Id. at 1338, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729-30.
1151. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729-30.
1152. Id. at 1339, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730.
1153. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730.
1154. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730.
1155. Id. at 1340, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731.
1156. See id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (citing its decision in SciMed Life Sys., Inc.
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) in support of this proposition and explaining that even its seemingly
countervailing decision in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002) cited SciMed with approval).
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light on the intended scope of the claims.”1157 The Federal Circuit then
determined that the “fact that all of the solubilizers listed in the
specification and used in the working examples were surfactants adds
further support to the conclusion that the term ‘solubilizer’ . . . should be
limited, according to the definition employed in the specification, to
surfactants.”1158
In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,1159 the disputed language was “an electrical
operating unit and a pair of spaced-apart electrically exposed conductive
probe networks” in claims directed to circuit devices for use in appliances
such as hair dryers.1160 The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether
the “electrical operating unit” was properly construed as being separate
from the “conductive probe networks.”1161 Starting with the claims
themselves, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “the clear implication of the
claim language is that the pair of probe networks is a distinct component,
separate from the electrical operating unit.”1162
Having surveyed the specification, the Federal Circuit determined that
“[n]othing in the descriptions of these two components suggests that their
structures or functions overlap. To the contrary, the specification plainly
describes the two components as separate.”1163 In particular, the Federal
Circuit found it significant that “the specification describes one of the
principal advantages of the claimed invention in a way that excludes the
electrical operating unit from serving as part of the pair of probe
networks.”1164 The specification distinguished prior art devices that
triggered a protective circuit only when there was direct contact between
water and the power supply, and taught that the claimed invention “protects
the user from . . . a shock . . . by arranging for the protective circuit to be
separate from the voltage-carrying components of the appliance.”1165
Rejecting plaintiff’s argument that such discussion in the specification
was directed to a preferred embodiment, the Federal Circuit noted that the
specification states that “‘according to the invention’ the protective circuit’
accomplishes this disconnection before the user can be connected to
voltage-carrying exposed parts via the fluid which has entered the

1157. Id. at 1341, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731.
1158. See id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (explaining that, in addition to the
specification, prosecution history may be looked at in making a claim construction
determination).
1159. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1160. Id. at 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
1161. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
1162. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
1163. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
1164. Id. at 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
1165. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
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The Federal Circuit thus held that “[t]he
housing.”1166
specification . . . demonstrates that the invention itself requires that the user
can be completely protected from shock, in contrast to prior art devices that
exposed the user to a brief, non-lethal shock.”1167
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Eon Labs Manufacturing, Inc.,1168
the issue was whether the claim term “hydrosol” was “limited to medicinal
products prepared outside of the body or whether it also include[d]
products formed . . . after a particular medicinal product has been
ingested.”1169 Because the parties did not “suggest[] that hydrosol has a
specialized meaning inconsistent with the ordinary dictionary
definition,”1170 the court began its analysis by examining general purpose
dictionary definitions.1171 After reviewing various dictionaries, the Federal
Circuit observed that it was presented with two competing definitions: one
definition “include[s] a dispersion of solid particles in aqueous colloidal
solution formed in a patient’s stomach” and another definition is “limited to
medicinal preparation consisting of dispersion of solid particles in an
aqueous colloidal solution formed outside the body.”1172
Faced with these competing dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit
explained that well-settled precedent provides that a court “need not
arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word
to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim.
[Rather t]he subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead
to the correct conclusion.”1173 The Federal Circuit then turned to the
specification and observed that the claimed “hydrosol” is described strictly
“in terms of a pharmaceutical composition and makes no mention of the
term in any other context.”1174 In particular, the Federal Circuit noted the
specification “repeatedly describes the invention as a ‘pharmaceutical
composition,’”1175 and distinguishes the claimed “hydrosol” from the prior
art “on the ground that ‘it was never [previously] proposed to use
pharmacologically active agent particles in an aqueous hydrosol form for
intravenous injection purposes.’”1176 The Federal Circuit thus concluded
1166. Id. at 1290, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1167. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1168. 363 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1169. Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
1170. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
1171. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
1172. Id. at 1310, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1173. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting Liebscher v. Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 948,
951, 119 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 135 (C.C.P.A. 1958)).
1174. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1310, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1175. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1176. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,389,382 (issued Feb.
14, 1995)).
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that “[b]ecause an injectable hydrosol must necessarily be prepared outside
the body, these statements further support adoption of more limited
definition of ‘hydrosol’ as a medicinal preparation prepared outside the
body.”1177
The Federal Circuit further determined that the prosecution history also
required that the claimed “hydrosol” be limited to preparation outside the
body because the patentee’s arguments to overcome the prior art “clearly
suggest[] that the hydrosol is a ‘pharmaceutical composition’ that can be
injected into a patient.”1178 While noting that none of the statements in the
intrinsic evidence “is an explicit disclaimer of subject matter sufficient to
vary the scope of the claim from its ordinary meaning, these statements are
helpful in guiding us to choose between competing dictionary definitions of
a claim term.”1179
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit distinguished its prior
decision in Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,1180 in
which the court held that claimed subject matter was not limited to a preingested form, because “the plain meaning of the claim language was clear
and there was no express or implied pre-ingestion limitation.”1181 The
Federal Circuit also distinguished its decision in Schering Corp. v. Geneval
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1182 involving circumstances in which the parties
agreed that the claimed metabolite was formed in a patients body following
ingestion.1183
In dissent, Judge Clevenger criticized the majority’s reliance on
“multiple dictionaries to find an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘hydrosol’ as
claimed.”1184 In particular, the dissent explained that it was “at a loss to
understand why this dictionary search creates an ambiguity” and that the
“majority’s decision depends entirely on a suspect secondary meaning for
‘medicine’ found in only a single dictionary,” especially when the disputed
term was hydrosol.1185 Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that it would
have followed “our settled law to allow the term its full breadth, unless the
patentee had made an explicit disclaimer or clear disavowal of scope to
alter the ordinary broad meaning of the term.”1186
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1187 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.

Id. at 1310-11, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
19 F.3d 1418, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 363 F.3d at 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
339 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 363 F.3d at 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
Id. at 1313, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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construction of the term “phosphoric acid source” to mean an “acidic
chemical that acts as a source of phosphate.”1188 While noting that the
“most natural reading of the [claim language] . . . would be a source of
phosphoric acid,”1189 the court explained that:
The meaning of a technical term in a patent claim is determined in
accordance with its usage in the specification, elaborated if appropriate
by the prosecution history and with due consideration to usage in the
field of invention . . . . A technical term is not properly removed from its
context in order to seek its meaning . . . . Whether a term appearing in a
patent claim is subject to limitations beyond its abstract general meaning
is determined in the context of the invention described in the
specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.1190

The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s construction
because it “accord[ed] with the chemical descriptions in the specification,”
and “[n]o contradictory information appears in the patent prosecution.”1191
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.1192 involved the issue of whether
the term “skin permeable form” should be construed to cover fentanyl that
can pass through skin including fentanyl citrate solutions.1193 Noting that
the claim term “is not plain on its face to one of ordinary skill in the art,”
the Federal Circuit proceeded to review the remaining intrinsic evidence to
determine the term’s meaning.1194 Referring to the specification’s
statement that the inventors “have discovered that fentanyl citrate . . . has
such a low skin permeability that it is not at all suitable for transdermal
delivery even with the use of permeation enhances. Instead . . . the drug
should be incorporated in the transdermal therapeutic system in the form of
the base,”1195 the Federal Circuit reasoned that fentanyl citrate “is not a skin
permeable form of fentanyl in the context of the invention of the [asserted]
patent.”1196 The Federal Circuit then determined that the prosecution
history confirmed that the claim term did not include fentanyl citrate based
on the inventors’ argument distinguishing the prior art as “suggest[ing] the
production of a diffusion matrix containing fentanyl citrate, which we
specifically stated in the [asserted] patent was unsuitable for transdermal
delivery.”1197 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “[b]oth the
prosecution history and the specification disclaimed fentanyl citrate
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.
1192.
1193.
1194.
1195.
1196.
1197.

Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
Id. at 1325-26, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511-12.
Id. at 1326, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
391 F.3d 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
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because it was unsuitable for transdermal administration and therefore not a
‘skin permeable form’ of fentanyl.”1198
5.

“Coined terms” cases
In 2004, the Federal Circuit rendered several opinions extending the
court’s holding in J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Past & Glue Co.1199 that if a
“dispostive claim limitation is a term unknown to those of ordinary skill in
the art at the time the application was filed[, i]t thus fell on the applicants,
as a duty, to provide a precise definition for . . . the limitation.”1200
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,1201 the Federal Circuit noted that though
a heavy presumption exists that terms carry their ordinary meaning as
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, such a presumption
is inapplicable when “a claim term has no ordinary and customary
meaning, [and] a court must resort to the remaining intrinsic evidence—the
written description and the prosecution history—to obtain the meaning of
that term.”1202 The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the
“parties agree that the term ‘marker substance’ has no accepted meaning to
one of ordinary skill in the art, and we find no reason to disagree with their
conclusion. Accordingly we construe [the term] only as broadly as
provided for by the patent itself.”1203 In affirming the district court’s
construction of “intra-cellular marker substance” to mean an “antigen
existing within a body cell,”1204 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the patent
disclosed twenty-six different antigens, all of which were described as
“suitable . . . marker substances.”1205 The Federal Circuit thus determined
that, at minimum, the “patent clearly regards ‘antigens’ as falling within the
scope of ‘marker substances.’”1206
The Federal Circuit then explained that the prosecution history supports
the district court’s construction by “further reveal[ing] the inventor’s
understanding of the term ‘marker substance’ as synonymous with
‘antigen.’”1207 In particular, the Federal Circuit pointed to the applicant’s
argument that “[t]he method and compositions claimed in the present
application relate to antibodies to intracellular tumor-associated
antigens.”1208 The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “[b]ecause neither
1198.
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1570, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
373 F.3d 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1164, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id. at 1165, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
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the patent specification nor the prosecution history supports the breadth of
the construction that [plaintiff] desires, we affirm the district court’s claim
construction . . . .”1209
In Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satelite Corp.,1210 the Federal Circuit
addressed the proper construction of the term “group key.”1211 Challenging
the district court’s construction of the term to mean “a key associated with
a subset of the total subscriber base,”1212 plaintiff contended that such a
construction was contrary to the “heavy presumption that [the claims] mean
what they say,” and thus “proffer[ed] definitions from a general-usage
dictionary to show that nothing in the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the claim
terms requires limiting ‘group’ to fewer than all subscribers.”1213
Nonetheless, based on the applicants statements during prosecution that
“the claims have certain ‘key’ modifiers which have no accepted meaning
in the art . . . [and] that the modifiers for key [such as group] . . . are very
adequately described in the specification,”1214 the Federal Circuit rejected
the argument.1215 The Federal Circuit instead agreed with defendant’s
position that “there can be no such ‘heavy presumption’ where a disputed
term lacks an accepted meaning in the art.”1216 Citing to its decision in J.T.
Eaton, the Federal Circuit explained that “absent such an accepted
meaning, we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the
patent itself. The duty thus falls on the patent applicant to provide a precise
definition for the disputed term.”1217 The Federal Circuit further explained
that: “[W]here evidence such as expert testimony or technical dictionaries
demonstrates that artisans would attach a special meaning to a claim term
or would attach no meaning at all to the claim term independent of the
specification[,] ‘general usage dictionaries are rendered irrelevant with
respect to that term.’”1218 The Federal Circuit thus reasoned that “[h]aving
conceded that the ‘key’ modifiers have no accepted meaning in the art, the
1209. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. In affirming, the court also clarified that
“molecular sub-units, such as those present in the HCG antigen, qualify as antigens under
this construction.” Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. Based on this clarification, the court
reversed the grant of summary judgement of no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. at 1169, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1210. 383 F.3d 1295, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The authors’ law firm
represented plaintiff in the case.
1211. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1212. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1213. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (quoting Lieble-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
358 F.3d 898, 913, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1214. Id. at 1298, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1215. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1216. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1217. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue
Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1570, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646-47 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1218. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (quoting Vanderlande Indus. Nederaland B.V. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
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applicant expressly directed the public to the specification to discern that
meaning and thus measure the scope of the claimed invention.”1219
Seeking to mitigate the impact of the prosecution history, plaintiff
argued that the applicant’s statement that certain terms were adequately
described in the specification “does not transform every aspect of the
preferred embodiment into a claim limitation,” and identified portions of
the specification that used language such as “may” and “for example” when
describing the term “group key.”1220 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected
this argument as well, explaining that “the specification consistently
equates group with a subset of all subscribers.”1221 Relying on its decision
in Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group,
Inc.,1222 holding that “the specification may define claim terms ‘by
implication’ such that the meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by
reading of the patent documents,’”1223 the Federal Circuit concluded that:
[W]hile the specification does not contain any statements of explicit
disavowal or words of manifest exclusion, it repeatedly, consistently, and
exclusively uses “group” to denote fewer than all subscribers,
manifesting the patentee’s clear intent to so limit the term. The
specification also contains no affirmative indication that group can
consist of all subscribers within the system. A reasonable competitor
reading the patent could only understand “group” to refer to a subset of
all subscribers.1224

In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s
argument that “only statements of ‘clear disclaimer’ in language indicating
‘manifest exclusion or restriction’ can overcome the ‘heavy presumption’
in favor of ordinary meaning.”1225 In so doing, the Federal Circuit
distinguished cases such as Leibel-Flarshiem Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,1226
Brookhill-Wilk I, L.L.C. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,1227 and Teleflex Inc. v.
Ficosa North America Corp.1228 on the basis that such cases did not
involve[] a situation where the applicant admitted that certain claim
terms lacked any agreed upon meaning in the art . . . and unequivocally
directed the patent examiner, as well as the public, to the specification as

1219. Id. at 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1220. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1221. See id. at 1301, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (explaining that “[n]owhere does the
specification contemplate a single group made up of the entire subscriber base.”).
1222. 262 F.3d 1258, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1223. Id. at 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1224. Irdeto Access, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1225. Id. at 1301, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1226. 358 F.3d. 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1227. 334 F.3d 1294, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
1228. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1092

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

the complete source of meaning for the disputed terms . . . . Patentee’s
clear intent to rely on the four corners of his patent to define fully the
terms at issue thus takes this case out of the “heavy presumption” regime
of our cases.1229

6.

Means-plus-function claims
a.

Determining whether a claim limitation invokes the means-plus
function format of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6

One of the Federal Circuit’s most consistent areas of jurisprudence is its
practice of strictly enforcing the rule that a claim term without the word
“means” carries a heavy presumption that it is not a means-plus-function
limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1230 As the Federal Circuit explained in 2004,
“it is not surprising that we have seldom held that a limitation not using the
term ‘means’ must be considered to be in means-plus-function form. In
fact, we have identified only one published opinion since [1996] in which
we have done so.”1231
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1232 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s construction of the phrase “determining
a condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the
heart.”1233 Agreeing with plaintiff’s contentions that the claim preamble’s
recitation of “the method comprising the steps of”1234 does not invoke a
means-plus-function analysis, the Federal Circuit held that
Method claims necessarily recite steps of the method, and the preamble
words that “the method comprises the steps of” do not automatically
convert each ensuing step into the form of § 112[,] ¶ 6. Nor does the
preamble usage “steps of” create a presumption that each ensuing step is
in step-plus-function form; to the contrary, the absence of the signal
“step for” creates the contrary presumption.1235

In Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1236 the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the terms “circuit” and “circuitry”
failed to connote sufficient structure such that the terms should be
construed as means-plus-function limitations.1237
Reversing the
construction of these terms pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6, the Federal Circuit
1229. Irdeto Access, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1302-03, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1230. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000) (stating that, in the specification of a patent
application, the means of performing a function can be an element of the specification).
1231. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1362, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1232. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1233. Id. at 1375, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
1234. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1235. Id. at 1382, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
1236. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1237. Id. at 1319, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

1093

explained that the district court legally erred by failing to impose on the
party advocating a means-plus-function construction the burden
“demonstrating that the claim fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’
or recites a ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing
that function.’”1238 The Federal Circuit noted that to “determine whether a
claim term recites sufficient structure, we examine whether it has an
understood meaning in the art,”1239 and concluded that the “[t]echnical
dictionaries, which are evidence of the understandings of persons of skill in
the technical arts, plainly indicate that the term ‘circuit’ connotes
structure.”1240 The Federal Circuit also reasoned that viewing the claim
language in context confirmed that the term “circuit” connoted sufficient
structure because claims recited the “respective objectives or operations”
for each circuit.1241 In addition, the Federal Circuit observed that an expert
declaration from plaintiff’s expert demonstrated “[t]hat persons of ordinary
skill in the art would understand the structural arrangements of circuit
components from the term ‘circuit’ coupled with the qualifying language of
[the] claim[s].”1242 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that
because the term “circuit” is used in each of the disputed limitations of
[the] claims . . . with a recitation of the respective circuit’s operation in
sufficient detail to suggest structure to persons of ordinary skill in the art,
the “circuit” and “circuitry” limitations of such claims are not meansplus-function limitations.1243

The decision in Linear Technology appears to comport with the decision
in Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,1244 in which the Federal Circuit held
that the term “circuit” preceded by “an appropriate identifier such as
‘interface,’ ‘programming’ and ‘logic,’ certainly identifies some structural
meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art” so as to preclude invocation of §
112, ¶ 6 absent the word “means.”1245 The Federal Circuit’s holding that
the term “circuit” for performing a certain function provides sufficient
structure is difficult to reconcile with its reasoning in Personalized Media
Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission,1246 which
posited that § 112, ¶ 6 would be applicable for “generic structural term[s]
1238. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877,
880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1239. Id. at 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1240. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1241. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1242. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1243. Id. at 1320-21, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1244. 325 F.3d 1364, 1371-72, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
1245. Id. at 1373, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451. However, the court expressly noted that
“we do not find it necessary to hold that the term ‘circuit’ by itself always connotes
sufficient structure.” Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
1246. 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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such as ‘means,’ ‘element,’ or ‘device.’”1247
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1248 an issue on
appeal was whether the claim term “connector assembly” was a meansplus-function limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1249 The Federal Circuit began its
analysis by observing that its “precedent provides that ‘[a] claim limitation
that actually uses the word ‘means’ invokes a rebuttable presumption that §
112, ¶ 6 applies. By contrast, a claim term that does not use ‘means’ will
trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.’”1250 The
Federal Circuit then explained that “[t]he presumption that a limitation
lacking the term ‘means’ is not subject to section 112, ¶ 6 can be overcome
if it is demonstrated that ‘the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite
structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function,’”1251 and noted that its “cases make clear . . . that
the presumption flowing from the absence of the term ‘means’ is a strong
one that is not readily overcome.”1252 The Federal Circuit further reasoned
that “[t]he task of determining whether [a] limitation in question should be
regarded as a means-plus-function limitation, like all claim construction
issues, is a question of law for the court, even though it is a question on
which evidence from experts may be relevant.”1253 The Federal Circuit
thus explained that “even when expert evidence has been offered with
respect to the issue of claim construction, we must determine whether that
evidence comports with the intrinsic evidence in the case.”1254
Turning to the claim language and record before it, the Federal Circuit
observed that defendant introduced an expert declaration urging that the
means-plus-function format should be invoked because “the term
‘connector’ encompasses ‘at least a single infinity of possible devices’ and
that the term ‘would not provide [those] of ordinary skill in the lighting
fixture art with sufficient structural information . . . as to what device or
component would read on the claim element.”1255 The Federal Circuit,
however, explained that the expert declaration failed to
address the central issue in determining whether section 112[,] ¶ 6
applies. Implicit in [defendant’s expert] declaration is the premise that in
order to be regarded as structural for purposes of section 112[,] ¶ 6, a

1247. Id. at 704, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
1248. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1249. Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1250. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
288 F.3d 1359, 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1251. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc., 288 F.3d at 1369, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664 (internal quotations omitted)).
1252. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1253. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1254. Id. at 1359, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
1255. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
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claim limitation must identify a specific structure and not use a generic
term that includes a wide variety of structures.1256

The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s approach as “unduly
restrictive,”1257 explaining that precedent does not “require[] the claim term
to denote a specific structure;”1258 rather, it is sufficient “if the claim term is
used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to
designate structure, even if the term identifies a broad class of structures by
their function.”1259
The Federal Circuit thus explained that the proper inquiry was whether
the term “connector assembly” would be understood by a person skilled in
the art “to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce
word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure
and is simply a substitute for the term ‘means for.’”1260 The Federal Circuit
then noted that its precedent instructs that relevant dictionaries can be
consulted “to determine if a disputed term has achieved recognition as a
noun denoting structure, even if the noun is derived from the function
performed.”1261 After examining the dictionary definitions of the words
“connector” and “assembly,” the Federal Circuit concluded that:
While the terms “connector” and “connector assembly” are certainly
broad, and may in the end include any structure that performs the role of
connecting . . . [t]hose terms are routinely treated as structural by patent
practitioners and courts, and we conclude that there is no reason to treat
the term “connector assembly” any differently for purposes of section
112[,] ¶ 6. The consequence of defining the term “connector assembly”
free of the constraints of section 112[,] ¶ 6 may be to render the claim
more vulnerable to attack for invalidity, but that is a risk that a claim
drafter assumes by choosing broad structural terms rather than choosing

1256. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
1257. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
1258. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
1259. Id. at 1359-60, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. The court canvassed its precedent in
which it held that broad claim language lacking the word “means” did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6.
See id. at 1360 (discussing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which held that the phrase “denote mechanism”
was not a means-plus-function limitation; Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (Fed. Cir. 1998, which held
that the phrase “digital detector” was not a means-plus-function limitation; Al-Site Corp. v.
VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which held that
the phrase “eyeglass hanger member” was not a means-plus-function limitation; CCS
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir.
2002), which held that the phrase “reciprocating member” was not a means-plus-function
limitation; Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2000),
which held that the phrase “sealing connected joints” was not a means-plus-function
limitation).
1260. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1350.
1261. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1350.
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to claim in means-plus-function format under section 112 [,] ¶ 6.1262

The Federal Circuit further added that in light of its rules for determining
whether a claim term without the word “means” invokes § 112, ¶ 6, “it is
not surprising that we have seldom held that a limitation not using the term
‘means’ must be considered to be in means-plus-function form. In fact, we
have identified only one published opinion since [1996] in which we have
done so.”1263
In Phillips v. AWH Corp.,1264 the Federal Circuit reversed a construction
of the term “baffles” as a means-plus-function limitation.1265 The Federal
Circuit noted that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that
§ 112, ¶ 6 applies,” while absence of “the word ‘means’ creates a
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.”1266 The Federal Circuit then
explained that the disputed claim term “does not expressly use the word
‘means’”1267 and “the word ‘baffle’ is a sufficient recitation of structure,
which carries its ordinary meaning of ‘something for deflecting, checking,
or otherwise regulating flow.’”1268 The Federal Circuit further elaborated
that “[s]imply because the claims do not identify the matter upon which the
baffle acts does not, by itself, rebut that presumption or render the term
subject to means-plus-function treatment. Our case law has focused on the
structure of claim terms when determining whether § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”1269
b.

Determining the recited function and corresponding structure

NOMOS Corp. v. Brainlab USA, Inc.,1270 presented a means-plusfunction claim related to a system for identifying the precise position of a
cancerous lesion in a patient’s body when the patient is positioned on a
treatment table of a radiation therapy device.1271 The claim at issue recited
as one of its limitations “a means for generating at least one ultrasound
image of the lesion in the patient’s body.”1272 The question was whether
this claim covered an accused infringer’s device which is also used for
identifying the position of lesion in a patient’s body for purposes of
administering radiation therapy, where the allegedly infringing device used
a hand-held ultrasound probe, rather than a probe that was fixed to the

1262. Id. at 1361-62, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351.
1263. Id. at 1362, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351.
1264. 363 F.3d 1207, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1265. Id. at 1211-12, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420.
1266. Id. at 1212, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420.
1267. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420.
1268. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 162 (1993)).
1269. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420.
1270. 357 F.3d. 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1271. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
1272. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
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treatment table.
The district court construed the means-plus-function limitation to require
an ultrasound probe that was fixed by a bracket or fixation device that
maintains the ultrasound probe perpendicular to the treatment table.
Applying this construction, the accused device did not infringe. On appeal
the Federal Circuit agreed with this construction because the only
embodiment described by the patient’s specification included a fixed
device and described the probe as “disposed on” or “secured to” the
treatment table. Furthermore, the patent stated that “the means for
generating the ultrasound image may be an ultrasound probe, including a
means for mounting the ultrasound probe to a radiation therapy device.”1273
The Federal Circuit also found it clear that “in order to generate ultrasound
image[s] the ultrasound probe must be mounted to the treatment table by a
fixation device” because the patent stated that the “‘[u]ltra sound probe . . .
is mounted so that it can be moved upwardly and downwardly with respect
to bracket 423, so that ultrasound probe 422 may be brought into contract
with the patient’s body 302 in order to generate ultrasound image
421.’”1274
Plaintiff countered that claim 1 should not be construed to require a fixed
probe because claim 3, dependant upon claim 1, expressly required a
“means for mounting,” and therefore the concept of claim differentiation
prevented the court from reading a mounting requirement into claim 1. The
Federal Circuit explained, however, that it was not reading limitations from
a dependant claim into the independent claim; it found the fixed probe
requirement by looking to the written description, not claim 3. Also, it
opined that the claim differentiation concept was a “guide, not a rigid rule,”
and would not outweigh the provisions of § 112.1275 Having thus agreed
with the district court interpretation of the claims, the Federal Circuit held
that the accused device did not infringe because it fashioned a hand held
probe. It further concluded that because the accused device antedated the
patent, there could be no resort to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents of this means- plus-function claim.
In TI Group Automotive Systems (North America), Inc. v. VDO North
America, L.L.C.,1276 plaintiff appealed the district court’s granting of
defendant’s post-verdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement.1277
Defendant cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for a
JMOL of invalidity. The patent at issue was directed to a fuel pump
1273.
1274.
1275.
1276.
1277.

Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856.
375 F.3d 1126, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1132, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1333.
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assembly technology.1278 Four claim terms were at issue in the appeal and
cross-appeal. First, plaintiff argued that the district court’s understanding
of “fuel reservoir” as “the portion of the apparatus for pumping fuel in
which fuel is collected and retained apart from fuel in the fuel tank” was
too narrow.1279 The Federal Circuit held that the written description amply
supported the district court’s definition, because each dictionary definition
of “reservoir” implicates “some sort of containment of liquid.”1280 Thus,
contrary to plaintiff’s proffered construction “in the context of this
invention,” the fuel in the “fuel reservoir” was contained apart from the
fuel in the “fuel tank.”1281
The second claim term at issue was “pumping means.” Plaintiff argued
that the district court erred by construing this term as a means-plus-function
limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1282 The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that,
although the term was presumed to be a means-plus-function limitation
because it used the word “means,” the presumption was overcome because
the claim limitation recited not only the means but also its structure,
location, and operation.1283
The district court therefore erred by
incorporating other limitations from the specification that were not
necessary to perform the function recited in the limitation “to pump fuel
into the reservoir.”1284
With respect to the same claim element, plaintiff argued that the district
court had again too narrowly construed “within” in “pumping means for
pumping fuel into the reservoir, said means being located within the
reservoir in the region of the opening” to require the pumping means to be
located inside the reservoir. On this point, plaintiff and defendant offered
competing dictionary definitions, plaintiff arguing that “within” should be
construed to mean “in the limits or compass of, not beyond,” and defendant
arguing that “within” should be construed to mean “in the inner part or
interior of.”1285 The Federal Circuit ultimately upheld the district court’s
1278. Id. at 1130, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331.
1279. Id. at 1134, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1334.
1280. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1334-35.
1281. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335. The independent claim at issue in the appeal recited:
“2. Apparatus for pumping fuel from a fuel tank to an engine comprising: (a) a supply port
for carrying fuel from the apparatus to the engine; (b) a fuel reservoir which includes an
opening for connecting the interior of the reservoir to the interior of the fuel tank . . . .” Id.
at 1131, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1332 (emphasis added).
1282. Id. at 1135, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335.
1283. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335. The court found that the portions of the claim limitation
which recited “including a nozzle and a ventui tube in alignment with the nozzle,” “being
located within the reservoir in the region of the opening,” and “the passage of fuel out of the
nozzle an through the venture tube causing fuel to be entrained through the opening into the
interior of the reservoir,” recited the structure, location, and operation of the “pumping
means,” respectively.
1284. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335.
1285. Id. at 1136, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335-36.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

1099

construction because plaintiff’s proffered construction was not so different
from defendant’s, where “in ordinary and customary usage, what is not
outside is on the inside.”1286
The Federal Circuit also addressed defendant’s arguments supporting its
construction, on the inner side. Defendant argued that the patent’s
drawings show the pumping means located inside the reservoir, that
plaintiff’s construction ignored the “primary . . . and most relevant”
definition of “within,” and that plaintiff’s statements during prosecution of
a Japanese counterpart application confirmed that “within” was intended to
mean “inside.”1287 The Federal Circuit found the first two arguments
unpersuasive because it had previously held that drawings alone do not
operate to limit the claims to the specific configuration depicted and
because “a patentee is entitled to a definition that encompasses all
consistent meanings.”1288 As for defendant’s third argument, the Federal
Circuit “declined to comment, . . . and note[d] only that ‘the varying legal
and procedural requirements for obtaining a patent protection in foreign
countries might render consideration of certain types of representations
inappropriate’ for consideration in a claim construction analysis of a United
States counterpart.”1289
As for the fifth term at issue, “opening for connecting the interior of the
reservoir to the interior of the fuel tank,” the Federal Circuit construed it to
require “that there be a hole, passage, or aperture for joining or linking the
interior of the reservoir to the exterior of the reservoir.”1290 It found that
the district court had erred in additionally requiring that the aperture be
“disposed adjacent to both the interior of the reservoir and the interior of
the fuel tank” because nothing in the ordinary meaning of the term nor in
the written description required such limitations.1291
Finally, the Federal Circuit found error in the district court’s construction
of a limitation in a dependent claim that the opening for connecting,
defined above, is “at the bottom of the reservoir” to mean that the opening
must be in the “bottom surface of the reservoir.”1292 Rather, the Federal
Circuit held, the ordinary and customary meaning of “bottom of the
reservoir” is “the lower or lowest part of the reservoir,” and was not
restricted to only the reservoir’s bottom surface.1293

1286. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336.
1287. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336.
1288. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336.
1289. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336 (citing Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d
1110, 1116, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 185, 188 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1290. Id. at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337.
1291. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337.
1292. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338.
1293. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338.
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Defendant’s “pumping means” was located on the fuel tank side of the
opening that divides the fuel tank from the reservoir; it was not “located
within the reservoir” as required by the claims. Therefore, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment granting of defendant’s postverdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement.1294 Having found that the
claims were too narrowly construed by the district court, it also vacated the
district court’s opinion that the patent was valid and remanded the
invalidity question for the court’s reconsideration under the properly
construed claims.1295
In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford
International, Inc.,1296 plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of non-infringement.1297 The patent was directed to a
remotely controlled device for handling sections of well casing to be
lowered into a well after drilling. The patented device included a “stabbing
apparatus” mounted on a derrick which had “at least three major
interconnectable subassemblies” that could be disassembled to facilitate
transport, among other things, and an “extendable boom” which contained
jaws on one end to engage the casing.1298 The boom was “hydraulically
movable in an up-and-down pivoting motion or in a side-to-side motion, or
both such motions simultaneously.”1299 In the preferred embodiment, a
hydraulic piston and cylinder subassembly “which [was] connected to the
boom through a plate structure” called a “lift plate” was used to raise and
lower the boom holding the casing section.1300
The asserted claims recited the following limitation, which the district
court, the parties, and the Federal Circuit agreed was a means-plus-function
limitation.1301 The means were for: “selectively pivoting said boom about
said horizontal axis to raise and lower the second end of said boom which
carries said jaws, and to elevate said boom to a location where it extends in
a generally vertical direction.”1302
The district court held that the structure corresponding to this “means for
selectively pivoting” term necessarily included the lift plate to which the
boom was attached, rather than merely the piston and cylinder subassembly
as plaintiff contended.1303 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s

1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.
1303.

Id. at 1139, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338.
Id. at 1139-40, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339.
389 F.3d 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
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Although the piston and cylinder subassembly
construction.1304
occasionally was described without mention of the lift plate, the court
found that “the only embodiment showing use of the piston and cylinder
subassembly discloses a direct connection to the lift plate.”1305
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that the applicant’s statement during
prosecution that the “lifting cylinder ‘simply cannot be used’ when directly
connected to the boom” in distinguishing the invention from the prior art
“underscored the essentiality of the lift plate to the claimed function.”1306
The Federal Circuit also established that the principle requiring that the
“same terms appearing in different portions of the claims should be given
the same meaning” extended to terms appearing in related claims and that
this principle supported the more limited construction advanced by
defendant and arrived at by the district court.1307 The Federal Circuit
explained that other claims besides the asserted one contained the same
means-plus-function limitation but also required a “yawing” function,
meaning side-to-side movement.1308 Because (1) the lift plate was essential
for performing a yawing function, (2) the identical means-plus-function
term found in the asserted claim was found in claims requiring yawing, and
(3) the specification gave no reason why the terms should be interpreted
differently in the various claims, the district court found that the structure,
which corresponded to the means-plus-function term in the asserted claim,
required a lift plate.1309
In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit agreed that the accused device, which
achieved pivoting by an under-mounted hydraulic cylinder, satisfied the
requirement that an identity of function exist in order to infringe a meansplus-function claim. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the
accused device represented a “distinct structural approach” to performing
that function.1310 Furthermore, because defendant’s accused device was in
use before the filing of the patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did
not need to engage in a separate analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents.1311 It therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment of
non-infringement. 1312
In Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1313 an issue on appeal was
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.

Id. at 1379-80, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1377-78, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069-70.
Id. at 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
Id. at 1379, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the determination of the proper structure corresponding to the claim phrase
“a second means for generating a first control signal during a first state of
circuit operation.”1314 The Federal Circuit explained that construing a
means-plus-function limitation entails a two-step process.1315 First, a court
must identify the recited function within the means-plus-function
limitation.1316 Second, a court must examine the written description to
determine the structure that corresponds to and performs the recited
function.1317 The Federal Circuit further noted that “[p]roper application of
§ 112 ¶ 6 generally reads the claim element to embrace distinct and
alternative described structures for performing the claimed function.”1318
Having identified the corresponding structure, the court explained that
simply because a “disputed term is not limited to a single structure does not
disqualify it as corresponding structure, as long as the class of structures is
identifiable by a person of ordinary skill in the art.”1319
Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag International Ltd.1320 involved the proper
construction of the term “means for creating air channels.”1321 The Federal
Circuit began by noting that construction of a means-plus-function
limitation “includes identifying the claimed function and determining the
corresponding structure or acts disclosed in the specification.”1322
Examining the claim language, the court reasoned that the dispute centered
on “whether flutes must be included in the structures that perform this
function.”1323 Though noting that “[i]n most places the specification
describes that invention as including both flutes and perforated pipe,” the
Federal Circuit observed that: “the specification also points out that both
structures are not required, stating: ‘[I]t is believed that sufficient air will
be present to achieve decomposition with either the channels . . . or the
perforated pipe . . . although it is preferred that both the flutes . . . and the
pipe . . . be utilized.’”1324 The Federal Circuit relied on precedent providing
that “[w]hen multiple embodiments in the specification correspond to the
claimed function, proper application of § 112, ¶ 6 generally reads the claim

1314. Id. at 1321, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1315. Id. at 1322, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071-72.
1316. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1317. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1318. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (quoting Creo Prods., Inc. v. Presstek, Inc., 305
F.3d 1337, 1346, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1319. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1320. 392 F.3d 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1321. Id. at 1327, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
1322. Id. at 1328, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193 (quoting IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas
Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1430, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1129, 1137 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
1323. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1193.
1324. Id. at 1328-29, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
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element to embrace each of those embodiments.”1325 Based on this
precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that “in light of this disclosure,
flutes are not essential.”1326
In dissent, Judge Newman explained that:
This case does not present a new question, and it should not have a new
answer. The question is, can a patent claim clause written in meansplus-function form be construed, as a matter of law, literally to cover a
device that is not the invention described in the specification, that is not
shown in any of the drawings, that was not examined for patentability,
that was excluded by prosecution arguments, and that is not an asserted
equivalent. Statute and precedent require that the question be answered
in the negative.1327

The dissent further characterized the majority opinion as requiring that
“the description of the invention, the prosecution history, and the prior art,
must give way to a claim construction that covers an invention that the
applicant foresaw but chose not to describe and prosecute.”1328
c.

Preamble limitations

Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.1329 presented the
issue of whether the term “blown-film” appearing in the claim preamble
was a claim limitation.1330 Instructing that “[n]o litmus test defines when a
preamble limits claim scope,”1331 the Federal Circuit identified two
circumstances in which a term in the preamble operates as a claim
limitation: (1) when the preamble “recites essential structure or steps, or if
it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim,”1332 and (2)
when the preamble recites “additional structure or steps underscored as
important by the specification.”1333 The Federal Circuit then determined
that “blown-film” was a claim limitation because the “specification is
replete with references to the invention as a ‘blown-film’ liner, including

1325. Id. at 1329, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193 (quoting Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great
Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258, 52 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1258, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1326. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
1327. Id. at 1331, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
1328. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
1329. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1330. Id. at 1309-10, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
1331. Id. at 1309, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1788 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
1332. Id. at 1309-10, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard, Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1333. Id. at 1310, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc., 289
F.3d at 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788).
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the title of the patent itself and the ‘Summary of the Invention.’”1334 The
Federal Circuit further reasoned that the specification also repeatedly uses
the term “blown-film” to describe the preferred embodiments and “the
entire preamble ‘blown-film textured liner’ is restated in each of the
patent’s seven claims.”1335 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “the
inventor considered that the ‘blown-film’ preamble language represented
an important characteristic of the claimed invention.”1336
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1337 the district court held that plaintiff’s
patent covering punch pliers for use in punching holes in overlapping
sheets of metal was invalid for failing to satisfy the written description
requirement.1338 The sole independent claim of the patent recited as its
preamble “handheld punch pliers for simultaneously punching and
connecting overlapping sheet metal” such as the corners of overlapping
ceiling tile grids.1339 Furthermore, Figure Six of the patent illustrated the
result of operation of the pliers in which “the portion of the metal not cut
by the punching operation bends back down and flat with the metal surface
so as to securely connect the two pieces of metal.”1340 The district court
found that the written description did not support the claims because clear
and convincing evidence showed that the pliers described by the
specification punched holes through overlapping sheets of metal but did not
connect the sheets, and Intirtool admitted that its pliers did not function in
the way illustrated by Figure Six.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of invalidity,
explaining that the district court erred by interpreting the preamble of the
independent claim as a limitation. The Federal Circuit held that the
preamble added nothing to the remainder of the claim, which described the
punch pliers in “complete and exacting structural detail.”1341 Furthermore,
although the specification discussed “a connecting tab [that] remains
securely connected to the parent sheet metal,” the court reasoned that the
preamble did not recite “any additional structure or steps underscored as
important by the specification.”1342 Moreover, any statements made during
prosecution that the punch pliers “simultaneously punched and connected”
metal sheets were merely referring to the benefits or features of the claimed
invention, which were not patentably significant. Finally, the Federal

1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.

Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1293, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782.
Id. at 1294, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
Id. at 1295, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
Id. at 1290, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
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Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously construed claim
language reciting “bending the sheet metal plug formed by said cut
substantially at an imaginary cord on the uncut sheet metal between the
ends of said semicircular shaped cut” to require a “crimping effect”
bending back the uncut portion of the holes as demonstrated in Figure
Six.1343 It opined that the claim term was not restricted to the embodiment
described by the figure, and therefore the court’s reliance on its erroneous
construction rendered its finding of invalidity clearly erroneous.1344
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America,1345 the
licensee of a patent directed to a method of detecting vitamin deficiencies
was held liable for indirect infringement in recommending an infringing
test to physicians.1346 The claimed method involved screening of body
fluids for increased levels of homocysteine, an amino acid that is
metabolized with the assistance of both vitamins B12 and folic acid and
thus appears in elevated levels in a person or animal who suffers from a
deficiency of either vitamin.1347 This method was called the “total
homocysteine test” and identified a deficiency of either vitamin, but it did
not indicate in which vitamin a patient was deficient. Metabolite’s claims
were also directed to a “total homocysteine-methylmalonic acid” test,
which, through the use of methylmalonic acid, identified the particular
vitamin that was deficient.1348
Metabolite licensed the patented method to LabCorp, a laboratory testing
company, who originally performed the total homocysteine assays. In
1998, LabCorp switched to a total homocysteine assay developed by
Abbott Laboratories and discontinued paying royalties to Metabolite for its
total homocysteine test. Pursuant to a jury verdict, LabCorp was found to
have willfully infringed Metabolite’s patent.
LabCorp’s primary non-infringement argument on appeal rested on the
construction of the claimed step of “[c]orrelating an elevated level of total
homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate.”1349 LabCorp argued that this correlating step should be construed
to require a showing of a separate hematologic or neuropsychiatric
symptom to confirm the “correlation.” The Federal Circuit disagreed,
explaining that the claim only required correlation between an elevated
level of total homocysteine and a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. It
found no further required correlation, nor anything about confirmation of
1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.
1347.
1348.
1349.

Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1371, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094.
Id. at 1358, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id. at 1359, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
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such correlation.
The Federal Circuit found support for this interpretation in the patent’s
preamble, “[a] method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate,”
which it characterized as restating that the invention was a method of
detecting vitamin deficiency, and it did not relate such deficiency to any
specific “abnormality.”1350 The Federal Circuit found further support in the
prosecution history, in which the examiner characterized the preamble as
stating the intended use of the invention. Finally, although the Federal
Circuit discussed the relationship between elevated homocysteine levels
and either clinical or hematological symptoms, it nevertheless found
support in the patent’s specification, which acknowledged that the
described method could show vitamin deficiencies that exist without any
clinical symptoms.
The Federal Circuit also rejected LabCorp’s argument that, since only
twenty percent of assays have elevated levels of homocysteine, only that
percentage could form the basis for a damages award. LabCorp itself had
urged the district court to define “correlating” to include either a mutual or
reciprocal relationship, the court observed. The Federal Circuit declined
“the invitation to apply a different claim construction for computation of
damages than for infringement liability.”1351
7.

Miscellaneous claim construction issues
The Federal Circuit reinforced its approach to “words of approximation”
in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,1352 where it held that a claim
reciting the term “substantial” and “substantially” did not require perfection
with respect to the specific parameters that the terms modified.1353 Plaintiff
brought an action against defendant alleging that its slurry tanks infringed
plaintiff’s patent covering an apparatus for storing and uniformly mixing
the liquid and solid components of waste that comprise slurries in
preparation for the slurry’s treatment and/or use as a fertilizer or other
agents. The claims at issue were drawn to an apparatus for stirring slurries
in slurry tanks and required as part of its limitations that certain flow
generating means be positioned in a certain way for generating:
substantial helical flow path of the liquid and solid components [with the
components] traveling outwardly . . . from the center portion of the
tank . . . then upwardly . . . then inwardly . . . then downwardly . . . and
then outwardly . . . , the liquid and solid components continuing to travel
in the helical path as the entire body of liquid and solid components

1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.

Id. at 1362, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
355 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
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continues to rotate.1354

The district court accepted defendant’s proposed construction of this
“substantial helical flow path” limitation to require “a helical flow path”
rather than a “largely or generally spiral-like flow path” as plaintiff would
have it, because the district court understood the plain claim language to
require “a flow path that emanates from the tank center and returns to the
center after one rotation,” and because two of the patent’s figures
illustrated a “perfectly helical flow.”1355 Applying this construction, the
district court ruled that defendant did not infringe plaintiff’s patent and
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, finding error in its construction. According to the Federal
Circuit, courts are to examine intrinsic evidence of record before resorting
to extrinsic evidence, and they are to examine intrinsic evidence “in
seriatim.” It explained that a court is to start with the claim terms’ ordinary
meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, and a court is to
resort to the written description “when the claim language itself lacks
sufficient clarity to determine the scope of the claims.”1356 In light of the
its previous decisions construing “words of approximation” such as
“substantial(ly)” to require something less than perfection, the Federal
Circuit found the plain language of the claims at issue to be clear and not
contradicted by anything in the written description—“substantial helical
flow path.” Such description required neither a perfectly helical flow nor a
flow that returns to the center in exactly one rotation, a pattern
demonstrated by a flow path that was none other than perfectly helical.
In Vanderlande Industries Nederland v. International Trade
Commission,1357 the Federal Circuit reviewed the International Trade
Commission’s decision that certain imported machinery infringed the
claims of a U.S. patent directed to “sortation systems,” i.e., mechanical
systems for sorting items such as packages.1358 The meanings of two claim
terms were disputed: “glide surface surrounding said [slat] wall” and
“glide surface having substantially the same configuration as said outer
surface of said slat.”1359
Plaintiff argued that the proper construction of the first term required the
glide surface to contact the outer surface of the slat on all sides. The
Federal Circuit held that it did not. Although it was evident that the glide
surface in the preferred embodiment contacted the outer surface of the slat
1354.
1355.
1356.
1357.
1358.
1359.

Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597.
Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
Id. at 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
366 F.3d 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1312, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
Id. at 1317, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
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at various points on all sides, there also existed points of no contact on each
side in the same embodiment. Furthermore, the Summary of Invention
section of the patent allowed for one or more sides to not have contact with
the slat because it stated that the invention includes embodiments with
contact “between at least one edge of each slat and an engaging portion of
the glide surface of the diverter shoe.”1360 The Summary section also
described a contact point on the bottom of the slat without describing a
similar point of contact on the top. Even though the Summary of Invention
section suggested that these embodiments lacking contact on all sides were
not preferable, embodiments contact on all sides “f[e]ll within the
disclosure of the invention, indicating that the patent requires a broader
meaning” of the disputed term than the one offered by Vanderlande.1361
The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that the patentee’s
statements to the European Patent Office during prosecution of a European
counterpart to the patent restricted the scope of the claims to cover glide
surfaces that contacted all sides of the outer surface of the slat. The
applicants for the European counterpart stated that the claimed invention
could be distinguished from a prior art device because the prior art device
did not have a glide surface that would “surround” the slats. Their
argument was that because the structure in the prior art that corresponded
to the claimed “glide surface” was located below the top wall of the slat, it
would not “surround” the slats. But the Federal Circuit agreed with the
tribunal below that this distinction had “nothing to do with whether or
where the ‘glide surface’ contacts the slot,” and therefore did not preclude a
broader construction.1362
Finally, plaintiff proffered a general-usage dictionary as proof that “glide
surface” should be understood as having contact on all sides. It specifically
relied on the dictionary’s definition of the noun “glide” and an illustrative
example of the word which showed a circular metal button attached to the
bottom of furniture legs in which the button completely contacted both the
furniture leg and the floor. Apart from its conclusion that plaintiff’s
argument consisted of a “shaky syllogism,” the Federal Circuit dismissed it
for several reasons. First, plaintiff misapprehended the function of claim
construction analysis of arriving at the construction the terms would be
given by “a person skilled in the relevant art” by resorting to a general
usage dictionary when the testimony of experts and the patent’s inventors
showed that “glide surface” had no recognized meaning in the relevant art.
“A general usage dictionary cannot overcome credible art-specific evidence

1360. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
1361. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
1362. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
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of the meaning or lack of meaning of a claim term.”1363 Second, plaintiff
relied on the definition of “glide,” “only one word in a two-word claim
term.”1364 Finally, the dictionary definition proffered was “entirely
eclipsed” by the patent’s written description which provided “detailed, art
specific examples of glide surfaces . . . including embodiments in which the
glide surface does not contact every side of the slat.”1365 Thus, the Federal
Circuit concluded that a “glide surface” has “some contact, but not
necessarily complete contact, with the outer surface of the slat, and that
need not contact all sides of the slat.”1366 This construction differed slightly
from that given to the term by the ITC because it required some contact;
whereas the ITC’s construction would conceivably cover “no contact”
technologies which the Federal Circuit believed were well beyond the
scope of the disclosure.
Turning to the second disputed claim term, “the glide surface having
substantially the same configuration as said outer surface of said slat,” the
Federal Circuit decided whether it was error for the ITC to not construe this
term and whether the plaintiff’s proffered construction, “that the glide
surface of the shoe must largely, but not necessarily wholly, resemble the
configuration of the outer surface of the slat in every, or largely every,
relevant respect,” was correct.1367
Again, the Federal Circuit found defects in plaintiff’s position. First,
there was no requirement that the ITC formally construe this claim because
it was not in dispute when the ALJ originally construed the claims.
Moreover, the ALJ was “plainly attentive to the critical words
‘substantially the same configuration’” in view of its statement that
“substantially is considered to be a ‘broadening usage’ that must be given
reasonable scope; such words must be viewed by the decision maker as
they would be understood by persons experienced in the field of the
invention.”1368 Third, plaintiff did not show how its proffered definition
was significantly different from the ALJ’s explanation of the effect of the
word substantially.
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision System Corp., N.V.,1369
1363. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
1364. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
1365. Id. at 1322, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
The Court also dismissed
Vanderlande’s argument that the content of a mediation statement drafted by the patent
owner and licensee supported its contact-with-all-sides construction because it was
ambiguous, and in any event, “was at most a theory advanced in a proceeding to mediate a
separate litigation, upon which [the Court places] little—if any weight in claim
construction.” Furthermore, the content of the statement would be inadmissible in a patent
suit in federal district court under Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
1366. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705.
1367. Id. at 1323, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705.
1368. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705.
1369. 365 F.3d 1299, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the court addressed the issue of whether the district court erred in
construing the term “an illumination apparatus” as limited to an apparatus
containing only a single illumination source.1370 The Federal Circuit
recounted long-standing precedent that it “has repeatedly emphasized that
an indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of
‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase
‘comprising.’” Based on this precedent, the Federal Circuit held that the
disputed term “is properly construed to encompass one or more
illumination sources because the patentee has not evinced a clear intent to
limit the article ‘an’ to a single illumination source in either the claims or
the specification . . . .”1371
Addressing defendant’s argument that both the disputed claim and the
specification “call out other limitations with multiple components, e.g.,
‘first camera’ to a take a ‘first image’ and ‘second camera’ to take ‘a
second image,’”1372 the court explained that:
we do not agree that the failure to specifically refer to a “first
illumination apparatus” and a “second illumination apparatus” evinces a
clear intent on the part of the patentee that the term be limited to a single
illumination source. Indeed, the very use of the article “an” indicates, at
least presumptively, that the patentees intended the claim language “an
illumination apparatus” to mean one or more illumination sources, and
thus to cover implicitly “a first illumination apparatus” and subsequent
“illumination apparatuses” where they exist. To limit the claim term “an
illumination apparatus” to one illumination source, we require much
stronger evidence of the patentees’ intent than strained extrapolation
from the language employed by the patentees in other claim
limitations.1373

The Federal Circuit thus concluded that when a “comprising” claim
“includes the article ‘a’ or ‘an,’ and the specification is at best inconclusive
on the patentee’s intent to limit that article to a single element or step, [the
court does not] find a ‘clear intent’ to so limit the claims.”1374
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit distinguished its prior
decisions in Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.1375 and
North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,1376 in which the
Federal Circuit held that use of the pronoun “a” limited the claim term to
the singular form, as isolated cases involving unique sets of

1370.
1371.
1372.
1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.

Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
Id. at 1305, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
99 F.3d 1098, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
7 F.3d 1571, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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circumstances.1377 The Federal Circuit explained that in Insituform where
the disputed term was “a cup,” “‘neither the specification nor the drawings
discloses the use of more than one cup,’ and in fact repeatedly described or
depicted ‘the cup.’”1378 The Federal Circuit also distinguished North
American Vaccine as inapposite because the claims in that case did not
invoke the open phrase “comprising.” Accordingly, the court concluded
that:
“Indeed, it [is] the very use of the transition ‘comprising’ in
conjunction with the article ‘a’ or ‘an’ that creates the presumption that the
article is construed to mean one or more elements or steps, unless there is
evidence of clear intent to limit the claims.”1379
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.1380 involved claims directed to kits used to
prepare calcium minerals where the disputed language was the phrase
“consisting of.”1381 Noting that this transitional phrase “is a term of patent
convention meaning that the claimed invention contains only what is
expressly set forth in the claims,”1382 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
phrase “does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention [and i]t is thus
necessary to determine what is limited by the ‘consisting of’ phrase.”1383
Having analyzed the disputed claim, the Federal Circuit concluded that
“[w]hile the term ‘consisting of’ permits no other chemicals in the
[claimed] kit [for preparing a calcium mineral], a spatula is not part of the
invention that is described.”1384
In dissent, Judge Schall reasoned that the majority opinion “errs in
holding that [plaintiff’s] use of the phrase ‘consisting of’ limits only
chemical, but not mechanical components.”1385 The dissent explained that
“[o]ur case law makes it clear that ‘closed’ transition phrases such as
consisting of are understood to exclude any elements, steps, or ingredients
not specified in the claim.”1386 The dissent further noted that plaintiff
“even recognized that a kit can include mechanical items, such as
packaging, by stating in [the] claims . . . that ‘said dry ingredients and

1377. Scanner Techs. Corp., 365 F.3d at 1304-06, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904-05.
1378. Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1379. Id. at 1305-06, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904-05.
1380. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1381. Id. at 1331, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
1382. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
1383. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
1384. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
1385. Id. at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
1386. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1776
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). A significant thrust of the dissenting opinion was that plaintiff’s use of
“consisting of” and its statements during prosecution provided notice to competitors that the
claims only covered the elements expressly recited in the claims. Id. at 1335-36, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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solution are present in separate containers.’”1387
The topic of waiver in the context of claim construction has become
much more prevalent in Federal Circuit jurisprudence, yet a cohesive
framework for resolving the issue continues to prove elusive.1388 In
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1389 defendant argued
that plaintiff failed to preserve its right to appeal a district court’s claim
construction because it “did not make a formal objection when the jury was
instructed on the claim construction.”1390 In response, plaintiff contended
that “the claim construction was decided at the Markman hearing, and was
not a proper subject of trial objection under [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 51.”1391 Crediting the position advanced by plaintiff, the Federal
Circuit explained that:
When the claim construction is resolved pre-trial, and the patentee
presented the same position in the Markman proceeding as is now
pressed, a further objection to the district court’s pre-trial ruling may
indeed have been not only futile but unnecessary. In this case the court
claim construction resulted from a hearing at which all parties’ positions
were presented, and . . . extensively argued . . . . Objection under Rule 51
was not required to preserve the right to appeal the Markman ruling.1392

In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech., L.L.C.,1393 the Federal
Circuit adopted a seemingly contrary position, holding that the patentee
waived its right to challenge the district court’s claim construction by
failing to object to the construction during trial even though the
construction was rendered pre-trial in two Markman orders.1394 The
Federal Circuit explained that the patentee:
did not, however, preserve its claim construction argument at trial and
also did not object to the jury’s instruction on this claim term. Because it
failed to preserve its rights, [patentee] is not permitted to contest the
1387. Id. at 1335, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
1388. One of the first decisions in this area was Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161
F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which the accused infringer
changed its positions on claim construction on appeal and even argued that the claim
constructions it advanced at trial were in error. The court recognized the defendant’s aboutface as a clear strategy to “salvage its invalidity case,” and ruled that a party is prohibited
from asserting a position on appeal that is inconsistent with a position it advocated at trial by
the law of waiver and judicial estoppel. The court, out of an “abundance of fairness,”
however, declined to stop the defendant in the case at hand because it had not explicitly set
forth this rule before. Since then, there have been a series of cases in which the court has
addressed waiver of a party’s right to argue claim construction on appeal, yet no cohesive
rule has emerged.
1389. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1390. Id. at 1380, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
1391. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1392. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1393. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1394. Id. at 1150, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
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construction . . . . If [patentee] had wanted a different construction . . . it
should have objected at trial.1395

In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,1396 the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s
argument that the defendant waived its right to advance a claim
construction on appeal that differed in scope from the proffered
construction at the district court, explaining that:
“While the two
formulations employ somewhat different language, they embody the same
concept—that the probe network must contain two conductive elements
that are separate or independent from the voltage—carrying portions of the
hairdryer. We find no change in position on [defendant’s] part, and thus no
waiver.”1397 This holding appears to be a caveat to the court’s prior
instruction that a party is not prevented from “clarifying” the original scope
of its claim construction, suggesting that a proffered construction on appeal
does not have to mimic en hac verba the construction urged at the district
court.
8.

Various tools of claim construction
a.

Use of related prosecution histories

In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,1398 the Federal Circuit addressed
propriety of using the prosecution history of second patent for construing
claims of a first patent in circumstances when such claims were rejected on
double patenting grounds over the second patent.1399 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that such reliance is entirely appropriate because the prosecution
history and content of the second patent “constitute[] part of the
prosecution history of the . . . application [for the first patent].”1400
Analogizing to an earlier decision providing that “prior art cited in a patent
or cited in the prosecution history of the patent constitutes prior art,”1401 the
Federal Circuit reasoned that statements made to overcome a double
patenting rejection by distinguishing one from another application are part
of the intrinsic evidence of the first patent.1402
The Federal Circuit also addressed whether a district court correctly
relied on added matter in a second application which was a continuation-inpart of a first application when construing claims that issued from the first

1395. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
1396. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1397. Id. at 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
1398. 373 F.3d 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1399. Id. at 1166-67, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
1400. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1401. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62 (quoting Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351
F.3d 1364, 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
1402. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
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application.1403 The Federal Circuit explained that such reliance is
incorrect because the “the relevant passages from the [second
application] . . . were added during the continuation-in-part . . . . These
passages are therefore new matter added to the content of the [second
application] subsequent to when it was distinguished from the [first
application].”1404 Thus, “[w]hile the content of the [second application] at
the time it was distinguished from the [first application] constitutes part of
the prosecution history of the [first application], subsequently added
material is not similarly incorporated.”1405
The Federal Circuit elucidated its reasoning by explaining that
[i]n the absence of an incorporation into the intrinsic evidence, this
court’s precedent takes a narrow view on when a related patent or its
prosecution history is available to construe the claims of a patent at issue
and draws a distinct line between patents that have a familial relationship
and those that do not.1406

While noting that its earlier holding in Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech
Systems, Inc.1407 permitted “reliance on statements made subsequent to the
issuance of a patent when construing its claims where the statements were
made in connection with continued prosecution of sibling applications,”1408
the Federal Circuit determined that decision to be inapposite because:
The [first application] and [second application] were filed separately and
therefore lack the formal relationship necessary for free license to use the
contents of the [second patent] and prosecution history when construing
the claims of [the first patent] . . . . While the [second application] was
distinguished from the scope of the [first] application’s claims, the
relevant passages from the [second patent] relied on by the district court
are new matter added by the . . . continuation-in-part application.
Consequently, the passages are not part of the intrinsic evidence of the
[second patent]. Absent a formal relationship or incorporation during
prosecution, the new-matter content of the [second patent] is not
available to construe the claims of the [first patent].1409

b.

Use of prior art cited in prosecution histories

In 2004, the Federal Circuit also placed an increased weight on prior art
cited during prosecution in construing disputed claim terms. The Federal
1403. Id. at 1166-67, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1404. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1405. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1406. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1407. 357 F.3d 1340, 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
supra notes 1030-1053 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the
Microsoft Corp. case) .
1408. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
1409. Id. at 1167-68, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1262.
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Circuit had previously held that “[w]hen prior art that sheds light on the
meaning of a term is cited by the patentee it can have particular value as a
guide to proper construction of the term, because it may indicate not only
the meaning of the claim terms to persons of ordinary skill in the art, but
also that the patentee intended to adopt that meaning.”1410
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the
prosecution history and content of a patent which was cited as the basis for
a double patenting rejection was properly considered in construing the
disputed claims of a different patent because such subject matter “formed
the basis of the examiner’s rejection of the [disputed claims] on doublepatenting grounds.”1411
Similarly, in Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc.,1412 the Federal
Circuit referenced cited prior art to determine that, at the time of the
invention, persons of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the
claimed phrase “upon detection of a suitably stable endpoint” to be broader
than use of a predetermined timing method.1413 Analyzing two patents
cited during prosecution, the Federal Circuit observed that the prior art
“discloses both an endpoint-seeking methodology and a predeterminedtiming methodology,”1414 and therefore concluded that persons of ordinary
skill in the art would have understood the phrase to encompass any method
for calculating glucose concentration “without an error of clinical
significance.”
c.

Expert testimony

In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed a district
court’s decision to permit expert testimony during a summary judgment
hearing at which claim construction issues were also argued.1415 Citing its
past decisions, the Federal Circuit noted that “[a]lthough expert testimony
and declarations are useful to confirm that the construed meaning is
1410. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1045, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]rior art cited in a patent or cited in the
prosecution history of a patent constitutes intrinsic evidence.”).
1411. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. The court’s analysis
analogized to the decision in Kumar, 351 F.3d at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224.
1412. 381 F.3d 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1413. Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1280-81.
1414. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1280-81.
1415. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1166, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. Judge Probst wrote a
dissenting opinion, reasoning that nothing in the intrinsic evidence proscribed the
“intracellular marker substance” from including portions of an antigen located inside a cell.
Id. at 1170, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264 (Probst, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent
opined that “the prosecution history can hardly be characterized as definitional of the term
‘marker substance,’ and cannot be used, in my view, as a basis to conclude that ‘marker
substance’ corresponds to an antigen, and not portions thereof.” Id. at 1171, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1264-65 (Probst, J., dissenting).
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consistent with the denotation ascribed by those in the field of the art, such
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the plain language of the patent
document.”1416 The Federal Circuit then explained that the district court’s
construction of the disputed terms “was consistent with that required by the
intrinsic evidence, and the district court’s use of the expert testimony
therefore falls within the permissible first clause of the above-quoted
language.”1417 The Federal Circuit further clarified that “there is no
prohibition on a district court’s ability to hear expert testimony.”1418
B. Literal Infringement
In AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,1419 plaintiff for infringement
of its patent claiming a glass window bearing a reflective coating to reduce
transfer of heat through the glass.1420 The only existing patent claim
required a “5-layered transparent coating” composed of alternating “layers”
of zinc oxide and silver. In a previous appeal by patentee,1421 the Federal
Circuit had construed the term “layer” to mean “a thickness of a material of
substantially uniform chemical composition, but excluding interlayers
having a thickness not to substantially affect the optical properties of the
coating.”1422 The Federal Circuit then remanded the case back to the
district court for a determination of whether defendant’s accused lowemissivity glass product infringed the claim under the Federal Circuit’s
construction. Defendant’s accused product was produced by moving a
piece of glass through sequential “coating zones” in which the thickness of
certain materials such as zinc oxide and silver were deposited by
“magnetron sputter deposition” on the glass. To increase the thickness of
certain coatings on the glass, the material was deposited twice or more on
the glass in consecutive depositions. As a result of this process,
defendant’s accused product had a central zinc coating which had been
formed by three separate “depositions.” The district court held that this
central zinc oxide coating was comprised of three separate “layers” as that
term was defined by the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, certain of
defendant’s products had titanium dioxide between its layers of zinc oxide
and silver. For these reasons, the district court held that the product did not
display the five-layer structure claimed by the patent.
1416. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (quoting Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek
Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
1417. Id. at 1166, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261.
1418. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261.
1419. 375 F.3d 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1420. Id. at 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
1421. See id. at 1370, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (noting that this litigation was
originally filed in 1996 and had already been appealed to and remanded by the Federal
Circuit twice before this decision was rendered).
1422. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had improperly
relied on the method of manufacture of the defendant’s product in
determining whether that product infringed the “pure product claim.”1423
Under its construction of the term “layer,” the Federal Circuit found that
defendant’s successive depositions of zinc oxide might form one “layer” as
required by the patent so long as the successive depositions did not have an
“optical effect different than that of a single deposition of the same
thickness.”1424 Thus, “multiple depositions [were] only relevant if they
affect the structure and optical properties.”1425
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and reviewed the record to determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact remained as to infringement. Based on a defendant’s internal
document describing its products as containing five layers, and results of
secondary ion mass spectroscopy studies of defendant’s products which
showed no interface between successive depositions of zinc oxide, the
Federal Circuit held that such a genuine issue of material fact did exist and
remanded the case back to the district court.1426
In International Rectifier, plaintiff argued that because the parties
stipulated to a simulated shape of an accused device, the issue of
infringement was a matter of law that hinged on claim construction.1427
The Federal Circuit explained in General Mills Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson,
Inc.1428 that the “question of literal infringement collapses into claim
construction and is amenable to summary judgment” was limited to cases
in which the parties and the district court agreed how competing claims
constructions would apply to the undisputed structure of the accused
device.1429 The Federal Circuit held that such reasoning does not apply
when “the structure of [accused] product has been stipulated to, not the
factual determination of whether that product meets one or another claim
construction.”1430 The Federal Circuit vacated summary judgment because
“factual issues exist as to whether the [accused] devices” included the

1423. Id. at 1373, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1424. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1425. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1426. The court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the alternative
ground that at least some of Cardinal’s accused products contained a layer of titanium
dioxide in between alternating layers of silver and zinc oxide. Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1684-85. It instructed the trial court to examine separately and distinctly each
category of Cardinal’s accused products and to determine whether the titanium oxide would
affect the optical properties of the coating. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1427. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1209, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1428. 103 F.3d 978, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1429. Id. at 983, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
1430. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
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disputed claim limitations.1431
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1432 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction and remanded for
new trial on infringement explaining that: “It is well established that when
an incorrect jury instruction—such as an incorrect claim construction—
removes from the jury a basis on which the jury could reasonably have
reached a different verdict, the verdict should not stand.”1433
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co.,1434 the Federal Circuit
reversed a finding of infringement following a bench trial because the
district court “did not provide any findings of fact or analysis to support its
conclusion.”1435 The Federal Circuit noted that the district court’s opinion
lacked any “expla[nation] how the limitations of the claim, as construed,
compare to the allegedly infringing device.”1436 Explaining that while
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) “‘does not require detailed findings
on every factual issue raised,’ the district court opinion ‘must include as
many of the subsidiary facts as are necessary to disclose . . . the steps by
which the trial court determined factual issues and reached its ultimate
conclusions.”1437 The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the judgment
below “[b]ecause the district court’s sparse opinion provides this court with
only bald conclusions for review, we conclude that the district court’s
judgment as to [issues of infringement] . . . is insufficient under Rule
52(a).”1438
In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.,1439 the
Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement
when the record contained “expert reports and other evidence [that] were
both highly technical and confusing.”1440 Citing its prior case law
regarding disposition of technical issues on summary judgment, the court
instructed that “[i]t is not our task, nor is it the task of the district court, to
attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a
[claim] has been made out, particularly at the summary judgment

1431. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
1432. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1433. Id. at 1383, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
1434. 365 F.3d 1054, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1435. Id. at 1060, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
1436. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
1437. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 (quoting Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1478-79, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1343, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1438. Id. at 1061, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. Dissenting from the majority opinion’s
holding on this issue, Judge Newman explained that the defendant “did not challenge the
specificity of the district court’s infringement analysis, and did not appeal this aspect.” Id.
at 1063, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1439. 362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1440. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
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stage.”1441
In Centricut, L.L.C. v. Esab Group, Inc.,1442 the central issue was
whether a patentee’s failure to proffer any expert testimony on
infringement resulted in an absence of proof.1443 On appeal, the alleged
infringer argued that the patentee failed to carry its burden of proof on the
infringement because it did not show how the accused devices satisfied the
claimed “work-function limitation.”1444 The Federal Circuit first explained
that only expert testimony in the record was from the alleged infringer’s
expert who testified that the patentee’s various evidence of infringement
was not reliable and not an accurate representation of the accused
product.1445 The Federal Circuit then noted that each of the patentee’s
theories of infringement “suffer[ed] from the same deficiency: none is
supported by expert testimony.”1446 In so doing, the Federal Circuit
explained that “[i]n many patent cases expert testimony will not be
necessary because the technology will ‘easily understandable without the
need for expert explanatory testimony,’” however, the Federal Circuit
concluded that “there is no claim that this is such case. Indeed, in this case
the technology was complex.”1447 The Federal Circuit further elaborated
that:
We do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is required to prove
infringement when the art is complex. Suffice it to say that in a case
involving complex technology, where the accused infringer offers expert
testimony negating infringement, the patentee cannot satisfy its burden
of proof by relying only on testimony from those who are admittedly not
expert in the field. That is what happened here, and the patentee thus
failed to satisfy its burden of proof. This case stands as an apt example
of what may befall a patent law plaintiff who presents complex subject
matter without inputs from experts qualified on the relevant points in
issue when the accused infringer has negated infringement with its own
expert.1448

C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
1.

Festo
In Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,1449

1441. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (quoting Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., 308
F.3d 1304, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1442. 390 F.3d 1361, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1443. Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
1444. Id. at 1367, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1445. Id. at 1367-68, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1446. Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1447. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1448. Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
1449. 370 F.3d 1131, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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plaintiff for infringement of its patents directed to an aircraft auxiliary
power unit (“APU”).1450 Each of the asserted patent claims required the
APU to include “inlet guide vanes” and required the operation of a “surge
bleed valve,” a valve that vents excess air in a main air duct within the
APU’s air compressor, to be a function of the position of the inlet guide
vanes.1451 Defendant’s accused device contained inlet guide vanes, but
operation of its surge bleed valve was a function of temperature, rather than
the position of the inlet guide vanes. However, the accused device had a
feature in which operation of its surge bleed valve would be blocked during
extreme conditions, and this blocking mechanism was a function of the
position of the guide vanes.
As part of its post-verdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement and
on appeal, defendant argued that its APU device could not be held to have
infringed the patents under the doctrine of equivalents because the asserted
claims were narrowed by amendment and that prosecution history estoppel
barred all equivalents for the inlet guide vane limitation under Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1452 During prosecution, the
claims at issue were originally dependent on other claims that did not
contain the inlet guide vane limitation. The original independent claims
were rejected as obvious over the prior art, and the claims asserted against
defendant were amended to expressly incorporate the limitations of the
rejected claims.1453 The district court held that because the claims were
“merely rewritten into independent form, the elements at issue were not
amended and patentee did not give up an embodiment of the invention with
the inlet guide vane” limitation.1454 In contrast, the Federal Circuit held
that an amendment that rewrites a dependent claim into independent form
and surrenders the original independent claims constitutes a narrowing
amendment that may give rise to an estoppel if it is made to secure the
patent.1455 It rejected the patentee’s argument that “although it surrendered
its broader independent claims, there is no presumption of surrender
because the scope of the rewritten claims themselves has not been
narrowed.”1456 The Supreme Court, it explained, had already considered
this argument in Festo and had stated that “rewriting a dependent claim in
independent form creates a presumptive surrender if the amendment is
‘made to secure the patent.’”1457 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit had
1450.
1451.
1452.
1453.
1454.
1455.
1456.
1457.

Id. at 1133-34, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
Id. at 1134-35, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67.
Id. at 1138-39, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id. at 1137, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1141, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071-72.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
Id. at 1142, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
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consistently applied this rule in its post-Festo decisions. Having found that
the patentee had presumptively surrendered all equivalents of the inlet
guide vane limitation, the Federal Circuit remanded the decision of whether
Honeywell had rebutted this presumption to the district court.1458
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,1459 the
Federal Circuit found that under the correct construction, the “lipophilic
phase” could include one or more “surfactants,” so long as the lipophilic
component also contains at least one non-surfactant lipophilic excipient,
which was capable of dissolving cyclosporine.1460 Defendant’s accused
product contained a component called “Span 80” which was both a
lipophilic excipient and a surfactant.1461 Because the accused product
contained no non-surfactant components that would meet the requirements
of a “lipophilic phase,” the court held that the product did not literally
infringe the asserted claim. 1462
Novartis argued that Defendant’s product infringed the claim under the
doctrine of equivalents because, as its experts testified, Span 80 “ ‘does not
exhibit the amphiphilic function of a surfactant’ nor does it ‘function as a
surfactant . . . but, rather, . . . it functions as the lipophilic component.’”1463
The Federal circuit, however, found that the specification expressly
acknowledged that Span 80 was a surfactant, and therefore, Novartis was
precluded from arguing that Span 80 was an equivalent to a non-surfactant
required by the claim as construed.1464
The Federal Circuit distinguished the case at hand from that of the
Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co.,1465 and its own case Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteonics
Corp.1466 In Graver Tank and Wright Medical, the Federal Circuit
explained, “the fact that certain claimed limitations in the element at issue
were missing in the accused product did not change the fact that the
element, albeit different from that expressly claimed, was indeed present in
the accused product.”1467 In contrast, the Federal Circuit found that the
“lipophilic component” element could not be met under the doctrine of
equivalents by Span 80, a surfactant, because inclusion of a chemical

Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707 (2002)
(internal quotations omitted)).
1458. Id. at 1146, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1459. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1460. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1461. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1462. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1463. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1464. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1465. 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950).
1466. 122 F.3d 1440, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1467. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 375 F.3d at 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
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composition made entirely of surfactants would be inconsistent with the
construction of “lipophilic component.”1468
In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1469 plaintiff
sued for infringement of its patent on a process for repairing underground
sewer pipes.1470 The claimed method involved installing a liner into a pipe
by applying “vacuum cups” to windows cut into the liner in order to draw a
resin through the liner.1471 Originally, the asserted claim as filed contained
no limit to the number of vacuum cups used in the method.1472 During
prosecution of the patent, however, the applicants amended the claim to
specify that the method used a single cup.1473 The defendants’ accused
method at issue used multiple vacuum cups.1474
Following a lengthy procedural history,1475 the Federal Circuit
considered whether the plaintiffs were barred by prosecution history
estoppel from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents after
Festo II and Festo III.1476 Plaintiff argued that the reason for its
amendment of the claim to require a single vacuum cup had only a
tangential relationship to the accused equivalent, and that therefore, the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel was rebutted.1477 The Federal
Circuit agreed.1478 It found that plaintiff made clear the applicants had
made the amendment at issue in order to overcome a § 103 rejection to
show that its process did not have the disadvantage of the prior art of

1468. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
1469. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1470. Id. at 1362, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1471. Id. at 1362-63, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872-73.
1472. Id. at 1366, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1473. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1474. Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
1475. See id. at 1363-67, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-76 (involving an initial grant of
judgment not withstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, a subsequent retrial to the bench and finding of patent
infringement and an initial appeal by defendants and cross-appeal by plaintiffs to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). The Court of Appeals affirmed the JNOV order but
vacated and remanded the decision on other grounds. The District Court again found for the
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. An initial petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court was denied. After two remands, the District Court entered final liability judgment and
another appeal ensued. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then reversed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The District Court entered final judgment for plaintiffs and
defendants again appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit again reversed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was
granted, and judgment was vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The Federal Circuit initially reinstated the appeal, vacated, and remanded.
However, following a petition for rehearing and response, the Federal Circuit decided the
case on the merits.
1476. Id. at 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1477. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1876-77.
1478. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1876-77.
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having a large compressor at the end of the liner.1479 The Federal Circuit
held that there was “no indication anywhere in the prosecution history of
any relationship between the narrowing amendment and a multiple cup
process.”1480 Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
successfully rebutted the presumption that they were estopped from seeking
to extend their claims to the accused process under the doctrine of
equivalents.1481
2.

Dedication-disclosure rule
In Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service Co.,1482 the Federal Circuit
formally pronounced the disclosure-dedication rule, holding that
when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . .
this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter
deliberately left unclaimed would “conflict with the primacy of the
claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.”1483

In 2004, the Federal Circuit addressed the disclosure dedication rule for
the first time since its decision in en banc decision in Johnson & Johnston.
PSC Computers Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International, Inc.1484
presented the Federal Circuit’s first opportunity to elaborate on the
dedication-disclosure rule1485 PSC Computers involved a claim directed to
a “resilient metal strap” for securing a heat sink clip to a microchip.1486
The asserted patent also provided that “‘the elongated strap . . . is made of
a resilient metal such as stainless steel although other resilient materials
may be suitable for the strap,’” and that “‘other prior art devices use
molded plastic and/or metal parts that must be cast or forged.’”1487 The
parties both sold competing heat sink clips, with plaintiff’s clip made of
metal and defendant’s clip made of plastic.1488 At the district court,
plaintiff conceded no literal infringement, and the court then granted
summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
reasoning that the dedication-disclosure rule precluded claims from

1479. Id. at 1370, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1480. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1481. Id. at 1370-71, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1482. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
1483. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). This
articulation of the rule follows the court’s decision in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d
1098, 1106-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008-10 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1484. 355 F.3d 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1485. Id. at 1355-56, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
1486. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1487. Id. at 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
1488. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
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extending to plastic clips.1489
On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified the two questions presented for
review: “(1) How specific must a disclosure in a written description be to
dedicate matter to the public? and (2) Was the [patent’s] written description
sufficiently specific to dedicate plastic parts to the public?”1490 Addressing
the first question, the Federal Circuit first observed that similar to claim
language that is interpreted from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in
the art, “[i]t thus follows as a matter of logic that, in the absence of a
compelling reason to do otherwise, the written description must also be
interpreted according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the
art.”1491 The Federal Circuit then answered the first question by explaining
that “that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed
disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative
matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public.”1492 The Federal Circuit
further noted that “any generic reference in a written specification” does
not necessarily result in dedication to the public, rather “[t]he disclosure
must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could
identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.”1493 In
enunciating this rule for evaluating the dedication-disclosure rule, the
Federal Circuit adopted a standard closely resembling the test for
compliance with the written description requirement:
We thus hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the
unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the
alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public. This
“disclosure-dedication” rule does not mean that any generic reference in
a written specification necessarily dedicates all members of that
particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be of such specificity
that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that
had been disclosed and not claimed.1494

Addressing the second question, the Federal Circuit stated that “generic
disclosure[s]” would not suffice to trigger the dedication-disclosure rule,
and held that the patent’s reference that “‘other resilient materials may be
suitable for the strap’” was not enough to effect a dedication of all resilient
materials other than metal.1495 The Federal Circuit, however, explained that
the specific disclosure that “‘[o]ther prior art devices use molded plastic
and/or metal parts that must be case or forged’” worked a dedication of the
1489.
1490.
1491.
1492.
1493.
1494.
1495.

Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461-62.
Id. at 1358, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
Id. at 1359, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id. at 1360, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (citation omitted).
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alternative use of plastic parts to the public.1496 The Federal Circuit noted
that one skilled in the art having read this disclosure
could reasonably conclude from this language . . . that plastic clip parts
could be substituted for metal clip parts. [Plaintiff] was thus obliged to
either claim plastic parts in addition to metal parts . . . or to not claim
them and dedicate the use of plastic parts to the public.1497

The court thus affirmed summary judgment, holding that the use of
plastic clips was dedicated to the public.1498
The Federal Circuit again addressed the scope and application of the
disclosure-dedication rule in Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,
Inc.1499 Toro involved a patent in which the specification disclosed both a
replaceable ring cover and a unitary cover for a vacuum blower, but the
claims were directed only to a permanently affixed cover (i.e., a unitary
cover).1500 Plaintiff appealed the district court’s holding that the disclosurededication rule precluded infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.1501
The Federal Circuit initially noted that its precedent did not “explicitly
articulate[] a standard for reviewing the application of the disclosurededication rule.”1502 Explaining that the disclosure-dedication rule, like the
prosecution history estoppel, limits the permissible scope under the
doctrine of equivalents, the court reasoned that both rules should be
analyzed under the same standard.1503 Given the prosecution history
estoppel presents a question of law, the court held that “the disclosurededication rule . . . presents a question of law, subject to de novo
review.”1504
To avoid application of the disclosure-dedication rule, plaintiff first
argued that “failure to claim . . . a cover with a replaceable ring, was
wholly unintentional and that the disclosure-dedication rule should not
apply as a matter of law.”1505 The court rejected that argument, explaining
that “intent is not part of the Johnson & Johnston disclosure-dedication
1496. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (citation omitted).
1497. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
1498. Id. at 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
1499. 383 F.3d 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1500. Id. at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1501. Id. at 1331-32, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1502. Id. at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1503. Id. at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1504. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. The opinion’s holding that application of the
disclosure-dedication rule presents a question of law is internally inconsistent with the
opinion’s subsequent reasoning that “[i]n the present case, the district court found no
genuine issue of material fact in concluding that the disclosure of a replaceable ring would
have been apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1455. If the disclosure-dedication rule is a question of law, it is unclear why affordance of a
district court opinion would be based on the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
1505. Id. at 1332, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
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analysis. The language of Johnson & Johnston is clear: ‘The patentee’s
subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether unclaimed subject
matter has been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public.’”1506
The plaintiff also argued that “the level of disclosure of a replaceable
ring in the . . . patent [was] insufficient, as a matter of law, to trigger the
disclosure-dedication rule.”1507 In doing so, plaintiff contended that the
degree of disclosure necessary to trigger the rule must satisfy the written
description standard under § 112, ¶ 1.1508 The Federal Circuit also rejected
this argument, reasoning that “the disclosure-dedication rule does not
impose a § 112 requirement on the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.
The standards articulated in § 112 are directed to the claimed invention, not
to disclosures in the written description that may implicate the disclosurededication rule.”1509 While acknowledging the court’s earlier decision in
PSC Computer Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International1510 holding that
subject matter is dedicated to the public “‘if one of ordinary skill in the art
can understand the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written
description,’”1511 the court explained that “disclosures implicating the
disclosure-dedication rule need not directly relate to the description of the
claimed invention or be contained in the ‘Detailed Description of the
Invention’ section of the patent, but may appear merely in the portion of
the patent describing the ‘Background of the Invention.’”1512
Plaintiff further argued that the Federal Circuit’s decision in an earlier
appeal held that the disputed patent did not describe any structure other
than an attached ring, which precluded application of the disclosurededication rule to removable rings.1513 The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument too, explaining that its earlier decision “did not analyze the
written description of the . . . patent for disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter . . . . Rather, in that decision, this court construed a claim term and
in that context concluded that the specification did not support [Plaintiff’s]
proposed claim construction.”1514 The Federal Circuit further opined that
“[m]aterial that is explicitly disclaimed in the specification—like the
disclaimer of a removable ring in this case—is disclosed for purposes of

1506. Id. at 1333, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (quoting Johnson & Johnston v. R.E.
Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 n.1, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1507. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1508. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1509. Id. at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1510. 355 F.3d 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1511. Toro Co., 383 F.3d at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting PSC Computer
Prods., Inc., 355 F.3d at 1360, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465).
1512. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citations omitted).
1513. Id. at 1336, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
1514. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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the disclosure-dedication rule, but it cannot be encompassed within the
scope of the claims.”1515
3.

Prosecution history estoppel
In two parallel cases decided on the same day by the Federal Circuit,
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Laboratories, Inc.,1516 and SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1517 Glaxo Wellcome sued
pharmaceutical companies for infringement of its patent when they filed
Abbreviated New Drug Applications with the FDA proposing generic
substitutes for the drugs covered by the patent.1518 The patented technology
was a sustained release form of the anti-depression and anti-smoking drug,
buproprion hydrochloride.
The claims were drawn to buproprion
hydrochloride compounded with hydroxypropyl methylcellulose
(“HPMC”), the latter ingredient being key for achieving sustained release.
In their motions for summary judgment, the accused infringers argued that
their generic compounds did not contain HPMC, but rather contained
different agents that achieved sustained release, hydroxypropyl cellulose
(“HPC”) and poly-vinyl alcohol (“PVC”). Moreover, they contended that
Glaxo could not attempt to extend its patent to reach their formulations
under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel because Glaxo limited its
claims to require HPMC in response to a rejection by an examiner during
prosecution. In response, Glaxo explained that it had amended its claims to
recite HPMC “to distinguish the sustained release agent in its invention
from other disclosed excipients in the application.”1519
Both district courts and the Federal Circuit agreed with the defendants.
The following factors weighed in the Federal Circuit’s decision. First, the
patent examiner required Glaxo during prosecution to restrict its claims to
include HPMC, because recitation of HPMC was “critical” to distinguish
the claims from the prior art, namely the instant release formulations of
buproprion hydrochloride that were known.1520 The examiner also required
recitation of HPMC in order to satisfy the enablement requirement, because
the application recited only HPMC as a sustained release agent, the
application did not enable one with ordinary skill in the art to make other
sustained release formulations.1521 Under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,1522 restriction of the claims to formulations that
1515. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
1516. 356 F.3d 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1517. 356 F.3d 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1712 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1518. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707; SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1359, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1519. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1520. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citation omitted).
1521. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1522. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
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required HPMC created a presumption that Glaxo gave up its claim to
equivalents of HPMC. Glaxo failed to rebut this presumption and thus
could not support its infringement claims against the defendants, whose
accused formulation did not include HMPC.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Glaxo’s argument that it did not
“narrow” its claims when it added HPMC, as required in order for the
Festo presumption to arise, because at the same time it added HPMC
limitation to its claims, it deleted another limitation, one requiring a
specific shelf life of the compound. The court rejected this argument
because the HPMC limitation was not an entirely new limitation that
replaced the shelf life limitation.1523 Rather, the preamble of the claims as
originally filed already recited the phrase “sustained release tablet,” and the
preamble limited the claims under Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc.,1524 because it recited the “‘essential structure or
steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the
claim.’”1525
Second, contrary to Glaxo’s contentions, the Federal Circuit found that
the examiner had not required Glaxo to recite HPMC in its claims in order
to distinguish the claims from other disclosed excipients. Rather, the
examiner found that the disclosed sustained release agent, HPMC,
distinguished the invention that was the subject of Glaxo’s application from
the prior art, and therefore found recitation of the sustained release agent to
be critical to the patentability of the invention.1526
Glaxo also failed to rebut the presumption that it threw away its right to
claim other sustained release compounds. It attempted to dispel the Festo
presumption by claiming that HPC was an unforeseeable equivalent.
Under Festo, the presumption can be rebutted if the patentee shows that the
alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment of the
claims that gave rise to the presumption. Glaxo argued that if it were to
have limited its claims to HPMC, PVC, and/or HPC formulations, the
claims would have been rejected for including new matter, as HPC was not
disclosed in the application. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo,
Glaxo urged that the patentee’s ability to claim an alleged equivalent was a
“hallmark of the unforeseeability excuse.”1527 The Federal Circuit rejected
and criticized this interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision. It opined
that new matter prohibitions are not directly germane to the issue of
1523. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1524. 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1525. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708-09 (internal
quotation omitted).
1526. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1527. Id. at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705).
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and pointed out the fact that
what it termed “the quintessential example of an enforceable equivalent,
after-arising technology” would always be new matter.1528 Furthermore,
Glaxo took the Supreme Court’s words out of context: the Federal Circuit
found no sympathy in Festo for patentees who fail to claim readily known
equivalents at the time of application. Instead, the question was whether
Glaxo could have foreseen sustained release agents for buproprion
hydrochloride other than HPMC at the time of filing or amendment.1529 In
the case of HPC, included by Impax in its formulation, there existed ample
evidence that HPC was used as a release agent at the time the claims were
amended. In contrast, there was not enough evidence of record to decide in
the SmithKline case whether PVA was a foreseeable and claimable
sustained release compound for buproprion hydrochloride.1530 Thus, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in Glaxo,1531 and
remanded the decision in SmithKline.1532
Gaus v. Conair Corp.1533 presented an appeal from a jury verdict of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents involving an accused device
that used a single component to perform the function of two claim
elements.1534 Plaintiff argued that the jury verdict was correct in light of
the court’s precedent that equivalency can be established even when
“‘separate claim limitations are combined into a single component of the
accused device.’”1535 The Federal Circuit, however, noted that its
precedent makes clear that “‘[a] particular structure can be deemed outside
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents because that structure is clearly
excluded from the claims whether the exclusion is express or implied.’”1536
1528. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1529. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
1530. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
1531. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1532. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. An
additional argument raised by Glaxo in Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., but not in SmithKline
Beecham Corp., centered on claim one of the asserted patent which recited HPMC as a
limitation as originally filed. Glaxo argued that because HPMC was not added as limitation
to Claim one in response to an office action, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
would not apply to the enforcement of Claim one; therefore, Glaxo could reach equivalents
to HPMC through that claim. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. It explained that the
Festo bar to invocation of the doctrine of equivalents applies to all claims containing the
same limitation to ensure consistent interpretation of the same claim terms in the same
patent, and there was no reason to diverge from the line in this case. It reasoned that Claim
one recitation was not added in response to an examiner’s rejection because it already
existed at the time of filing. There was nothing to say that the examiner considered
recitation of HPMC to be less critical to claim one’s patentability than other claims.
1533. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1534. Id. at 1291, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
1535. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos.,
16 F.3d 394, 399, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
1536. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
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Noting that the patent “criticized prior art in which the protective device
relied on the fluid coming in contact with the voltage-carrying portions of
the system,”1537 the Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee “disavowed
coverage of devices in which the two components are separate . . . the
patentee cannot reclaim that surrendered coverage by invoking the doctrine
of equivalents.”1538
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1539 the plaintiff
appealed a grant of the JMOL of no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, arguing that the district court incorrectly required “evidence as
to the level of ordinary skill in the art as part of [the] proof of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.”1540 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
judgment below, noting that the “‘vantage point of one of ordinary skill in
the relevant art provides the perspective for assessing the substantiality of
the differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device.”1541
The Federal Circuit further elaborated that “the requirement that
equivalence be evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in
the art applies whether equivalence is misused by the ‘function-way-result’
test or by the ‘insubstantial difference’ test.”1542
D. Indirect Infringement
In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1543 the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that the standard for determining whether a party has
the requisite intent in order to qualify as an inducer of infringement under §
271 was ambiguous.1544 Specifically, it stated that “there is a lack of clarity
concerning whether the required intent must be merely to induce the
specific acts or additionally to cause an infringement.”1545 It cited Manville
Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.1546 for the proposition that “‘[t]he
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions
induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions
would induce actual infringements’”1547 and Hewlett-Packard Co. v.

2001)).
1537. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
1538. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1539. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1540. Id. at 1357, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347.
1541. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1542. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at
1518-19, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1645-46).
1543. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1544. Id. at 1377-78, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884.
1545. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884.
1546. 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1547. Insituform Techs., Inc., 385 F.3d at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884.
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Bausch & Lomb, Inc.1548 for the proposition that “‘[p]roof of actual intent
to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary
prerequisite to finding active inducement.’”1549 The Federal Circuit
refrained from settling the law on this issue, however, because it found that
the lower court’s holding that defendants were liable for inducing
infringement should be upheld under either standard.
Defendants Firstliner and CAT were in the business of rehabilitating and
restructuring pipes. Firstliner oversaw the marketing of its “trenchless”
procedure for pipe rehabilitation to potential licensees, and sold pipe liners
and related materials to CAT and its licensees.1550 The district court held
defendants CAT and Firstliner liable for induced infringement of
Insituform’s patented process of fixing underground pipes by installing a
liner into the pipe. The district court based its decision on the fact that
CAT and Firstliner’s licensee, in responding to a questionnaire, indicated
that it used the infringing process and that Firstliner representatives
provided directives to teach the licensee how to implement the process.1551
Reviewing the decision of the district court under the clearly erroneous
standard, the Federal Circuit held that there was evidence in the record to
support the district court’s finding of induced infringement, and it was “not
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” 1552
Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.1553 presented a matter of first
impression for the Federal Circuit.1554 Plaintiff appealed the district court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of Analog with respect to
Pelligrini’s claims of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).1555
Plaintiff held a patent directed to “brushless motor drive circuits,” and
defendant, headquartered in the United States, designed circuit chips that
either alone or in combination with other components, ostensibly fell
within the scope of the patent claims. All of defendant’s circuit chips,
however, were manufactured outside of the United States, and most of
1548. 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1549. Insituform Techs., Inc., 385 F.3d at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884.
1550. Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
1551. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
1552. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
1553. 375 F.3d 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1554. Id. at 1115-16, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632.
1555. Id. at 1116, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) reads:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, such a manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United Shall
be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000).
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them were sold and shipped to customers outside of the United States.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s chips which were manufactured and sold
abroad were “supplie[d] or cause[d] to be supplied in or from the United
States” in violation of § 271 because they were designed in the United
States and produced and sold according to instructions emanating from the
United States.1556
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. It found
that § 271 (f)(1) “is clear on its face,” applying “only where components of
a patented invention are physically present in the United States.”1557 It
found further support for its decision in its previous cases stating that the
“tort” of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is committed,
and not where the injury lies. Thus, it held that the “‘suppl[ying] or
caus[ing] to be supplied’ in § 271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of
components, not simply to the supply of instructions or corporate
oversight.”1558
Plaintiff argued that the court’s location requirement would result in a
“‘seemingly contradictory construction of §271(f)(1)’”1559 in that the
combination of components outside the United States cannot occur if the
components are inside the United States.1560 Plaintiff additionally argued
that boilerplate language in defendant’s commercial invoices, admittedly
included to demonstrate compliance with U.S. export laws, proved that
defendant in fact did supply components from the United States, or at least
prevented Analog from denying that fact to escape liability under U.S.
patent laws.
The Federal Circuit rejected both of these arguments. First, it held that
its construction of § 271(f)(1) would result in no inconsistency because it
was obvious that § 271(f) contemplates an intervening sale or exportation
between the time the components exist in their uncombined state within the
United States and the time the components are combined outside of the
United States. Second, the Federal Circuit determined that compliance
with the export laws was not an issue before the court, and the fact that
defendant notes on its invoices that its commodities were exported from the
United States simply “does not stand up against the uncontested fact that no
[accused] chips were exported from the United States.”1561
In Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp.1562 the Federal Circuit
addressed circumstances under which a party could be held liable for
1556.
1557.
1558.
1559.
1560.
1561.
1562.

Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1115, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.
Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
Id. at 1118, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633 (citation omitted).
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
Id. at 1118, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
363 F.3d 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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indirect infringement.1563 The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n order to
prove vicarious liability for indirect infringement, a plaintiff who
demonstrates direct infringement must also establish that the defendant
possessed the requisite knowledge or intent to be held liable.”1564 The
Federal Circuit further noted “[a] defendant’s liability for indirect
infringement must relate to the identified instances of direct infringement.
Plaintiffs who identify individual acts of direct infringement must restrict
their theories of vicarious liability—and tie their claims for damages or
injunctive relief—to the identified act.”1565
In Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1566 plaintiff
appealed a grant of summary judgment holding that defendant was not
liable for contributory infringement of claims directed to controlling a
switching voltage regulator.1567 While noting that “the evidentiary showing
in this case may be sparse and not altogether clear,” the court vacated the
grant of summary judgment reasoning that a genuine issue of fact existed
as to whether defendant was liable for contributory infringement.1568 In
particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the record contains evidence that
defendant’s products used by third parties “may have circuitry that prevents
reversal of inductor current,” and evidence that defendant’s customers may
“directly infringe by using [defendant’s] parts to prevent current
reversal.”1569
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America,1570 the
Federal Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict that defendant indirectly infringed

1563. Id. at 1272, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1564. Id. at 1273-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Dynacore and its citation to Hewlett-Packard continues a schism in the court’s
jurisprudence on whether induced infringement requires “proof of actual intent to cause the
acts which constitute the infringement,” Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529, or a “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce
infringement,” Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo
Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging without resolving the “lack of clarity” in this issue).
1565. Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1274, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. The court affirmed
summary judgment of non-infringement, explaining that
[i]t is well settled that an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of
infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and that a party
may not avoid that rule simply by framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion
that a particular critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.
Id. at 1278, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
1566. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1567. Id. at 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1568. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1569. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1570. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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plaintiff’s patented method of detecting vitamin deficiencies.1571 The
claimed method comprised the steps of (1) assaying a body fluid for an
elevated level of total homocysteine and (2) correlating an elevated level of
total homocysteine with a deficiency of certain vitamins. In its primary
non-infringement argument, defendant asserted that the doctors to which it
provided the accused assay were not shown to have performed the second
correlating step. The Federal Circuit disagreed. It found “substantial
evidence” supporting the jury’s verdict where it was shown that physicians
receiving total assays performed the step and an inventor testified to the
effect that “it would be malpractice” for a doctor to receive the assay and
then not determine the deficiency.1572 The Federal Circuit held that the
record did not need to contain direct evidence that every physician
performed the “correlating” step in order to support the verdict. Rather, it
opined that circumstantial evidence is “‘not only sufficient, but may also be
more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’”1573
The Federal Circuit also found that a reasonable jury could find that
defendant had the requisite intent to induce infringement under § 271(b)
where defendant’s articles stated that elevated total homocysteine
correlated to particular vitamin deficiencies, and further recommended
treatment of such deficiency with vitamin supplements.1574
E. Willful Infringement
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp. (“Knorr-Bremse”)1575 addressed the
long-debated issue of whether an adverse inference is properly drawn by a
factfinder in determining willful infringement when a defendant either does
not rely on an opinion of counsel or fails to obtain such an opinion.1576 The
factual posture of the case involved an appeal from a finding of willful
infringement, in which one defendant argued that “an adverse inference
should not have been drawn from [the] withholding . . . of an opinion of
counsel concerning the patent issues, and from the failure of [another
defendant] to obtain its own opinion of counsel.”1577 The majority opinion
addressed four specific questions for which it requested additional briefing
from the parties and invited submission of amicus curiae briefs.1578

1571. Id. at 1357, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
1572. Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
1573. Id. at 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088 (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v.
CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1574. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
1575. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1576. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
1577. Id. at 1340, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562.
1578. Id. at 1341, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562.
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Before reaching the specific questions, however, the Federal Circuit
observed that the “concept of ‘willful infringement’ is not simply a conduit
for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like
other civil wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights
warrants deterrence.”1579 Noting that “[f]undamental to determination of
willful infringement is the duty to act in accordance with law,”1580 the
Federal Circuit explained a finding of willful infringement is predicated
“on consideration of the totality of the circumstances . . . and may include
contributions of several factors.”1581
The Federal Circuit also traced the evolution of the adverse inference in
the context of determining willful infringement.1582 In particular, the court
addressed its decision in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co.,1583 which involved a defendant who was advised by its attorney to
“‘continue to refuse even to discuss the payment of a royalty’” because
“‘[c]ourts, in recent years, have—in patent infringement cases—found the
patents claimed to be infringed upon invalid in approximately 80% of the
cases.’”1584 The court explained that based on the record evincing “flagrant
disregard of presumptively valid patents,”1585 the Underwater Devices court
held that “‘where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of
another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to
determine whether or not he is infringing,’ including ‘the duty to seek and
obtain competent legal advice.’”1586
The Federal Circuit then noted that the issue of privilege first arose in
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc.,1587 in which the defendant had “not
even asserted that it sought advice of counsel when notified of the allowed
claims,”1588 and the court held that the defendant’s “silence on the subject,
in alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant the
conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was
advised that its . . . accused products would be an infringement of valid
U.S. patents.”1589 The court explained that the propriety of using an
1579. Id. at 1342, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
1580. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
1581. Id. at 1342-43, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (citing Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems
Indus. Prods., 897 F.2d 508, 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1972, 1973 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1582. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
1583. 717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1584. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1385, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 572).
1585. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
1586. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 138990, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576).
1587. 793 F.2d 1565, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
1588. Id. at 1580, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173.
1589. Id., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173.
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adverse inference was reinforced in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate &
Supply Co.,1590 in which the court held that “a court must be free to infer
that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was
contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of the
patentee’s invention.”1591 Having canvassed the history of the adverse
inference, the court concluded that while those decisions did not “focus . . .
on attorney-client relationships, but on disrespect for law . . . . [T]he
implementation of this precedent has resulted in inappropriate burdens on
the attorney-client relationship.”1592
Turning to the questions before it, the Federal Circuit first addressed the
issue of:
“When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product
privilege is invoked by defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate
for the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful
infringement?”1593 The court simply stated that “[t]he answer is ‘no,’”
explaining that “[a]lthough the duty to respect the law is undiminished, no
adverse inference shall arise from invocation of the attorney-client and/or
work product privilege.”1594 Citing to the Supreme Court’s instruction that
the attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to common law,”1595 and that its purpose
“encourag[es] full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promot[es] broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice,”1596 the Federal Circuit explained:
Although this court has never suggested that opinions of counsel
concerning patents are not privileged, the inference that withheld
opinions are adverse to the client’s actions can distort the attorney-client
relationship, in derogation of the foundations of that relationship. We
conclude that a special rule affecting attorney-client relationships in
patent cases is not warranted . . . . There should be no risk of liability in
disclosures to and from counsel in patent matters; such risk can intrude
upon full communication and ultimately the public interest in
encouraging open and confident relationships between client and
attorney.1597

1590. 853 F.2d 1568, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1591. Id. at 1572-73, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
1592. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
1593. Id. at 1344, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
1594. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
1595. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981)).
1596. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
1597. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (citations omitted). In so doing, the court noted
that “[t]here is precedent for the drawing of adverse inferences in circumstances other than
those involving attorney-client relationships,” such as a party’s refusal to produce
documents or its destruction of documents. Id. at 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
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The Federal Circuit thus concluded that while a “defendant may of
course choose to waive the privilege and produce the advice of counsel . . .
[such action] shall no longer entail an adverse inference as to the nature of
the advice.”1598
The second question before the court was “[w]hen the defendant had not
obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse inference with
respect to willful infringement?”1599 The Federal Circuit again answered
the question “no,” explaining that the issue “is not of privilege, but whether
there is a legal duty upon a potential infringer to consult with counsel, such
that failure to do so will provide an inference or evidentiary presumption
that such opinion would have been negative.”1600
The Federal Circuit reasoned that together with its “holding that it is
inappropriate to draw an adverse inference that undisclosed legal advice for
which attorney-client privilege is claimed was unfavorable, we also hold
that it is inappropriate to draw a similar adverse inference from failure to
consult counsel.”1601 The court further reasoned that “[a]lthough there
continues to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of
the known patent rights of others’ . . . the failure to obtain an exculpatory
opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or
evidentiary presumption that such an opinion would have been
unfavorable.”1602
The third question addressed by the Federal Circuit was “[i]f the court
concludes that the law should be changed, and the adverse inference
withdrawn as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this
case?”1603 Answering the question, the court explained that “[b]ecause
elimination of the adverse inference as drawn by the district court is a
material change in the totality of the circumstances, a fresh weighing of the
evidence is required to determine whether the defendants committed willful
infringement.”1604 The court did so despite the district court’s analysis of
1598. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1599. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1600. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1601. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1602. Id. at 1345-46, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc., v. Thom
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
The court’s answers to questions one and two give rise to another question: under what
circumstances can a plaintiff introduce into evidence that a defendant obtained an opinion
on which it did not rely or that defendant did not obtain any opinion at all? Put differently,
it is difficult to imagine any reason why a plaintiff would refer to an opinion that a
defendant did not rely upon for any reason other than to have the factfinder draw a negative
inference. The court’s opinion noted that certain amicus curiae raised the issue, but it
declined to address the issue because it was “not raised by this case, was not before the
district court, and has not been briefed on this appeal.” Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1567.
1603. Id. at 1346, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1604. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
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other factors supporting a finding of willfulness.1605
The last question before the Federal Circuit was whether “the existence
of a substantial defense to infringement [should] be sufficient to defeat
liability for willful infringement even if no legal advice has been
secured?”1606 The Federal Circuit also answered this question in the
negative, observing that its “[p]recedent includes this factor with other
factors to be considered among the totality of circumstances, stressing the
‘theme of whether a prudent person would have sound reason to believe
that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and
would be so held if litigated.’”1607 The Federal Circuit explained that
“accord[ing] each factor the weight warranted by its strength in the
particular case . . . [is] preferable to abstracting any factor for per se
treatment, for this greater flexibility enables the trier of fact to fit the
decision to all the circumstances.”1608
Writing separately, Judge Dyk concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part,
explaining that he joined the “majority opinion insofar as it eliminates an
adverse inference” but dissented to the extent that the majority’s opinion
may be read to reaffirm the Underwater Devices holding.1609 In dissent,
Judge Dyk observed that “[t]here is a substantial question as to whether the
due care requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court cases holding
that punitive damages can only be awarded in situations where the conduct
is reprehensible.”1610 Judge Dyk further noted that the court’s own
precedent “often recognized that enhanced damages . . . are a form of
punitive damages . . . [that] are awarded to punish reprehensible behavior,
referred to in this context as willful infringement.”1611 Accordingly, Judge
Dyk reasoned that
a potential infringer’s mere failure to engage in due care is not itself
reprehensible conduct. To hold that it is effectively shifts the burden of
proof on the issue of willfulness from the patentee to the infringer, which
must show that its infringement is not willful by showing that it
exercised due care.1612

In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1613 the plaintiff appealed the district
court’s grant of a JMOL that there was no willful infringement, arguing
1605. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
1606. Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
1607. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting SRI, Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs.
Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1608. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
1609. Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1610. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) and BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
1611. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1612. Id. at 1349, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1613. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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that willfulness could be found by a jury because the evidence showed that
defendant had knowledge of the asserted patent and that defendant
“provided no evidence that it had relied on an opinion of counsel that its
activities were not infringing.”1614 Foreshadowing its en banc decision in
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp.,1615 the
Federal Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument and explained that:
[A]bsent an initial presentation of evidence on the [willfulness] issue by
[plaintiff], this burden of coming forward in defense did not arise. There
is no evidentiary presumption that every infringement is willful. Willful
infringement is not established by the simple fact of infringement, even
though [defendant] stipulated that it had knowledge of [defendant’s]
patents.1616

In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1617 the district
court had held that certain defendants’ infringement was willful “due to a
complete absence of competent advice regarding possible infringement of
the ‘012 patent and a flagrant display of deliberate misconduct by [the
defendants] throughout this proceeding.”1618 The Federal Circuit vacated
this decision in light of its decision in Knorr-Bremse.1619 The court in
Knorr-Bremse held that “the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of
counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary
presumption that such an opinion would have been unfavorable.”1620
Because the district court in Insituform relied upon such an inference in
deciding that the defendants’ infringement was willful, and elimination of
this inference would materially change the totality of the circumstances the
district court was required to consider in making its willfulness
determination, the court could not uphold the district court’s decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings.1621
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,1622 the Federal Circuit held that the
mere filing of an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) cannot
constitute an act of willful infringement compensable by attorney’s fees.1623
Apotex had filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval of a generic version of
1614. Id. at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1615. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
1616. Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1617. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1618. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (emphasis omitted).
1619. See id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (2004) holding that failing to attain an
attorney’s exculpatory opinion “shall no longer provide an adverse inference or presumption
that such an opinion would have been unfavorable.”).
1620. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1346, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1621. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
1622. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1623. Id. at 1342, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
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Ceftin®, an orally administered antibiotic. Glaxo brought a declaratory
action against Apotex alleging that its ANDA infringed two of Glaxo’s
patents covering Ceftin® under § 271(e)(2)(A).1624 The district court found
that Apotex’s ANDA infringed Glaxo’s patents and that Apotex’s
infringement was willful because it did not exercise due care, relying
heavily on the fact that Apotex did not receive an opinion from patent
counsel. The Federal Circuit reversed. It reasoned that infringement under
§ 271(e)(2)(A) was a “highly artificial” act of infringement which results in
only a very limited set of consequences set forth in § 271(e)(4).1625 It noted
that under the statutorily limited list of available remedies, a court could
only award money damages if commercial activity had actually occurred in
the United States or if the product had been imported. It described 35
U.S.C. § 2851626 as an “exception” to these limits in that it permits
attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in exceptional
cases.1627
Although a “myriad of factual circumstances” may give rise to the § 285
exception, the Federal Circuit found that such circumstances were not
present in this case.1628 Apotex had not engaged in any litigation
misconduct nor included any certification in its ANDA under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)1629 that commercial marketing of the subject drug would not
infringe any valid, unexpired patent.1630 It contrasted these facts to those in
Yamanuchi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal,1631 in which the
Federal Circuit determined that a “baseless and ‘wholly unjustified’”
certification combined with litigation misconduct, warranted a finding of
willfulness.1632 Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the district court had abused its discretion in finding willful
infringement.1633

1624. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)(2000) (“It shall be an act of infringement to
submit[:](A) an application under Section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, . . . [i]f the
purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.”).
1625. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1626. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
1627. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1628. Id. at 1350-51, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808-09.
1629. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000).
1630. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809. The omission
was due to the fact that Glaxo had not listed its patents in the Orange Book because at the
time its patent applications were filed, antibiotics were excepted from such listing under a
now-repealed section of the FDCA. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-04.
1631. 231 F.3d 1339, 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1632. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1633. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
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IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES
A. Inequitable Conduct
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1634 the district court held that the
patentee had engaged in inequitable conduct during prosecution of its
patent covering punch pliers by “repeatedly stat[ing], and indeed
stress[ing], that the described tool simultaneously punched holes and
connected ceiling grids, knowing that this assertion was false.”1635
Specifically, the district court found “clear and convincing evidence” that
the claimed punch pliers punched holes in overlapping sheets of metal but
did not connect the sheets.1636 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the repeated statements were “not clearly incorrect,” because, as the district
court had found, a loose connection was established through use of the
pliers. Furthermore, the statements regarding “punching and connecting”
referred merely to the features described in the preamble of the patent’s
sole independent claim.1637 For these reasons, the Federal Circuit found
that patentee’s conduct during prosecution neither rose to the required level
of materiality to support a finding of inequitable conduct nor were its
statements false.1638 Therefore, it held that the district court clearly erred in
its findings that plaintiff’s statements were material misrepresentations and
abused its discretion in ruling that Intirtool had engaged in inequitable
conduct.1639
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.1640 presented an appeal from a
grant of summary judgment that defendant procured the disputed patent
through inequitable conduct.1641 In particular, the district court held that in
order to overcome a rejection for lack of enablement, the defendant
submitted a false declaration with intent to deceive the PTO by omitting
negative test results concerning the claimed method for producing a protein
toxic to insects.1642
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that to “hold a patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct, a court must find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the applicant omitted or misrepresented material
facts with the intention of misleading or deceiving the patent examiner.”1643
On the issue of falsity of the declaration, plaintiff argued that the district
1634.
1635.
1636.
1637.
1638.
1639.
1640.
1641.
1642.
1643.

369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
Id. at 1294, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
Id. at 1296-97, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
Id. at 1297, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
363 F.3d 1235, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1237, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id. at 1239, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
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court correctly held that defendant’s assertion in its declaration that it knew
of no negative test results was clearly false.1644 Defendant by contrast,
argued that the “omitted test results were not ‘negative’ with respect to the
question that the patent examiner was seeking to answer,” but rather
“showed that those tests led to no reliable conclusion.”1645 Noting that at
summary judgment “‘the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor,’”1646 the Federal
Circuit determined that the district court erroneously resolved the disputed
issue of falsity in favor of defendant because such a decision:
[R]equired the court to reject the explanation provided in [defendant’s]
affidavit. If the [district] court were to credit [defendant’s] affidavit, it
could find that the test results withheld from the PTO were not negative
and [the defendant’s] statement to the PTO that he know of no contrary
results was true.1647

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that a material issue of fact existed
concerning the truth of the defendant’s declaration.1648
Relying on the court’s earlier decision in Paragon Podiatry Laboratory,
Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc.,1649 plaintiff argued that defendant’s
litigation affidavit was “insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to falsity.”1650 The Federal Circuit, however, determined that Pargaon
was markedly different from the case before it, explaining that in Paragon
“there was no question that the submission to the PTO was false and that
the false representations were material; the only issue was whether the false
and material representations were submitted with an intent to deceive.”1651
The Federal Circuit then reasoned that, by contrast, the record before it
contained disputes of material fact concerning both “the issue of intent”
and “whether [defendant’s] declaration was false or misleading at all.”1652
Specifically, the Federal Circuit observed that because defendant’s affidavit
“described in detail each of the allegedly negative test results and explained
why those test results, in [defendant’s] view, were not inconsistent with the
declaration . . . submitted to the PTO,” the record contained a disputed
issue of fact for the factfinder to resolve.1653
The Federal Circuit further explained that even if no genuine issue
1644. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
1645. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260-61.
1646. Id. at 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
1647. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1648. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1649. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1650. Monsanto Co., 363 F.3d at 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1651. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1652. Id. at 1241, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1653. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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existed concerning the falsity of defendant’s declaration, a triable issue
remained regarding defendant’s intent to deceive the PTO.1654 The court
opined:
[A]lthough the intent element of fraud or inequitable conduct may be
proven by a showing of acts the natural consequence of which were
presumably intended by the actor, this requires the fact finder to evaluate
all the facts and circumstances in each case. Such an evaluation is rarely
enabled in summary proceedings.1655

Noting that defendant’s statement that it “did not intend to deceive the
PTO was based on [its] detailed explanation of [its] interpretation of the
disputed results,”1656 the court thus concluded that defendant had “at least
state[d] facts supporting a plausible justification or excuse for the
misrepresentation.”1657
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s determination
that “the circumstances surrounding the declaration provided convincing
evidence that [defendant’s] declaration was submitted with the intention of
misleading the PTO,”1658 particularly in light of “the threat that without the
declaration the examiner would limit the claims”1659 and defendant’s status
“as a small enterprise with limited resources . . . pursuing a survival
strategy.”1660 Though agreeing that “circumstances surrounding the
submission of the declaration are certainly relevant to the inquiry into
intent,”1661 the court concluded that: “[T]he small size of the applicants’
company and the applicants’ presumed incentive to obtain broad patent
protection for their inventions did not give rise to such a compelling
inference of deceptive intent as to justify the entry of summary judgment
on the issue.”1662
In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,1663 defendant appealed the
district court’s finding of no inequitable conduct.1664 Defendant argued that
an inventor committed inequitable conduct by submitting a declaration to
the PTO containing statements that were misleading and inconsistent with
actual test results.1665 The district court found that the statement at issue on
1654. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1655. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d
at 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567).
1656. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1657. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d
at 1191, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569).
1658. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1659. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1660. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1661. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1662. Id. at 1241-42, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1663. 391 F.3d 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1664. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1665. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
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appeal “was literally true” but “had the potential to mislead the
examiner.”1666 However, the district court reasoned that “in light of all the
circumstances,” it could not find that the inventor “acted with the requisite
intent when he failed to point out that the data he submitted to the patent
examiner included values that would suggest that one could also achieve an
adequate flux in a transdermal system that used a sufficiently large fentanyl
citrate.”1667 Reviewing the record evidence, the court held that the district
court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion.1668
B. Antitrust
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,1669 plaintiff appealed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment denying its claim that defendant committed
patent misuse by tying patented products of first generation soybean seeds
to unpatented second generation soybean seeds.1670 The Federal Circuit
explained that “in evaluating a patent misuse defense, ‘[t]he key inquiry is
whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the
patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect.’”1671 The Federal Circuit then explained that a tying
agreement may serve as a form of patent misuse if a licensor “conditions
the license on a patent licensee’s purchase of an unpatented material for use
in the invention.”1672
In vacating the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit reasoned
that defendant “does not raise a typical tying allegation and the mere
recitation of the word ‘tying’ is not sufficient to state a patent misuse
defense.”1673 Noting that the “licensed and patented product (the first
generation seeds) and the good made by the licensed product (the second
generation seeds) are nearly identical copies,”1674 the court declined “to
hold that [defendant’s] raw exercise of its right to exclude from the
patented invention by itself is a ‘tying’ arrangement that exceeds the scope
of the patent grant.”1675

1666. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1667. Id. at 1373-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1668. Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. In dissent, Judge Dyk reasoned that
“[t]here would seem to be no basis for finding the statement ‘literally true.’” Id. at 1376, 73
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1669. 363 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1670. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1671. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340, 1372, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1672. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1673. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1674. Id. at 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1675. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
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C. Pre-Emption
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.1676 presented
an issue of whether federal patent law preempted state-law tort claims in
circumstances in which defendant could not establish that plaintiff’s claims
of infringement were objectively baseless.1677 Noting that, as a general
matter, state-law claims “can survive federal preemption only to the extent
that those claims are based on a showing of ‘bad faith’ action in asserting
infringement,”1678 the court explained that “federal patent laws thus bar
state-law liability for communications concerning alleged infringement so
long as those communications are not made in ‘bad faith.’”1679 After
canvassing the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence
concerning the bad faith standard,1680 the court determined that:
[T]he objectively baseless standard . . . applies to state-law claims based
on communications alleging that a patent holder has engaged in wrongful
conduct by asserting claims of patent infringement . . . . A plaintiff
claiming that a patent holder has engaged in wrongful conduct by
asserting claims of patent infringement must establish that the claims of
infringement were objectively baseless.1681

Turning to the record below, the court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment that defendant’s state-law tort claims were preempted by the
patent laws, noting that defendant “made no effort to establish that the
claims asserted by [plaintiff] with respect to [two asserted] patents were
objectively baseless, either because those patents were obviously invalid or
plainly not infringed.”1682 With regard to a third asserted patent, the court
concluded that plaintiff’s infringement claim “was not objectively baseless,
as is amply demonstrated by our reversal of that grant of summary
judgment [of noninfringement].”1683
1676. 362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1677. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
1678. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc.,
182 F.3d 1340, 1355, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1679. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
1680. The court specifically addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., in which the Court held that a
“lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.” 508 U.S. 49, 60, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641,
1648 (1993). The court likewise noted its holding in Golan v. Pingel Enterprises, Inc., that
“[t]o show bad faith in [the patentee’s] actions, [plaintiff] must offer clear and convincing
evidence that [patentee] had no reasonable basis to believe that the [accused device]
infringed [the] patents.” 310 F.3d 1360, 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1918 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The court also noted its decision in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.,
providing that federal law preempts state law claims that punish “publicizing a patent in the
marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith.” 153 F.3d
1318, 1336, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1681. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
1682. Id. at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1683. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167; see also id. at 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

1146

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:941

D. License
In Jacobs v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,1684 plaintiff sued for infringement
of its patent covering a “tilt sensitive” video game control box.1685
Plaintiff had previously sued defendant’s supplier of certain
“accelerometer” components of the claimed control box, Analog Devices,
Inc., for inducement and contributory infringement of the same patent.
That litigation ended when plaintiff and Analog entered into a settlement
agreement providing Analog a license “to make, use, sell, import and
export components . . . for use in tilt-sensitive control boxes,” and by which
plaintiff covenanted not to sue Analog for “any cause of action having as
an element the infringement of the ‘958 patent by Analog or any other
party, whether occurring in the past, present or in the future.”1686
Defendant asserted that it was protected from suit by plaintiff’s agreement
with Analog. The Federal Circuit agreed, reasoning that basic contract law
principles prevent a party who assigns a right in exchange for consideration
from acting to undermine the commercial value of that right.1687 Thus,
plaintiff could not prevent Analog’s customers from making infringing
control boxes after granting Analog the right to sell components of those
control boxes.
Plaintiff argued that defendant could only raise the license as a defense if
the court determined that Analog’s accelerometer components had no
noninfringing uses. Plaintiff’s argument referred to previous Federal
Circuit decisions discussing the Court’s view that a patentee’s (or
licensee’s) sale of an article that has no noninfringing uses may carry with
it an implied license to use the article in an infringing manner.1688
However, the Federal Circuit found these cases to be irrelevant, because
there was no need to make a determination as to whether plaintiff had given
Analog the right to sell components to be used in infringing devices. The
settlement agreement conclusively allowed Analog to sell its
accelerometers to be used in infringing control boxes because plaintiff
could not prevent anyone from making non-infringing devices. Thus, the
agreement would only make sense if it was understood to permit the sale of
components to be made in infringing devices.1689

1168 (finding that where claim is not objectively baseless, the court cannot examine
litigant’s subjective motives and therefore cannot establish bad faith).
1684. 370 F.3d 1097, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The authors’ law firm
represented defendant in this case.
1685. Id. at 1098, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
1686. Id. at 1098-99, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055-56.
1687. Id. at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
1688. Id. at 1100, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners
Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686, 231 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 474, 476 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1689. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
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Plaintiff next offered three separate interpretations of the license
agreement that would permit suit against defendant. First, plaintiff
contended the agreement granted Analog a “bare license” that consisted
merely of the right not so be sued for making, using, or selling the
accelerometers. But the Federal Circuit found that if it were to adopt
plaintiff’s construction of the license provision of the settlement agreement,
then the additional “covenant not to sue” provision would be completely
redundant. Furthermore, the license provided Analog the right to sell
accelerators “for use in tilt-sensitive control boxes.”1690 This language
went far beyond the grant of a bare license. Second, plaintiff argued that
the license should be interpreted to grant Analog the right to make and sell
infringing control boxes on its own (rather than the accelerometer
components). The Federal Circuit found it unlikely, however, that Analog
would have bargained for the right to build infringing control boxes on its
own because it was not in the business of making game controllers. As its
last attempt, plaintiff broadly argued that the license afforded Analog the
right to sell accelerometers to anyone without fear of suit, but simply did
not shield its customers from suit. The Federal Circuit again rejected this
argument asking why Analog would have “contracted for the right to
manufacture and sell a product knowing that its customers would be unable
to use the product for the bargained-for purpose.”1691 Thus, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that plaintiff was precluded
from suing defendant for its manufacture and sale of tilt-sensitive control
boxes that incorporated Analog’s accelerometers.1692
E. Settlement
1693

Unova, Inc. v. Acer Inc.
involved an appeal from a district court’s
grant of summary judgment holding that a settlement agreement between
plaintiff and a third party worked to release defendant from patent
infringement liability where the defendant had acquired the third party
subsequent to the settlement agreement.1694 As an initial matter, the
Federal Circuit noted that “[s]ettlement agreements are governed by the
generally applicable law of contracts”1695 and that “[a] contract must be so
interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it
existed at the time of contracting.”1696 Reviewing the applicable California
1690.
1691.
1692.
1693.
1694.
1695.
1696.
2004)).

Id. at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
Id. at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
363 F.3d 1278, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1279-80, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465-66.
Id. at 1281, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (Deering
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contract law, the Federal Circuit determined that “courts have held that a
third party’s rights under a release agreement are predicated upon the
contracting parties’ intent to benefit him and that the third party bears the
burden of showing that the contracting parties intended to release him.”1697
Having reviewed the settlement agreement, the Federal Circuit
determined that the plaintiff and third party “did not intend to release
[defendant] from liability for infringement arising from events that
occurred before it became [third party’s] parent” company.1698 In
particular, the Federal Circuit observed that “release provision itself is most
sensibly read as not releasing [defendant] from liability for infringement
prior to its acquisition of [the third party]” because the provision stated that
the plaintiff “‘hereby releases [the third party], its parents, and its
subsidiaries’ from all claims that related to ‘an allegation of infringement
of any Smart Battery Patents.’”1699 The Federal Circuit explained that it
construed the provision to mean that as of the signing date the defendant
released the third party, its parents, and subsidiaries from liability for prior
infringement.1700 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that because
the defendant was not the third party’s parent “on that date,” it “is not
entitled to the benefit of the release.”1701
Addressing the defendant’s argument that such an interpretation would
render the term “parent” to be a nullity because the third party did not have
any parent companies on the date the settlement agreement was signed, the
Federal Circuit explained that it would “not interpret the release provision
contrary to the plain meaning of its language or contrary to common sense.
The release agreement is written in the present tense . . . and refers to acts
of past infringement; thus it most naturally does not refer to [third party’s]
future parents.”1702 The Federal Circuit further noted that when the parties
to the settlement agreement intended to refer to future entities, they did so
expressly and “the fact that they did not similarly modify the term ‘parents’
suggests that they did not seek to release [the third party’s] future
parents.”1703
F. Miscellaneous Defenses
In National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd.,1704 the
Federal Circuit confronted an issue that only two federal courts had ever
1697.
1698.
1699.
1700.
1701.
1702.
1703.
1704.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
Id. at 1282, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
357 F.3d 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:31 PM

PATENT SUMMARY

1149

before addressed:
what is the scope of the “temporary presence”
exemption to liability for infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 272?1705 National
Steel sued Canadian Pacific Railway (“CPR”) for infringement of its patent
directed to a type of railway car and moved for a preliminary injunction.1706
The district court granted National Steel’s motion, finding that CPR had
conceded that the asserted claims read on its railway cars and that its
defenses to infringement lacked substantial merit.1707 As one of these
defenses, CPR contended that its actions were exempt from liability under
§ 272’s “temporary presence” exception to infringement liability.1708
Under this statute, never before interpreted by the Federal Circuit, the use
of any invention in “certain foreign-owned” vehicles entering the United
States “temporarily or accidentally” is not an act of infringement under
certain conditions.1709
To prove that its use of the accused railcars was exempted under this
statute, CPR brought forth evidence that it was a Canadian company and
that its rail cars operated on rail lines that, for the most part, it owned in
Canada and the United States to deliver lumber from Canada to the United
States.1710 The district court held that these facts were insufficient to raise a
substantial question of whether CPR was liable for infringement.1711 The
Federal Circuit disagreed. First, it disagreed with the district court’s
reasoning that the rail car invention was not used in a foreign-owned
vehicle because the trains that pulled the cars were owned and operated by
U.S. companies in the United States.1712 The Federal Circuit looked to
Congress’s definition of “vehicle” in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 4,1713
which it said controlled its interpretation of the term, and found that the
district court had construed that term in § 272 too narrowly.1714 Rather, a
vehicle for purposes of § 272 “includes every description of carriage or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on land,” carriage being defined in Webster’s Dictionary as
1705. Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 35 U.S.C. § 272 states:
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any country which
afford similar privileges to vessels, aircraft of vehicles of the United States,
entering the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not constitute
infringement of any patent, if the invention is used exclusively for the needs of the
vessel, aircraft or vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or used for the
manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the United States.
35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
1706. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd., 357 F.3d at 1322, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
1707. Id. at 1324, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
1708. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
1709. Id. at 1326, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
1710. Id. at 1323-24, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45.
1711. Id. at 1328-29, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647-48.
1712. Id. at 1328, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
1713. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
1714. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
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“means of conveyance,” “a wheeled vehicle for people, or a wheeled
support carrying a burden such as a gun carriage.”1715 Therefore, the court
concluded, the railcars were vehicles for purposes of the exemption.1716
The Federal Circuit next turned to the issue of whether CPR’s railcars
were only entering the United States “temporarily” for purposes of
satisfying § 272’s requirements.1717 Resorting to the legislative history
behind the statute which indicated that it was promulgated to facilitate
international commerce that would otherwise be overburdened by
conflicting patent laws regulating transportation vessels, it held that
entering “temporarily” should be defined to mean “entering for a period of
time of finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in international
commerce.”1718 Contrary to the urgings of National Steel Car, the Federal
Circuit found the following factors irrelevant to this inquiry:
the
magnitude of the benefit derived by the accused infringer as a result of the
use of the vehicle in the United States and the burden imposed on the
patent holder as a result of the exemption.1719 Also dismissed was National
Steel Car’s argument that CPR should not be able to claim the benefit of
the exemption because there existed testimony that their cars occasionally
are “grabbed” by the U.S. railway without permission and used for
domestic commerce.1720 This evidence did not show that the cars entered
with the “purpose to engage in commerce other than international
commerce.”1721
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the question of what the
requirement that the invention be “used exclusively for the needs of
the . . . vehicle” meant.1722 The court disagreed with the district court’s
narrow interpretation that the invention at issue should exclude inventions
“pertaining to the construction of the vehicle.”1723 It found no distinction in
the statute between “propulsive needs” and “structural needs,” therefore the
district court was wrong in its reasoning that because the invention at issue
defined the structure of the rail car, rather than an aspect of the
locomotive’s propulsion system, the use of the invention did not fall within
the scope of § 272.1724 Rather, looking again to the legislative history, the
court found that the Supreme Court case which the statute had codified, as
well as the Paris Convention Treaty after which the statute was modeled,
1715.
1716.
1717.
1718.
1719.
1720.
1721.
1722.
1723.
1724.

Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (internal quotations omitted).
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id. at 1332-33, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51.
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both expressly extended the scope of noninfringing uses to inventions used
in the construction of vehicles.1725 Therefore, the train cars at issue
satisfied this requirement.1726
Finally, the court found error in the district court’s finding that CPR was
precluded from benefiting from the statutory exemption because, allegedly,
both CPR and the supplier of the accused cars that it used had sold the cars
in the United States.1727 As for the alleged sales by the supplier, the statute
only exempts sales in the United States by those that temporarily enter the
United States, and not third parties.1728 Therefore, the supplier’s sales did
not bar CPR from using this defense.1729 Second, as for the alleged sales by
CPR to United States companies, the district court itself recognized that
there had been no decision regarding the ownership of the cars—the only
finding was that CPR “may” engage in such conduct.1730 This was
insufficient to deprive CPR of its § 2721731 defense.1732
In Vanderlande Industries Nederland v. International Trade
Commission,1733 the Federal Circuit reviewed the ITC’s ruling that
Vanderlande Industries Nederland and Vanderlande Industries, Inc.
(“Vanderlande”) had “engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts” in violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and
selling a “sortation system” that infringed a U.S. patent.1734 Vanderlande
contested the ITC’s ruling on the basis that the patent owner and exclusive
licensee (“Complainants”) were equitably estopped from asserting the
patent against Vanderlande.1735 Specifically, Vanderlande argued that the
Complainants misled Vanderlande by (1) their delay in filing suit despite
their knowledge that Vanderlande had contracted to build the accused
sorting systems in Europe and the United States, and by (2) their
participation in the construction of a United Parcel Service sorting facility
in which Vanderlande was installing the accused system.1736
Despite these allegations, the Federal Circuit held that Vanderlande did
not fulfill the first element of equitable estoppel requiring that “the
patentee, who usually must have knowledge of the true facts,
communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or

1725.
1726.
1727.
1728.
1729.
1730.
1731.
1732.
1733.
1734.
1735.
1736.

Id. at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1334, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
366 F.3d 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
Id. at 1324, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
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silence.”1737 The Complainants had twice warned Vanderlande by letter
that it may infringe their patent if it built its sorting system in the United
States, and such “warnings of potential infringement . . . are precisely the
opposite of the sort of conduct needed to give rise to equitable
estoppel.”1738 Furthermore, the Complainants had only waited nine months
after confirming that Vanderlande was using an infringing system at the
United States Parcel facility before filed a complaint with the ITC.1739
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1740 Intirtool owned a patent on punch
pliers and supplied these pliers to Texar, who resold them to retailers.1741
In 1993, Texar informed Intirtool that, although it was “perfectly satisfied”
with Intirtool, it could get very similar pliers from a competing supplier for
a lower cost. Texar therefore requested that Intirtool match the lower price.
When Intirtool refused, Texar at a later, unspecified date, turned to the
competitor for its supply. Intirtool did not pursue enforcement of its patent
against Texar until 2000. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas found that Intirtool should have known from its 1993 conversation
with Texar that Texar was “going to continue to sell the punch pliers but
would acquire them from another vendor,” and held that, as a result of
Intirtool’s delay in filing suit until 2000, Intirtool’s pre-filing damages were
barred. The Federal Circuit reversed.1742 Although it found that a
presumption of laches arises “where a patentee delays bringing suit for
more than six years after the date the patentee knew or should have known
of the alleged infringer’s activity,”1743 it found that Texar’s notice to
Intirtool that it contemplated the possibility of reselling competing tools at
a future date was not sufficient to give Intirtool actual or constructive
knowledge of an act of infringement.1744 Rather, at the time of that
conversation, Texar was still Intirtool’s “perfectly satisfied” customer.
Therefore, the laches clock did not start ticking as a result of the 1993
conversation between Intirtool and Texar, and because there was no
evidence that Intirtool should have known that Texar had ever acted on its
plan, the laches clock did not start ticking at all. Therefore, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court’s determination that Intirtool should have
known that it had an infringement claim more than six years prior to the
date it filed suit against Texar was an abuse of discretion.1745

1737.
1738.
1739.
1740.
1741.
1742.
1743.
1744.
1745.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1292-93, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782-83.
Id. at 1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id. at 1297, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1297-1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785-86.
Id. at 1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
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V. REMEDIES
A. Permanent Injunction
International Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co.1746 involved an
appeal from contempt proceedings following entry of a permanent
injunction.1747 At the district court, the parties stipulated to a consent
judgment and an injunction that resolved all infringement issues concerning
defendant’s product but reserved the issue of infringement regarding
products made by defendant for a third party according to the third party’s
specifications.1748 Tracking the language of § 271(a),1749 the permanent
injunction prohibited defendant “‘from making, using, offering for sale or
selling in or importing into the United States the components, devices or
products infringing any claim of [the asserted patent].’”1750 Two years after
entry of the permanent injunction, plaintiff initiated contempt proceedings
against defendant and the third party for violating the injunction through
sales of third party-designed and defendant-manufactured devices in the
United States.1751 Thus, the primary issue on appeal was whether
defendant’s and third party’s conduct violated the district court’s order.1752
The Federal Circuit started its analysis by noting that “[a] court may
grant an injunction in a patent infringement case ‘in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by the
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.’”1753 The Federal
Circuit explained that “it is well known that United Sates patent laws ‘do
not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States,’”1754 and that “‘it is not an infringement to make or use a patented
product outside of the United States.’”1755 The Federal Circuit then
reasoned that because no dispute existed that defendant’s actions did not
occur within the United States, its actions do not violate either the language
of the permanent injunction or the applicable patent law precedent.1756

1746. 361 F.3d 1355, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1747. Id. at 1357, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
1748. Id. at 1358, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
1749. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers ot sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent.”).
1750. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1360, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
1751. Id. at 1358, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
1752. Id. at 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
1753. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
1754. Id. at 1360, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
183, 195, (1856)).
1755. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,
215 F.3d 1246, 1251, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1756. Id. at 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
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Then addressing plaintiff’s theory that the defendant’s and third party’s
agreement to subvert a permanent injunction was tantamount to
infringement of the patent, the Federal Circuit held that such an argument
“has no basis in law.”1757 The court further reasoned that even if the third
party imported an infringing device, such conduct would not violate the
permanent injunction because there was no basis for attributing the third
party’s conduct to the defendant.1758 Rather, the Federal Circuit explained
that “[t]he only occasion when a person not a party may be punished is
when he has helped to bring about . . . an act of a party. This means that
the non-party must either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified
with him.”1759 Based on the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
only arrangement between defendant and third party was a fabrication
agreement for the manufacture and shipment of devices outside the United
States, and there was no evidence that defendant exercised any control over
the third party nor was defendant related to the third party.1760
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,1761 the issue was whether
a permanent injunction order “prohibiting infringement by ‘any device
covered by one or more of Claims 1 through 5’”1762 of the disputed patent
was overly broad given the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d).1763 The Federal Circuit noted that, as a general matter,
“broad injunctions that merely instruct that enjoined party not to violate a
statute” are contrary to the policy of Rule 65(d) because “[s]uch injunctions
increase the likelihood of unwarranted contempt proceedings for acts
unlike or unrelated to those originally judged unlawful.”1764 The Federal
Circuit explained that in the patent infringement context, it “has rejected as
1757. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
1758. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (citing Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248
F.3d 1376, 1379, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791, 1793 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Tegal, the Federal
Circuit explained that “courts have held parties in contempt based on the conduct of others,
but in that circumstance they have required proof that the party subject to contempt
sanctions had control over those who engaged in the conduct proscribed by the injunction.”
248 F.3d at 1379, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793.
1759. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting
Additive Controls & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1106, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1760. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
1761. 383 F.3d 1312, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1762. Id. at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1763. Id. at 1315, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. Rule 65(d) provides:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the acts or acts
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
1764. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
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overly broad a permanent injunction that simply prohibits future
infringement of a patent.”1765 Discussing its decision in Additive Controls
& Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,1766 the court explained that
it vacated a permanent injunction order because:
[I]t lacked specific terms and a reasonably detailed description of the
acts sought to be restrained. Furthermore, the order failed to state which
acts constituted infringement or to expressly limit its prohibition to the
manufacture, use, or sale of the specific device found to infringe, or
devices no more than colorably different from the infringing device.1767

Analogizing the circumstances in Additive Controls to the permanent
injunction order on appeal, the court explained that “[o]n its face the
injunction applies to many more devices than those actually adjudicated.
Indeed, by its terms the injunction applies to ‘any device’ made or sold by
[defendant] that is within the scope of the patent claims.”1768 The Federal
Circuit further reasoned that the
actual scope of the injunction cannot be that expansive . . . because this
court has held that “contempt proceedings . . . are available only with
respect to devices previously admitted or adjudged to infringe, and to
other devices which are no more than colorably different therefrom and
which clearly are infringements of the patent.”1769

The court thus concluded that “the only acts the injunction may prohibit
are infringement of the patent by the adjudicated devices and infringement
by devices not more than colorably different from the adjudicated devices”
and “to comply with Rule 65(d), the injunction should explicitly proscribe
those specific acts.”1770
B. Damages
1.

Lost profits
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,1771 the plaintiff appealed the
district court decision denying its claim for lost profits, arguing that there
was a functional relationship between a patented device and an unpatented
material requiring application of the entire market value rule.1772 Vacating
the district court’s order, the Federal Circuit explained that:
1765. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1766. 986 F.2d 476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1767. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574 (internal
citations omitted) (citing Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 479-80, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1801
1768. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1769. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574 (quoting KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones
Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1526, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1770. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1771. 382 F.3d 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1772. Id. at 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
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The entire market value rule was a principle of patent damages that
defined a patentee’s ability to recover lost profits on unpatented
components typically sold with a patented item . . . . “[T]he rule has been
extended to allow inclusion of physically separate unpatented
components normally sold with a patented components” with the caveat
that both were “considered to be components of a single assembly or
parts of a complete machine, or they together constitute a functional
unit.”1773

Based on the record evidence, the court determined that the patented
device and unpatented material “are in fact analogous to parts of a single
assembly or a complete machine, as the [unpatented material] functions
together with the [patented product] to produce the visual appearance that
is central to [plaintiff’s patent].”1774 The court further reasoned that
“[d]espite some limited interchangeability . . . the two items do ‘function
together to achieve one result.’”1775
In Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.1776 plaintiff sought
to recover lost profits based on its sister company’s sales.1777 While noting
that “the recovery of lost profits by a patentee is not limited to the situation
in which the patentee is selling the patented device”, the Federal Circuit
rejected plaintiff’s attempt to extend the reach of lost profits and made
clear that “the patentee needs to have been selling some item, the profits of
which have been lost due to infringing sales, in order to claim damages
consisting of lost profits.”1778 The Federal Circuit explained that plaintiff
and its sister corporation “may not enjoy the advantages of their separate
corporate structure and, at the same time avoid the consequential
limitations of that structure—in this case, the inability of the patent holder
to claim lost profits of its non-exclusive licensee.”1779 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit held that although plaintiff “may have the right to sue under
its patents, both as an owner and as a back-licensee, it can recover only its
own lost profits, not [its sister company’s].”1780
2.

Reasonable royalty
In Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1781 defendant challenged an
assessed royalty rate as “unreasonable as a matter of law” because it would
1773. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1543, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1774. Id. at 1372, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1775. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073).
1776. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1777. Id. at 1310, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1778. Id. at 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1779. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1780. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1781. 355 F.3d 1327, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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have required defendant to sell the product below cost and defendant could
not have raised its prices to account for the royalty because it was “already
selling the products at a loss.”1782 The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s
challenge, explaining that “[t]here is no rule that a royalty be no higher
than the infringer’s net profit margin.”1783 The Federal Circuit further
noted that defendant’s evidence “establishes no more than what it might
have preferred to pay, which is not the test for damages.”1784
In Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,1785 the Federal Circuit again declined to
overturn the jury’s award of a reasonable royalty on the ground that
defendant would not have “negotiate[d} a royalty in excess of [its]
anticipated profit.”1786 The Federal Circuit explained that “although an
infringer’s anticipated profit from use of the patented invention is ‘[a]mong
the factors to be considered in determining’ a reasonable royalty . . . the
law does not require that an infringer be permitted to make a profit.”1787
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1788 the Federal Circuit again affirmed
that upon finding of infringement, a plaintiff is entitled to at least a
reasonable royalty pursuant to § 284,1789 if such damages are sought.1790 At
trial, the plaintiff’s expert testified that a reasonable royalty would have
been fifteen percent, while defendant’s expert testified that such a royalty
would have been three percent.1791 The district court then entered judgment
on the jury’s finding that no amount of damages had been proven.1792 In
reversing this judgment, the Federal Circuit explained that § 284 requires
that “damages to a successful claimant in a patent infringement suit shall
not be less than a reasonable royalty.”1793
3.

Enhanced damages
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,1794 the Federal Circuit affirmed

1782. Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489-90.
1783. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus.,
Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
1784. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
1785. 382 F.3d 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1786. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1787. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Georgia-Pac.
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
1788. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1789. Section 284 provides, in pertinent part, that a court shall award a successful
claimant “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
1790. Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. Of course, a
plaintiff can choose not to plead damages resulting from infringement, and seek only an
injunction.
1791. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1792. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1793. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
1794. 382 F.3d 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the denial of enhanced damages and attorney’s fees explaining that its
precedent makes “clear that ‘a finding of willful infringement merely
authorizes, but does not mandate an award of increased damages.’”1795 The
Federal Circuit also noted that the district court “properly considered the
various factors relating to attorney fees, including ‘the degree of culpability
of the infringer, the closeness of the question, [and] litigation behavior.”1796
4.

Attorney’s fees and costs
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1797 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the defendant based on
plaintiff’s alleged litigation misconduct, explaining that it “decline[s] to
second-guess the district court’s judgment” because “[t]he district judge is
in a far better position to assess that matter than we are, and nothing
presented to us on appeal indicates that the district court’s assessment is so
clearly flawed as to justify our overturning the district court’s holding on
that issue.”1798 The Federal Circuit also declined to accept defendant’s
argument that it was entitled to attorney’s fees based on an inequitable
conduct theory that was raised solely in the context of a request for
attorney’s fees.1799 The Federal Circuit explained that based on defendant’s
“belated raising of the inequitable conduct issue and the exacting standard
applicable to attorney fee requests, we hold that the district court did not err
in denying [defendant’s] fee application.”1800
Inland Steel Co. v. LTV Steel Co.1801 involved an appeal from a denial of
defendant’s request for attorney fees and costs based on the court’s
determination that the defendant was not a prevailing party in
circumstances in which the asserted patent was found invalid during reexamination before the PTO.1802 The question before the Federal Circuit
was “whether [defendant] is a ‘prevailing party’ and thus potentially
eligible for the award of attorney fees and costs.”1803 The Federal Circuit
first observed that it applies its own law “to define the meaning of
prevailing party in the context of patent litigation.”1804 The Federal Circuit
then stated that “to be a prevailing party, one must ‘receive at least some
1795. Id. at 1373, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388-89 (quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1796. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (quoting Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic
Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1797. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1798. Id. at 1366, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354-55.
1799. Id. at 1366-67, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
1800. Id. at 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
1801. 364 F.3d 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1802. Id. at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473.
1803. Id. at 1319-20, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474.
1804. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474 (quoting Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie
Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1707, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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relief on the merits,’ which ‘alters . . . the legal relationship of the
parties.’”1805 The Federal Circuit held that in light of district court entry of
judgment of non-infringement and dismissal of invalidity counterclaims as
moot, defendant “is a prevailing party on a claim adjudicated by the district
court, even though it initially prevailed on the issue of invalidity in a
different forum.”1806 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded back to
the district court to determine whether attorney’s fees and costs should be
awarded given defendant’s status as the prevailing party.1807
In Power Mosfet Technologies, L.L.C. v. Siemens AG,1808 the Federal
Circuit held that a party who had all claims asserted against it dismissed
with prejudice was a prevailing party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(1).1809 The court explained that it applies its own law to
determine whether a party is prevailing, and explained that, under its law, a
“dismissal of a claim with prejudice . . . is a judgment on the merits.” 1810
Stephens v. Tech International1811 involved an appeal from a district
court’s grant of attorney’s fees to defendant under § 285.1812 The district
court based its award on findings that plaintiff’s infringement suit was
frivolous and in bad faith and its notification of a separate patent
application constituted litigation misconduct.1813 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit began its analysis by noting that exceptional cases under § 285
typically involve “inequitable conduct before the PTO, litigation
misconduct, vexatious and otherwise bad faith litigation, frivolous suit or
willful infringement.”1814 The Federal Circuit then explained that “[a]
frivolous infringement suit is one which the patentee knew or, on
reasonable investigation, should have known was baseless.”1815
Reviewing the record, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred in concluding that plaintiff’s suit was frivolous.1816 In particular, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that plaintiff’s theories of claim construction and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents were consistent with the
intrinsic evidence, expert testimony, and precedent.1817 The court also held
1805. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474 (quoting Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods.
v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001)).
1806. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474-75.
1807. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1475.
1808. 378 F.3d 1396, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1809. Id. at 1415-16, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
1810. Id. at 1416, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
1811. 393 F.3d 1269, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1812. Id. at 1273, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
1813. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
1814. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
1815. Id. at 1273-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372 (quoting Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessup
Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1816. Id. at 1274, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
1817. Id. at 1274-75, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373-74.
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that notifying defendant of pending application was not litigation
misconduct, but was well within plaintiff’s rights under 35 U.S.C. §
154.1818
5.

Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens
Co.1819 relaxed the standard for a pre-filing investigation from the court’s
prior decision in View Engineering Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.1820
Q-Pharma involved an appeal from a district court’s denial of Rule 111821
sanctions and attorney’s fees after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim
of infringement and agreed not to sue defendant in the future for
infringement of the asserted patent.1822 On appeal, defendant argued that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to award sanctions given
that plaintiff’s pre-suit claim construction was frivolous, plaintiff’s reliance
on defendant’s advertisements were not reasonable, and that plaintiff did
not take reasonable steps to test the accused product to determine whether
it was infringing.1823
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Federal
Circuit explained that “[i]n the context of patent infringement actions, we
have interpreted Rule 11 to require, at a minimum, that an attorney
interpret the asserted patent claims and compare the accused device with
those claims before filing a claim alleging infringement.”1824 Attempting to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by failing to levy
sanctions, defendant first argued that plaintiff never possessed a formal prefiling claim chart.1825 Rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit
explained that “a claim chart is not a requirement of a pre-filing
infringement analysis, as the owner, inventor, and/or drafter of a patent
ought to have a clear idea of what the patent covers without the formality
of a claim chart.”1826
The defendant also argued that sanctions were appropriate because
plaintiff’s pre-filing claim construction analysis was frivolous.1827 The
Federal Circuit again rejected defendant’s argument, reasoning that claim
construction is “not always an exact science, and it is not unusual for the
parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim
1818.
1819.
1820.
1821.
1822.
1823.
1824.
1825.
1826.
1827.

Id. at 1276, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
360 F.3d 1295, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
208 F.3d 981, 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
Q-Pharma, Inc., 360 F.3d at 1297-98, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03.
Id. at 1300, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
Id. at 1300-01, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1301, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
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language.”1828 The court thus concluded that defendant’s pre-filing
construction was not frivolous because it “followed the standard canons of
claim construction and was reasonably supported by the intrinsic
record.”1829
Defendant next contended that plaintiff’s pre-filing infringement analysis
was inadequate because it was premised only on plaintiff’s advertising
statements and did not include actual testing of the physical product.1830
The Federal Circuit explained that while plaintiff could have conducted a
more thorough investigation, the reliance on advertising statements and
product ingredients provided a sufficient basis for filing suit.1831
Defendant also contended that the suit was frivolous because plaintiff
should have known that the asserted claims were invalid in light of letters
from potential licensees questioning their validity.1832 The Federal Circuit
rejected this contention, observing that plaintiff
reasonably believed its patent to be valid in light of the statutory
presumption of validity . . . as well as licenses that several companies
took under the patent.
The . . . letters from accused infringers
questioning the validity of the [asserted] patent do not negate
[defendant’s] legal and factual bases for believing the patent to be
valid.1833

The Federal Circuit then distinguished its prior decision in View
Engineering from the circumstances on appeal. While explaining that View
Engineering “makes clear that reliance on advertising as a basis for filing
an infringement suit is not sufficient under Rule 11,”1834 the court limited
that decision to its facts by noting that “sanctions were warranted because
the patentee had not performed any claim construction analysis or an
infringement analysis prior to filing its counterclaim for infringement.”1835
By contrast, the court explained that defendant relied on both its claim
construction analysis and plaintiff’s advertisement information.1836 The
court further explained that
our case law makes clear that the key factor in determining whether a
patentee performed a reasonable pre-filing inquiry is the presence of an
infringement analysis . . . [a]nd an infringement analysis can simply
consist of a good faith, informed comparison of the claims of a patent

1828.
1829.
1830.
1831.
1832.
1833.
1834.
1835.
1836.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1301-02, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06.
Id. at 1303, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id. at 1302, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
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against the accused subject matter.1837

Defendant also argued that the district court abused its discretion in
denying attorney’s fees.1838 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s denial based on the same reasoning as it affirmed the court’s denial
of sanctions.1839 The Federal Circuit further reasoned that attorney’s fees
were properly denied because “we fail to see how a changed legal theory
that leads to the voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit can amount to bad faith
litigation.”1840

1837.
1838.
1839.
1840.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id. at 1303, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.

